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Malicious Domain Name Detection System By Auke Zwaan DNS DNS DNS Give me google. gle.nl nl DNS Give me google. gle.nl nl Okay. 64.233. 4.233.166.9 66.94 Research Question Is it possible to detect ma malic iciou ious do domain


  1. Malicious Domain Name Detection System By Auke Zwaan

  2. DNS

  3. DNS

  4. DNS Give me google. gle.nl nl

  5. DNS Give me google. gle.nl nl Okay. 64.233. 4.233.166.9 66.94

  6. Research Question Is it possible to detect ma malic iciou ious do domain ins by analyzing interrelations between DN DNS reso esolver ers and blackli acklist sted ed do doma main ins?

  7. One giant DNS dataset  All DNS requests done to ns1.dns.nl on January 6, 2016  170M+ DNS Queries (+-7GB)

  8. DNS Data

  9. DNS Data

  10. DNS Data

  11. DNS Data

  12. DNS Data

  13. DNS Data

  14. DNS Data

  15. DNS Data

  16. DNS Data

  17. Nice, but what is a ‘ ma malicious icious domain main name me ’?

  18. Initial blacklist  joewein.de LLC: 424 domains  SIDN Labs Sinkhole: 15 domains  Internet Storm Center (SANS): 14 domains  MalwareDomainList.com: 6 domains Total 459 domains

  19. Poten enti tial ally DNS da DN data ta Mal alici icious ous X Blac Bl ackli klist st = Do Domain ins

  20. Processing the data Sour urce ce Target rget Time mestam stamp 192.168.0.105 google.nl 1452091187 192.168.0.106 uva.nl 1452091187 192.168.0.232 nu.nl 1452091187 145.100.104.208 os3.nl 1452091187 192.168.0.108 bdcrqgonzmwuehky.nl 1452091187 145.100.104.208 hzmksreiuojy.nl 1452091187 145.100.104.208 xjpakmdcfuqe.nl 1452091187

  21. Processing the data Sou ource ce Target rget 192.168.0.105 google.nl 192.168.0.106 uva.nl 192.168.0.232 nu.nl 145.100.104.208 os3.nl 192.168.0.108 bdcrqgonzmwuehky.nl 145.100.104.208 hzmksreiuojy.nl 145.100.104.208 xjpakmdcfuqe.nl

  22. Processing the data Sou ource ce Target rget 192.168.0.105 google.nl 192.168.0.106 uva.nl 192.168.0.232 nu.nl 145.100.104.208 os3.nl 192.168.0.108 bdcrqgonzmwuehky.nl 145.100.104.208 hzmksreiuojy.nl 145.100.104.208 xjpakmdcfuqe.nl

  23. Grouping queries, suspicious resolvers only Sou ource ce Target rget 145.100.104.208 os3.nl hzmksreiuojy.nl xjpakmdcfuqe.nl aanrechtblad-kopen.nl 192.168.0.108 bdcrqgonzmwuehky.nl replicarolex.nl google.nl

  24. Flagging malicious domains Sou ource ce Target rget Ma Malicious licious 145.100.104.208 os3.nl Unknown hzmksreiuojy.nl Yes xjpakmdcfuqe.nl Yes aanrechtblad-kopen.nl Unknown 192.168.0.108 bdcrqgonzmwuehky.nl Yes replicarolex.nl Unknown google.nl Unknown

  25. Processing the data Sou ource ce Ma Malicious licious Un Unkno known wn 145.100.104.208 2 2 192.168.0.108 1 2 192.168.0.106 1 6 192.168.0.105 1 5

