Medicaid Expenditures Todd Gilmer, PhD Rick Kronick, PhD - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

medicaid expenditures
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Medicaid Expenditures Todd Gilmer, PhD Rick Kronick, PhD - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Inter- and Intrastate Variation in Medicaid Expenditures Todd Gilmer, PhD Rick Kronick, PhD University of California, San Diego SUPPORTED BY A GRANT FROM HCFO/RWJ Research Questions Does interstate variation in Medicaid spending result


  • Inter- and Intrastate Variation in Medicaid Expenditures Todd Gilmer, PhD Rick Kronick, PhD University of California, San Diego SUPPORTED BY A GRANT FROM HCFO/RWJ

  • Research Questions  Does interstate variation in Medicaid spending result primarily from variation in the volume of services or in the price per unit of service?  How do inter- and intrastate variation in Medicaid utilization and spending compare to variation in Medicare spending and utilization?  Is more better for Medicaid beneficiaries? 2

  • Data  Medicaid Analytic eXtract (MAX) data for CY 2001- 2005 for all 50 states and DC  MAX data starts with data from the Medicaid Statistical Information System (MSIS), and is then massaged by CMS to create person-level analytic files  Complete claims and eligibility data on approximately 280 million beneficiaries (not necessarily unique) over five years 3

  • Methods  Exclude partial benefits beneficiaries (SLMBs, QMBs, family planning-only, etc)  Focus on Cash-Assistance, Medicaid-Only, fee-for-service, beneficiaries with Disabilities (CAMODs) - Restrict to cash disabled because uniform national eligibility standard for SSI increases comparability of the analysis sample across states - Restrict to Medicaid-only (eliminate dual eligibles) to get a complete view of utilization and expenditures - Restrict to FFS because encounter data are incomplete for beneficiaries in managed care  In analyses of spending on CAMODs, exclude five states (AL, AZ, DE, MD, and ND) because managed care penetration is too high or other data anomalies 4

  • Distribution of Medicaid Beneficiaries and Expenditures, 2001-2005 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Beneficiaries Total Expenditures Acute LTC 47.2 million $234.6 billion $149.2 billion $74.8 billion Cash Assistance, Medicaid-only, Disabled (CAMOD Other disabled Aged Adults Children 5

  • Correlation Coefficients, State-level Expenditures per Beneficiary and Expenditures per CAMOD, 2001-2005 Standardized Acute LTC Expenditures per Expenditures expenditures expenditures Beneficiary per CAMOD per CAMOD per CAMOD Standardized expenditures per beneficiary 1.00 — — — Expenditures per CAMOD 0.86 1.00 — — Acute expenditures per CAMOD 0.81 0.96 1.00 — LTC expenditures per CAMOD 0.81 0.93 0.81 1.00 Source: 2001-2005 MAX data. N=46 (excludes AL, AZ, DE, MD, and ND). 6

  • Measuring Volume and Price  Inpatient (PH & MH) - Volume = inpatient days - Price = expenditure per day  Outpatient (PH & MH) - Volume = unique days - Price = expenditure per day  Pharmacy - Volume = number of fills - Volume = average expenditure per fill at mean prices - Price = Ratio of actual expenditure to predicted expenditure at mean prices 7

  • Calculating Incremental Effects  Decomposition of price and volume effects  Incremental volume is the difference between actual and mean volume multiplied by mean price - Vinc = (Vi – Vm) * Pm  Incremental Price is the difference between actual and mean price multiplied by actual volume - Pinc = (Pi – Pm) * Vi  Combined incremental effect is the product - Inc Effect = Vinc + Pinc 8

  • Results 9

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  • Distribution of State-level per Beneficiary Acute and LTC Spending on CAMODs, 2001 – 2005 11 Source: 2001-2005 MAX data. Note: Data exclude AL, AZ, DE, MD, and ND.

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  • Robust Effect of Primary Care  Multiple indicators of access to primary care are related to reduced admissions: - Supply of primary care physicians - Average number of outpatient visits - Average Price Per Visit 20

  • The relationship between Medicare and Medicaid utilization and spending 21

  • Distribution of state-level 2004 Medicare spending per beneficiary, and 2001-2005 acute care Medicaid spending per CAMOD 22 Source: Medicare, Dartmouth Atlas; Medicaid, MAX data, 2001-2005 AL, AZ, DE, MD, and ND are excluded.

