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Post-Quantum Protecting the worlds information Cyber Security - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Jul 24, 2023 •458 likes •735 views

Post-Quantum Protecting the worlds information Cyber Security Issues to be considered when Implementing Fintech Solutions Contents Four Major Threats When Communicating Online

  1. Post-Quantum Protecting the world’s information Cyber Security Issues to be considered when Implementing Fintech Solutions 實施金融科技方案時 需考慮的網絡安全問題

  2. Contents Four Major Threats When Communicating Online • Key Considerations for Systems Implementation • Most Fundamental Control in Cyber Security • Fintech Implementation Triangle • Why Hong Kong? • www.post-quantum.com 2

  3. Four Major Threats When Communicating Online www.post-quantum.com 3

  4. Man-In-The-Middle Attacks www.post-quantum.com 4

  5. Four Major Threats When Communicating Online www.post-quantum.com 5

  6. Insider Threats www.post-quantum.com 6

  7. Insider Threats www.post-quantum.com 7

  8. Four Major Threats When Communicating Online www.post-quantum.com 8

  9. Transaction Authentication & Non-Repudiation www.post-quantum.com 9

  10. Transaction Authentication & Non-Repudiation www.post-quantum.com 10

  11. Transaction Authentication & Non-Repudiation www.post-quantum.com 11

  12. Four Major Threats When Communicating Online www.post-quantum.com 12

  13. Encryption Cracking www.post-quantum.com 13

  14. Encryption Cracking www.post-quantum.com 14

  15. Four Major Threats When Communicating Online www.post-quantum.com 15

  16. So Should We Give Up Then? Far from it! www.post-quantum.com 16

  17. Key Considerations for Systems Implementation Completeness • Accuracy • Validity • Timeliness • www.post-quantum.com 17

  18. Most Fundamental Control in Cyber Security Segregation of duties www.post-quantum.com 18

  19. Segregation of Duties A. Encrypted data has a master key B. The key is split and the fragments are which can be lost, stolen or abused shared between stakeholders C. A quorum of stakeholders D. After use the key is immediately is needed to unlock the data broken into fragments again for security www.post-quantum.com www.post-quantum.com 19 19

  20. Segregation of Duties Approver Approver Approver 1 2 3 3. Quorum request sent to Approvers 1. Need to 2. Request access sent encrypted Approver Approver Approver document 1 2 3 Requestor 1. Individual approvals given by Approvers 2. Quorum approval 3. Document access given given Requestor www.post-quantum.com 20

  21. Fintech Implementation Triangle www.post-quantum.com 21

  22. Why Hong Kong? www.post-quantum.com 22

  23. Why Hong Kong? www.post-quantum.com 23

  24. Why Hong Kong? Leading financial services, logistics and technology centre • Supportive government policies • World class physical and technology infrastructure • Flexible demographics • Highly adaptable workforce • Willingness to learn best practices • Welcoming in importing fintech and blockchain expertise • Close proximity to all major cities in Asia • www.post-quantum.com 24

  25. Is it Too Late for Hong Kong? Late but not too late • Minimum wasted costs so far • Learn from other people’s mistakes • Absorb world class expertise and knowledge transfer • Introduce best technologies and practices • Choose most ready technologies to implement NOW • Leapfrog directly into execution • www.post-quantum.com 25

  26. Thank you! Contact: Andersen Cheng, CEO 鄭毓輝 行政總裁 ac@post-quantum.com www.post-quantum.com 26

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