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POLI 437: International Relations of Latin America First 1/3 of class is over Time to honestly assess your class participation Send me an email before Tuesday point score in each category paragraph justifying score THIS WEEK Drug flows


  1. POLI 437: International Relations of Latin America

  2. First 1/3 of class is over Time to honestly assess your class participation Send me an email before Tuesday point score in each category paragraph justifying score

  3. THIS WEEK Drug flows Gangs and competition State & civilian responses to crime

  4. CORRIDOS IN MEXICO https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=55&v=rryDND06LHU&feature=emb_logo

  5. NARCO-CORRIDOS https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DRXUWwn86FE

  6. NARCO-NOVELAS https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0MlCfKSwUn0

  7. RELIGION

  8. NARCO -CULTURE Cultural obsession with depicting “narco” lifestyle in soaps, films, music Controversial: simply depicting, or glorifying? Is it exploitative of real suffering?

  9. Latin America has largely traded civil war violence for criminal violence Crime is a central topic today, especially with respect to violence

  10. NORTHERN TRIANGLE

  11. WHY SO VIOLENT? Three factors: Changing drug routes Weak/complicit states Org. competition

  12. Producers: Colombia, Bolivia, Peru Bulk of cocaine goes: Colombia/Ecuador —> Guatemala/Mexico —> US border Mostly boats, some air

  13. GROW IN COLOMBIA

  14. US SOUTHERN COMMAND

  15. 68% of all coca moves through Pacific

  16. CHANGING DRUG ROUTES Height of Pablo Escobar era (1980s), 75% of coca moved through Caribbean Massive US effort to shut down Caribbean transit moved routes west

  17. By 2010, over 80% was going through Central America Boat to CA —> cross border into Mexico —> cross into US Note: all our data is seizures ; might be lots we don’t know!

  18. Arguably one of the most violent countries in the world in 2000s

  19. Not as choice of a transit location for drug routes But scale of problem for region is huge $4 billion in cocaine passes through Guatemala, entire region spends $3 billion on fighting drug war

  20. But position along PA HWY + small coastline for parceling drugs Border with Guatemala completely porous

  21. VIDEO https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HGG7lRJJkJk

  22. The biggest moving piece for crime and violence in El Salvador are street gangs Why do gangs even exist? Why do people form gangs? State absence

  23. MS-13, biggest gang in El Salvador, formed in… Los Angeles Formed to protect Salvadorians immigrants from other gangs But why doesn't the state offer this protection? And why is protection even necessary?

  24. Due to political/moral/economic reasons, there are certain markets states won’t regulate Drugs Gambling Prostitution Illegal migration Prohibition means private agents have to conduct business without recourse to the state, police, or legal system

  25. Economic agents face a lot of vulnerability + uncertainty Coca producer in Peru can’t sue a buyer who won’t pay Buyers can eliminate competition, not compete over price Product not subject to common standards or regulation

  26. Large % of drug transactions are rip-offs Cannot discriminate using price!

  27. How do you do this without a state to enforce property rights, contracts? Wield violence individually Repeat interactions, networks Might work at small-level, but scale to entirely of supply route Private actors might be better if someone can establish monopoly of violence

  28. Gangs are less like firms and more like proto-states Fill power-vacuum left by states in areas it can’t / won't regulate Offer protection/enforcement to private actors in exchange for rents (“tax”) Retaliation/ Protect exchange Prevent ripoffs mediation

  29. Of course, with monopoly, gangs extort everyone Extorting bus routes is a huge business for gangs in El Salvador Bus lines from gang-controlled neighborhoods systematically extorted at tune of $26 million/year

  30. Bus companies have incorporated extortion into their business model

  31. Gangs enforce payment through violence 2014-2015, 800 bus workers murdered “Most dangerous job in the world”

  32. Why violence? Competition over territory MS-13 vs. Calle-18 Drug dealing Extortion Mostly urban areas, ~ 30k members the capital

