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On the Bit Security of Cryptographic Primitives M E T R A S 7 . 7 M Daniele Micciancio Michael Walter UCSD IST Austria eprint.iacr.org/2018/077 Security Security Adversary Game 1 Security Security Adversary Game


  1. On the Bit Security of Cryptographic Primitives M E T R A S 7 . 7 M Daniele Micciancio Michael Walter UCSD IST Austria eprint.iacr.org/2018/077

  2. Security Security Adversary Game 1

  3. Security Security Adversary Game 1

  4. Security Security Adversary Game A's resources and advantage 1

  5. Proofs of Security Precision Simplicity 2

  6. Proofs of Security Asymptotic Proofs Precision Simplicity 2

  7. Proofs of Security Concrete Asymptotic Security Proofs Precision Simplicity 2

  8. Proofs of Security Concrete Asymptotic Security Proofs Bit Security Precision Simplicity 2

  9. Proofs of Security Concrete Asymptotic Security Proofs Bit Security Precision Simplicity A's resources A's advantage 2

  10. Adversarial Advantage 3

  11. Adversarial Advantage 1) Search game: 3

  12. Adversarial Advantage 1) Search game: 2) Decision game: 3

  13. Adversarial Advantage 1) Search game: A's resources constant A's advantage 2) Decision game: 3

  14. Adversarial Advantage 1) Search game: A's resources constant A's advantage 2) Decision game: A's resources not constant A's advantage 3

  15. Adversarial Advantage 1) Search game: A's resources constant A's advantage 2) Decision game: A's resources not constant A's advantage no bit secure PRG: 3

  16. Adversarial Advantage, contd. 4

  17. Adversarial Advantage, contd. [HILL'99] 4

  18. Adversarial Advantage, contd. [HILL'99] 4

  19. Adversarial Advantage, contd. [HILL'99] [GL'89,L'93] 4

  20. Adversarial Advantage, contd. [HILL'99] [GL'89,L'93] 4

  21. Adversarial Advantage, contd. [HILL'99] [GL'89,L'93] 4

  22. Adversarial Advantage, contd. [HILL'99] [GL'89,L'93] 4

  23. Adversarial Advantage, contd. [HILL'99] [GL'89,L'93] 4

  24. Adversarial Advantage, contd. [HILL'99] [GL'89,L'93] 4

  25. General De fi nition 5

  26. General De fi nition - unify search and decision games 5

  27. General De fi nition - unify search and decision games - characterize information gain of A 5

  28. General De fi nition - unify search and decision games - characterize information gain of A - specialize to search and decision games 5

  29. General De fi nition - unify search and decision games - characterize information gain of A - specialize to search and decision games "right" advantage: 5

  30. General De fi nition - unify search and decision games - characterize information gain of A - specialize to search and decision games "right" advantage: Search 5

  31. General De fi nition - unify search and decision games - characterize information gain of A - specialize to search and decision games "right" advantage: Search Decision 5

  32. Security Reductions: One-Way vs Pseudorandom OW PR 6

  33. Security Reductions: One-Way vs Pseudorandom OW PR 6

  34. Security Reductions: One-Way vs Pseudorandom bit secure OWF implies GL hardcore bit is bit pseudorandom [L'93] OW PR 6

  35. Security Reductions: One-Way vs Pseudorandom bit secure OWF implies GL hardcore bit is bit pseudorandom [L'93] OW PR 6

  36. Security Reductions: One-Way vs Pseudorandom bit secure OWF implies GL hardcore bit is bit pseudorandom [L'93] OW PR bit secure PRG is also bit secure OWF 6

  37. Security Reductions: Further Results 7

  38. Security Reductions: Further Results - Encryption: IND implies OW 7

  39. Security Reductions: Further Results - Encryption: IND implies OW - Hybrid Argument 7

  40. Security Reductions: Further Results - Encryption: IND implies OW - Hybrid Argument - Security for Approximate Samplers with Less Precision 7

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