  26. Defining the mal alic iciousness iousness ra ratio io 𝑁𝑏𝑚𝑗𝑑𝑗𝑝𝑣𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑆𝑏𝑢𝑗𝑝 = 𝑂𝑣𝑛𝑐𝑓𝑠 𝑝𝑔 𝑟𝑣𝑓𝑠𝑗𝑓𝑡 𝑢𝑝 𝒏𝒃𝒎𝒋𝒅𝒋𝒑𝒗𝒕 𝒆𝒑𝒏𝒃𝒋𝒐𝒕 𝑂𝑣𝑛𝑐𝑓𝑠 𝑝𝑔 𝑟𝑣𝑓𝑠𝑗𝑓𝑡 𝑢𝑝 𝒗𝒐𝒍𝒐𝒑𝒙𝒐 𝒆𝒑𝒏𝒃𝒋𝒐𝒕

  27. Processing the data Sou ource ce Ma Malicious licious Un Unkno known wn Ratio tio 145.100.104.208 2 2 1.0 1.0 192.168.0.108 1 2 0.5 192.168.0.106 1 6 0.167 67 192.168.0.105 1 4 0.25 25 192.168.0.232 4 300 0.013

  28. Assumption 1 A ma malicious icious res esolv lver er is a resolver for which the maliciousness ratio ≥ 0.25

  29. Processing the data Sou ource ce Ma Malicious licious Un Unkno known wn Ratio tio 145.100.104.208 2 2 1.0 1.0 192.168.0.108 1 2 0.5 192.168.0.106 1 6 0.167 67 192.168.0.105 1 4 0.25 25 192.168.0.232 4 300 0.013

  30. Finding malicious domains  Get all the domains requested by malic icious ious res esolv lver ers  Filter out the domains from the initial blacklist

  31. Assumption 2 The 100 most popular .nl domain names are not ma malicious icious

  32. Results  40,469 469 queries to malicious domains  8,132 suspicious resolvers, doing 85M+ M+ queries  673 673 malicious resolvers (maliciousness ratio ≥ 0.25)  413 potentially malicious domains  392 392 potentially malicious domains (minus top 100)

  33. Assumption 3 If a website has at t lea east st one hit in VirusTotal in the past, it is considered malicious

  34. Example www.ikhouvanirakezen.nl Detected by VirusTotal thus tr true positiv itive

  35. Example 2 No hits on VirusTotal  Manual Google Search:  Hits: Classification “Yes”  No hits: Classification “No”  Hosting provider: Classification “ Possibly ”  Search not feasible: Classifcation “ Unknown ”

  36. Ma Mali liciou cious Numb mber er of doma mains ins Yes 125 No 153 Possibly 111 Unknown 3 Total tal 392 92

  37. Evaluation: 32 test rounds Poten enti tial ally DN DNS da data ta Mal alici icious ous X Blac Bl ackli klist st = Do Domain ins

  38. Trying to find domains from a test set Training ining DN DNS da data ta X set t (9 (90% 0%) Blacklist acklist Poten enti tial ally Tes est t set t Mal alici icious ous (1 (10% 0%) Do Doma main ins

  39. Trying to find domains from a test set Training ining DN DNS da data ta X set t (9 (90% 0%) Blacklist acklist Poten enti tial ally Tes est t set t Mal alici icious ous (1 (10% 0%) Do Doma main ins

  40. Evaluation: 32 test rounds Min Max Mean Std # # Pot otent ntia ially maliciou cious domai ains ns 114 400 400 349.875 75 68.295 # # From test t set et found und 0 5 2.594 94 1. 1.316

  41. Conclusion  It is possible to find malicious domains by looking at spatial co-occurrence of DNS queries  31.8% true positives, so not suitable for blacklisting  Instead, use as factor for further analysis

  42. Future work  Add a content analysis for each potentially malicious domain (i.e. crawling), and apply NLP  Compare lists between different dates (datasets) and analyze commonly found domains  Look at whois info for potentially malicious domains and use it for finding malicious registrars

  43. Future work  Extend blacklists (or run the algorithm recursively)  Use the maliciousness ratio to identify most ‘ dangerous ’ resolvers  111x ‘ Possibly ’: strip out hosting providers?

  44. Thanks for your attention! Qu Questions estions?

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