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www.npec-web.org DTRA-ASCO Fort Belvoir, VA April 21, 2009 1 - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Nuclear Abolition and the Next Arms Race A Presentation by Henry Sokolski Executive Director, The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center www.npec-web.org DTRA-ASCO Fort Belvoir, VA April 21, 2009 1 Good News: Declining US/Russian

  1. Nuclear Abolition and the Next Arms Race A Presentation by Henry Sokolski Executive Director, The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center www.npec-web.org DTRA-ASCO Fort Belvoir, VA April 21, 2009 1

  2. Good News: Declining US/Russian Nuclear Deployments* Operational tactical and strategic nuclear warheads since 1965 ������ ������ ������ ������ ������ ���� ������ ������ ������ ������ ������ ����� � ���� ���� ���� ���� 2

  3. The Hope Ahead: 1,000 Warheads on the Road to Zero (World with 1,000 US operationally deployed strategic warheads) 3

  4. Bad News: Others Are Coming Up Operationally Deployed Strategic Warheads 6000 5000 US 4000 Russia France 3000 China UK Israel 2000 India Pakistan 1000 0 2008 2016 2020 4

  5. What’s in the Wings: Growing Plutonium Stockpiles for States to Ramp Up or Break Out Frank Von Hippel et al., Global Fissile Materials Report 2008 5

  6. And Plenty of Weapons Uranium for Weapons States to Enlarge Their Weapons Arsenals Frank Von Hippel, Global Fissile Materials Report 2008 6

  7. CTBT Current concerns center on whether or not this treaty will enter into force; what Russian and China think it might ban; and how verifiable it might be given Russian and Chinese interest in low blast weapons. Bigger issue may be how necessary testing is for states wishing to acquire a nominal bomb. Also, how relevant might a CTBT for restraining states with advanced nuclear weapons interested in building new, over-engineered weapons designs 7

  8. FMCT Current debate focuses on whether this treaty will ever come into force; how verifiable it will be; and if it will create a double standard for verifying non-weapons and weapons states’ civilian nuclear fuel making plants Bigger question may be how relevant this treaty is to arresting states from acquiring additional nuclear weapons from existing nuclear weapons material stockpiles or from legitimate civilian stockpiles of separated plutonium and nuclear fuel making plants 8

  9. More START Debate will likely focus on what the appropriate level of Congressional consent should be and what US must concede to Russia on tactical nuclear weapons and nonnuclear weapons to conclude a follow-on to START Bigger question may be will others follow in reducing or be goaded on by US-Russian reductions to catch up 9

  10. Current Horizontal Proliferation Seems Manageable (With DPRK Disarming and Iran Nonnuclear) 10

  11. Number of States or Regions that Have Significant Civil Nuclear Capabilities Is Limited 11

  12. What Nuclear Enthusiasts Are Planning � � ��� � � � � � � � � ��� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � ���� � ������� ���������� ����������������� ���������� ������������ ����������� ����������������� ����������� ������������

  13. Middle Eastern Countries Intent on Building Power Reactors by 2030 � Turkey (US, France, Rus .) � Qatar (France) � Egypt (US, Fr. PRC, Rus.) � Tunisia � S. Arabia, (Fr., US, Rus.)* � Syria (DPRK?, Russia?) � UAE (France)* � Libya (US, France � Yemen Russia ) � Morocco (France) � Algeria ( Rus., Fr., US) � Jordan (US, France, Rus. ) � Iran ( Russia ) � Applauded by Israeli officials as an “announcement directed against Iran” ( ) Countries that have initialed or are discussing nuclear cooperation to build power reactors 13 13

  14. A Potential Problem: Power Reactors Used for Nuclear Weapons Material Production • US Watts Bar, Sequoyah’s reactor units 1 and 2,(LWRs), tritium for US nuclear weapons • Pakistani KANUPP, (PHWR) pu diversion prior to 1982 for 1998 test weapon Nuclear Express, p.258 • Russian RMBK reactors • French EDF series (at Chinon, St. Laurent, and Bugey) • British Magnox reactors at Calder Hall and Chapelcross (fuel grade Pu) • Indian unsafeguarded CANDU reactors

  15. Yet Another Worry: “Peaceful” Reactors As a Cover for Weapons Activities -- the Iranian Case � Bill Clinton and John Bolton agreed Bushehr was being used as a procurement cover for other weapons-related nuclear projects (enrichment, HWR, etc.) � Oct 10, 2008 NYT reported a Russian implosion expert “visited” Iran. Bushehr will soon have 2,600 Russian technicians. � Dr. Prasad of India believed to have transferred tritium extraction technology useful for nuclear weapons “boosting” on “safety” assistance visits to Bushehr � Hundreds of Iranians trained in Russia and elsewhere on the entire fuel cycle � US and EU are still hostage to Russian “assurances” that nuclear transfers “outside of Bushehr” will cease � Dingell letter and GAO study on the completeness of Bush explanation of Russian proliferation activities in Iran 15 15

