On the Exploration of Model-Based Support for DO-178C-COMPLIANT AIRBORNE SOFTWARE D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C E R T I F I C A T I O N Andres Paz and Ghizlane El Boussaidi École de Technologie Supérieure – Université du Québec WoSoCer2016 The 6th IEEE International Workshop on Software Certification WoSoCer2016
Outline • Research context • Related work • Research objective • Proposal and results • Conclusions and future work WoSoCer2016 2
DO-178C • Most recent version of the Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification • Set of required practices to produce software that is validated and verified for its airworthiness . • Certification is evidence-based → data items • e.g., plans, standards, software requirements data, design descriptions, verification cases and trace data. WoSoCer2016 3
New in DO-178C • DO-178C now includes particular practices for contemporary technologies and techniques. • Model-based development and verification • Object oriented technologies and related techniques • Formal methods WoSoCer2016 4
New in DO-178C • DO-178C now includes particular practices for contemporary technologies and techniques. • Model-based development and verification • Object oriented technologies and related techniques What is the level of support for DO-178C-compliant software development • Formal methods and certification provided by existing model-based approaches? WoSoCer2016 5
Outline • Research context • Related work • Research objective • Proposal and results • Conclusions and future work WoSoCer2016 6
Some Existing Literature Reviews Study Objective Pros Cons Huhn et Review UML profiles for supporting Takes into account norms and standards on Only UML-based approaches. al. , 2007 software safety design and software development for safety-critical assurance. systems. Zoughbi et Review UML-based solutions to Information requirements specification with Only UML-based approaches. al. , 2011 support modeling under DO-178B. 54 information modeling requirements Focus on DO-178B. extracted from DO-178B. Focus only on requirements and design. Nair et al. , Review approaches for provision of Taxonomy of evidence of compliance with Some evidences missing in the 2014 evidence for safety certification. safety standards. taxonomy (e.g., software Identified techniques used for structuring standards, trace data). evidence. Model-based support only for structuring evidence. De la Vara Review (briefly) model-based Classification based on modeling streams. Brief and only classifying et al. , 2016 approaches for the specification of approaches as regulation modeling, safety-critical systems aimed at standard-specific modeling, safety compliance. standard-independent modeling. Biggs et Review existing approaches for Classification based on purpose. Model-based support only for al. , 2016 modeling system safety properties. Review support for modeling safety hazards. modeling hazards. WoSoCer2016 7
Outline • Research context • Related work • Research objective • Proposal and results • Conclusions and future work WoSoCer2016 8
Research Objective • Assess the support of model-based approaches for the production and certification aspects of software for airborne systems in compliance with DO-178C. • Provide a comprehensive tool that allows the assessment of compliance with DO-178C. • Compile a knowledge base of existing model-based approaches. WoSoCer2016 9
Outline • Research context • Related work • Research objective • Proposal and results • Conclusions and future work WoSoCer2016 10
Characterization Framework Model-Based Approach for the Production and Certification of Airborne Software in compliance with DO-178C Legend: Feature Mandatory DO-178C Information Philosophy Usage Optional Coverage Handling Or-relationship Alternative Planning Development Verification WoSoCer2016 11
Reviewed Model-Based Approaches • Architectural design and analysis: • AADL, 2006; Wu et al. , 2015; OMEGA-RT, 2006; MARTE, 2011. • Testing: • Stallbaum et al. , 2010; RT-Tester, 2013. • System specification: • RDAL, 2011; Zoughbi et al. , 2011; Nejati et al. , 2012; Biggs et al. , 2016. • Meta-approaches: • Panesar-Walawege et al. , 2013; de la Vara et al. , 2016. WoSoCer2016 12
