Introduction Overview Propositions and Propositions Distinguish two construals of declaratives. I As a proposition in the analytic philosophical sense. I As a proposition in the ordinary business sense. Paul Dekker Clarify relativist discourse. ILLC/Department of Philosophy, Amsterdam I That of nominal disagreement. I That of useful agreement. Workshop Use and limitations of theoretical linguistics. Bridging Formal and Conceptual Semantics I Relativized understanding of truth-conditional semantics. August 6–10, 2018 I Publicly engaged understanding of conceptual semantics. ESSLLI18 Bridging Workshop Propositions and Propositions Paul Dekker 1 / 21 ESSLLI18 Bridging Workshop Propositions and Propositions Paul Dekker 2 / 21 Propositions Propositions The World We Live In (1) Knowing the World In order to state a proposition , we must assume that we agree on the Bedeutung of the logical and non-logical terms employed. The world that we live in figures as the object of our science, knowledge, thoughts, theories, and assertions. We, however, only need to assume agreement on a joint determination of the Bedeutung in circumstances defined by the Findings and conjectures about what it is or must be like are occasion of use, and perhaps unspecific or undefined in others. stated in what are called (capital) propositions here. It can, thus, be contextually, and publicly, clear and determinate Propositions are the things that typically are true or false , what propositions are stated . possibly neither, but impossibly both. I what situations are said to obtain, I which individuals are recognized, I and are said to stand in which relations, A Proposition is true ( false ) i ff the world is (not) as it is I etc. presented to be, and such can be taken to define the proposition. Philosophers like Aristotle, Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, . . . , are ‘invariantists’ You understand a proposition i ff you know what the world is in so far as they are interested in truth about this world, and, therefore, shun like i ff it is true . vague and ambiguous and other such discourse to begin with. I believe that this makes sense. ESSLLI18 Bridging Workshop Propositions and Propositions Paul Dekker 3 / 21 ESSLLI18 Bridging Workshop Propositions and Propositions Paul Dekker 4 / 21
Propositions Propositions The World We Live In (2) Defining the World We state propositions in the hortative or jussive mood, or issue generics or recipes or definitions or declaratives . The world we live in is also one of our own making. Indicative sentences ( declaratives ) are also easily used this way. We are told how things are viewed, classified, defined, done and handled. This is your desk. / This piece is state of the art. / We attack tomorrow morning. / You agree to our use of cookies. / Birds The articulation of how things are is staged in what I do not know fly and boys don’t cry. / He is not welcome anymore. / a better general term for than that of (emphatic) propositions . The world is everything that is the case. Propositions typically are agreed with or disagreed upon , possibly We stage propositions when teaching someone a language, a logic, neither, possibly both. and in other kinds of training (mental or otherwise). Philosophers like Herakleitos, Husserl, Sapir, Derrida, . . . are ‘relativists’ in so Agreement consists in our verbal and non-verbal acts, experiences, far as they are interested in men being (or not even being) the measure of interests and feelings aligning with the world as characterized. things, and therefore shun an absolute and dogmatic objective. I believe that this makes sense, too. ESSLLI18 Bridging Workshop Propositions and Propositions Paul Dekker 5 / 21 ESSLLI18 Bridging Workshop Propositions and Propositions Paul Dekker 6 / 21 Propositions Propositions One World Bridging ‘Worlds’ Empirical hypotheses ( propositions ) can be construed as propositions for articulating our evidence, viewing nature. Of course it is one and the same world we live in. (Davidson) Moral claims ( propositions ) can be construed as propositions “The world we live in” is not ambiguous like “The tree Muriel about a public good, facts in a moral universe. painted,” but unambiguous like “The dagger Max saw.” (Husserl) If a proposition is agreed upon , it achieves the status of a ( true ) In our Lebenswelt, is and ought are not categorically distinct, only proposition . practicably. (Gibson) If the terms of a proposition are not agreed upon , it at best If knowledge is more general, it is just less directly applicable . achieves the status of a proposition . (Aristotle) Philosophical definitions, rules of grammar, evaluative judgments, Propositions and Propositions are somewhat exchangeable. . . . , they can all be appreciated both ways, and that can be a source of confusion, practical as well as philosophical. ESSLLI18 Bridging Workshop Propositions and Propositions Paul Dekker 7 / 21 ESSLLI18 Bridging Workshop Propositions and Propositions Paul Dekker 8 / 21
Relativism Relativism Faultless Disagreement Faultless Disagreement Evaluative language like personal-taste talk, moral speech and Evaluative language like personal-taste talk, moral speech and aesthetic discourse, faces the challenge of ‘faultless disagreement’: aesthetic discourse, faces the challenge of ‘faultless disagreement’: I two world-mates believing contradictory ‘propositions’ without any I two world-mates believing contradictory ‘propositions’ without any one of them being wrong. [Max K¨ olbel, 2004, “Faultless Disagree- one of them being wrong. [Max K¨ olbel, 2004, “Faultless Disagree- ment”, Proc. of the Aristotelian Society 104, pp. 53–73.] ment”, Proc. of the Aristotelian Society 104, pp. 53–73.] This piece of cake is tasty. No, it is not. Yes, it is. This piece of music is funky. No, it is not. Yes, it is. ESSLLI18 Bridging Workshop Propositions and Propositions Paul Dekker 9 / 21 ESSLLI18 Bridging Workshop Propositions and Propositions Paul Dekker 9 / 21 Relativism Relativism Faultless Disagreement Faultless Disagreement Evaluative language like personal-taste talk, moral speech and Evaluative language like personal-taste talk, moral speech and aesthetic discourse, faces the challenge of ‘faultless disagreement’: aesthetic discourse, faces the challenge of ‘faultless disagreement’: I two world-mates believing contradictory ‘propositions’ without any I two world-mates believing contradictory ‘propositions’ without any one of them being wrong. [Max K¨ one of them being wrong. [Max K¨ olbel, 2004, “Faultless Disagree- olbel, 2004, “Faultless Disagree- ment”, Proc. of the Aristotelian Society 104, pp. 53–73.] ment”, Proc. of the Aristotelian Society 104, pp. 53–73.] This pretentious nobody is an expert? Yes, he is. No, he is not. This piece of reasoning is valid. No, it is not. Yes, it is. ¬¬ φ | = φ ESSLLI18 Bridging Workshop Propositions and Propositions Paul Dekker 9 / 21 ESSLLI18 Bridging Workshop Propositions and Propositions Paul Dekker 9 / 21
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