  33. Why territory? New members Rents Extortion And why just one gang? Pricing power = extract monopoly prices

  34. What factors increase territorial competition? Existing “agreement” no longer Changes in relative power viable Changing drug routes Changes in rents Changes in organizational Death of leaders, consolidation of org. structure

  35. Mexican anti-narcotic efforts shift drug routes

  36. 2007 - 2010: Sinaloa Cartel suffers multiple decapitations Jesus Reylando Ignacio Coronel Sandra Ávila Beltrán Zambada Villareal Explosion in levels of violence around this time

  37. TAKEAWAYS Central America is transit point in drug flows from South to North America Illicit nature of drugs means gangs push to fill power vacuum Territorial competition is a key source of violence in CA today, esp. El Salvador

  38. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-51439020

  39. Weak/complicit states key part of crime in Latin America How does Yashar describe the legal system in El Salvador? Mix of ineffective and predatory

  40. INEFFECTIVE POLICING Sources of inefficiency in El Salvador’s police Weak infrastructure Bad performance incentives Corruption

  41. Prisons are overcrowded, run by gangs Substantial organized crime takes place in prisons

  42. SAO PAULO’S PRIMEIRO COMANDO DA CAPITAL (PCC) Extremely organized, bureaucratized Synchronized riots across prisons to demand concessions

  43. “Consignment” model of selling drugs vs. free-lance Alleviates credit constraints on dealers, but creates agency problems

  44. Overcome agency problems via meticulous record-keeping

  45. How does gang enforce contracts outside of prison? Evidence that prison actually helps gangs conduct business Gang members can expect they or someone near them will end up in prison, where there’s no protection from gang Incentive to not cheat the gang, pay back debts, etc.

  46. Police lack equipment/training for processing homicides Homicide clearance rates = low single-digits Reduces disincentives to murder

  47. Very low street-level presence, absenteeism high Low disincentives to commit crime, low crime- reporting Though some research to suggest foot police just push crime "around the corner”

  48. Not great pay, but bigger problem is low wage growth prospects Best paid police - worst paid police = 10% Rest of public sector ~ 80% Weak relationship between pay, promotions, and performance

  49. One response has been to “militarize” police; SWAT-like units What’s the trade-off here? Firepower, human rights abuses Not just “inaccuracy”; abuse of power —> power asymmetry, frustration, dehumanizing “enemy"

  50. Even while ineffective, police are also predatory and corrupt In CA, some of this is legacy of the civil wars Police forces inherited bad institutions + ideology from civil war period Corrupt military officers, soldiers, involved in drug/weapons trade in police force

  51. NOT JUST POOR COUNTRIES

  52. Lots of crime, violence; police are ineffective or corrupt How do citizens navigate this? How does living in these contexts shape people and their perspectives?

  53. LYNCHINGS Spontaneous mobs, organized groups More likely in places where people had to defend themselves in civil war Why some communities but not others? Which crimes? Is this deterrence or revenge? Stay tuned for data, maybe later in semester

  54. Wealthy living in large urban areas have retreated into heavily fortified “gated communities” Private security, internal malls, shops, spas, etc.

  55. What might some of the consequences be of this increased segregation?

  56. 1 in 5 Latin Americans report being victims of crime (Bateson) What effect does victimization have on people? mobilizes them to seek change, vote more, etc. Support punitive responses even at the expense of rule of law

  57. “tough on crime” (“mano dura”) policies are at center of politics in LA Discretionary crimes, reduction in procedural rights, use of military ARENA held power in El Salvador for almost two decades in part on appeal to voters wanting harsher punishment

  58. Bolsonaro also ran on mano dura policy Idea that there’s tradeoff between fighting crime and democratic rule

  59. There’s a class dimension to these beliefs Support in many cases increases in wealth But lower-middle and middle-class often key parts of “mano dura” coalitions Why?

  60. Part of answer is middle-class can’t afford the protections of the rich + won’t bear brunt of "mano dura” Another part might be a sense that they’ve “done what they were supposed to” and resent dealing with crime

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