Analysis of Model-Based Approaches • Planning Software life cycle Data items Legend: ⊕ Provides support ⊖ Provides reduced support ⊙ Enables provisioning support WoSoCer2016 13
Analysis of Model-Based Approaches • Planning Software life cycle Data items subactivities successor * * * ReferenceActivity Legend: predecessor ⊕ Provides support user * * producer ⊖ Provides reduced support ⊙ Enables provisioning inputArtifact outputArtifact * * support ReferenceArtifact Fragment of de la Vara et al. ’s metamodel WoSoCer2016 14
Analysis of Model-Based Approaches Legend: ⊕ Provides ⊖ ⊙ Provides Enables • Requirements support reduced provisioning support support Software functional requirements LLR-Source Code Derived requirements HLR-LLR WoSoCer2016 15
Analysis of Model-Based Approaches Legend: ⊕ Provides ⊖ ⊙ Provides Enables • Requirements support reduced provisioning support support Software functional requirements LLR-Source Code Derived requirements HLR-LLR isRequirementOf references Rationale * 1..* references Specification Requirement Deviation derivedFrom 1..* * references 1..* requirementGroups 0..* RequirementsGroup Requirement Partition requirements Fragment of Zoughbi et al. ’s UML profile Fragment of RDAL WoSoCer2016 16
Analysis of Model-Based Approaches Legend: ⊕ Provides ⊖ ⊙ Provides Enables • Requirements support reduced provisioning support support Failure detection Quality attributes Timing Safety monitoring WoSoCer2016 17
Analysis of Model-Based Approaches Legend: ⊕ Provides ⊖ ⊙ Provides Enables • Requirements support reduced provisioning support support Failure detection Quality attributes Timing Safety monitoring deriveReqt Requirement reqDetection ContextDetector 0..* HarmContext detect 1..* Fragment of Biggs et al. ’s SysML profile WoSoCer2016 18
Analysis of Model-Based Approaches Legend: ⊕ Provides ⊖ ⊙ Provides Enables • Requirements support reduced provisioning support support Deviations Precision and accuracy criteria Interfaces Modes of operation WoSoCer2016 19
Analysis of Model-Based Approaches • Software architecture Software structure Data flow Legend: ⊕ Provides support ⊖ Provides reduced support ⊙ Enables provisioning support WoSoCer2016 20
Analysis of Model-Based Approaches • Software architecture Software structure Data flow supplier * * client Legend: port SafetyPort SafetyComponent Component ⊕ Provides support 1..* ⊖ Provides reduced support 1..* interface ⊙ Enables provisioning * support SafetyInterface SafetyChannel safetyChannel Fragment of Wu et al. ’s UML profile WoSoCer2016 21
Analysis of Model-Based Approaches • Software architecture Partitioning Control flow Resource limitations Legend: ⊕ Provides support ⊖ Provides reduced support ⊙ Enables provisioning support WoSoCer2016 22
Analysis of Model-Based Approaches • Software architecture Partitioning Control flow Resource limitations thread data_processing Legend: features 20 ms ⊕ Provides raw_speed_in : in data port ; support speed_out : out data port ; ⊖ Provides data_processing reduced properties support Period => 20 ms; ⊙ Enables end data_processing; provisioning support Fragment of an AADL example WoSoCer2016 23
Analysis of Model-Based Approaches • Verification Test cases Legend: ⊕ Provides support ⊖ Provides reduced support ⊙ Enables provisioning support WoSoCer2016 24
Analysis of Model-Based Approaches • Verification Verification results Expected Obtained Legend: ⊕ Provides support ⊖ Provides reduced support ⊙ Enables provisioning support WoSoCer2016 25
Analysis of Model-Based Approaches • Verification Analyses Coverage Traceability Legend: ⊕ Provides support ⊖ Provides reduced support ⊙ Enables provisioning support WoSoCer2016 26
Analysis of Model-Based Approaches • Verification Analyses Coverage Traceability SoftwareComponent SourceCodeStructure verification 0..* 0..* coverage Legend: TestModelElement ⊕ Provides support ⊖ Provides reduced 0..* satisfaction reference 0..* support ⊙ Enables provisioning Requirement Interface SafetyRationale support 0..* isRequirementOf Fragment of Stallbaum et al. ’s UML profile WoSoCer2016 27
Analysis of Model-Based Approaches • Verification Traces Reqmts.-Test cases (TC) / TC-Test procedures (TP) / TP-Test results Legend: ⊕ Provides support ⊖ Provides reduced support ⊙ Enables provisioning support WoSoCer2016 28
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