  16. The Russian Are Coming � Lower prices than US or France � No requirement for accident coverage for any of its nuclear controlled goods � Looser control requirements than the US, access to sensitive technology and experts � With reported, projected cooperation with Siemens, high- quality assurance products 16 16

  17. Managing Proliferation Risks In the Middle East: Distrust and Strike � 13 Military Strikes against IAEA member nuclear projects since 1980 � 11 against safeguarded reactors since 1980 � 1980 Iran against Osirak � 1981 Israel against Osirak � 1980-1985 Seven Iraqi strikes against Bushehr � 1990 US against Osirak � 2003 US against Osirak � 1 Iraqi Scud attack attempted against Diamona � 1 Israeli strike against Syria’s Reactor 17 17

  18. But Reactors Will be Safeguarded LWRs. Aren’t They “Proliferation Resistant”? 18 18 18

  19. Perhaps, but Not Enough: Estimated Yields for Different Bomb Technologies Using LWR Pu (Hubbard) �� �������!�����!��"#�$ �� %���#!���!�&!��� �� '���#�� �� �� �#�"���!����#�!�& �� � ���!��!'���#�� � � � (�#$'�')#!���!��� � ��&!��!���!'���#�� ������� ������� ������� ������� ���� �� �! � ��� ��� �� 19 19

  20. Small, Covert Reprocessing Plant --20 or More Bombs/Month from Spent Fuel < 10-day startup, 1 bomb’s-worth-a-day production rate 20 20 20

  21. Fresh LWR Fuel Is A Worry Too Using Natural Uranium, Iran’s Uranium Bomb Takes Nearly a Year � 4,000 swus needed to convert natural uranium into a bomb’s worth (20 kgs) of HEU, 2.5 SWUs/P1centrifuge and 3,000 machines operating with batch recycling Using 4.8% enriched LWR fuel, only 4 to 13 Weeks Are Needed � Tons of fresh LWR fuel shipped to Bushehr every 12-18 months and loaded over a period of weeks, affording opportunities for gradual or abrupt diversion. � Crushing, heating, and fluorinating the ceramic fresh fuel pellets is all that’s needed to get 4.8% enriched UF6 feed. Using this as feed, you need to expend as little as 1/5 th the effort or time to enrich it to get one bomb’s worth � Iran could conceivably beat the inspections system: IAEA inspections are at Natanz at most once a month and sometimes are every three months 21

  22. Detecting Illicit Nuclear Fuel Making: A Record of Regret � Taiwanese hot cell activity–detected after begun � RoK weapons efforts—ditto � Algerian fuel diversions detected—after they occurred Natanz –detected after 18 years through Humit � Early North Korean reprocessing campaigns – debated through 1991 within US intelligence community -- a textile plant? � North Korean uranium enrichment efforts – US claim, still in doubt � Operational Iraqi EMIS – US detected after war using UNSCOM � Libyan centrifuges – confirmed after delivered � Syrian production reactor– US detected after near completion; reprocessing plant not found 22 22

  23. But Can’t the IAEA Safeguard Systems Prevent Fresh and Spent Nuclear Fuel Diversions? 23 23

  24. Not Unless They Are Upgraded � Of IAEA’s ~1,200 remote nuclear inspection cameras, nearly 800 still have no near-real-time feedback. Virtually all of the countries of concern have no near-real-time feedback � IAEA internal review of May 2005 found in that “Over the past 6 years, there have been 12 occasions when facility lights were turned off for a period greater than 30 hours ” See http://www.npec- web.org/Frameset.asp?PageType=Single&PDFFile=20070731-NPEC- ReportOnIaeaSafeguardsSystem&PDFFolder=Reports � Of those ~ 400 IAEA cameras that have near-time feedback today, many depend on internet connections that can be interrupted � US State Dept. officials requested NPEC self-censor 2 scenarios for spent fuel rod diversions that could evade IAEA detection entirely. Similar scenarios, it turns out, were described elsewhere on the web by IAEA’s own Safeguards advisory group chairman . See http://www.npec- web.org/Frameset.asp?PageType=Single&PDFFile=20041022-GilinskyEtAl- LWR&PDFFolder=Essays 24 24 24

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