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  • 2004 Medicare spending per beneficiary and 2001-2005 acute care Medicaid spending per CAMOD 24 Source: Medicare, Dartmouth Atlas; Medicaid, MAX data, 2001-2005 AL, AZ, DE, MD, and ND are excluded.

  • 2004 Medicare admissions/1,000 and 2001-2005 Medicaid admissions per CAMOD Source: Medicare, Dartmouth Atlas; Medicaid, MAX data, 2001-2005AL, AZ, DE, MD, and ND are excluded. Admissions to psychiatric hospitals and admissions to acute care hospitals with a primary mental health 25 diagnosis are excluded from the Medicaid data.

  • 2004 Medicare Part B spending, and 2001-2005 Medicaid 'Part B' spending Source: Medicare, Dartmouth Atlas; Medicaid, MAX data, 2001-2005AL, AZ, DE, MD, and ND are excluded. Medicaid 'Part B' spending includes MD/OPD/Clinic spending, and expenditures for laboratory and 26 radiology services.

  • 2004 Medicare spending per beneficiary and 2001-2005 acute care Medicaid spending per CAMOD, by HRR, selected states 27 2004 Medicare Part B spending, and 2001-2005 Medicaid 'Part B' spending Source: Medicare, Dartmouth Atlas; Medicaid, MAX data, 2001-2005AL, AZ, DE, MD, and ND are excluded.

  • 2004 Medicare spending per beneficiary and 2001-2005 acute care Medicaid spending per CAMOD, by HRR, California 28

  • Exhibit 3. 2001 – 2005 Medicare and Medicaid Acute Care Spending per Beneficiary by Hospital Referral Region, Deviations from State Means 6000 5000 4000 3000 Medicare 2000 1000 0 -1000 -2000 -4000 -3000 -2000 -1000 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 Medicaid Source ce: Medicare data from the Dartmouth Atlas of Health care. Medicaid from MAX data. Note: Medicaid data limited to non-dually eligible FFS disabled beneficiaries receiving cash assistance. Excludes AL, AZ, DE, MD, ND. Each data point calculated as the difference from the state mean. 29

  • Conclusions 30

  • There is wide variation across states in spending per Medicaid beneficiary  For example, NY spends more than twice as much per beneficiary than CA on acute care  Spending is generally lower in the South, and higher in the Mid-Atlantic, New England, and the upper Midwest  Inpatient utilization only partially follows the contours of acute care spending - Low in New England; high in FL, LA, TX, and OK  There is much more interstate variation in mental health and ‘ other acute ’ spending than in inpatient, MD/OPD/Clinics, or Rx, and much more variation in LTC than in acute spending 31

  • Volume of services drives relative positioning, unit price is secondary  High-spending and low-spending states are different from the national average primarily because of volume (2/3), and only secondarily because of price (1/3) - Inpatient, mental health, and other spending contribute approximately equally, while variation in MD/OPD/Clinic has very little effect - Inpatient spending varies approximately equally because of volume and price, while MH and drugs variation is driven almost entirely by volume 32

  • At the state level, Medicaid and Medicare spending are unrelated  There is a weak relationship between Medicare and Medicaid inpatient admissions/1,000  There is no relationship between Medicare Part B and Medicaid outpatient spending  Inpatient hospital spending is a much larger component of Medicare spending than of Medicaid spending 33

  • Within most states, Medicaid and Medicare spending are strongly related at the HRR level  Inpatient admissions strongly related  Outpatient spending very weakly related  California a notable exception, with no relationship between Medicare and Medicaid within state 34

  • Making sense of the Medicare-Medicaid relationship  Virtually zero state-level correlation in spending, and very small correlation in inpatient admissions suggest that Medicaid policy variables mediate the supply-utilization relationship suggested by the Dartmouth Atlas  Relatively strong within-state relationship at the HRR level for inpatient admissions suggests that, holding Medicaid policy constant, supply of resources affects Medicare and Medicaid utilization similarly  Very weak within-state relationship on outpatient spending requires more investigation 35

  • Is more better in Medicaid?  At the state level, some suggestion that more physician visits are associated with lower readmission and lower ACS rates  Strong association between larger fraction of primary care physicians and lower hospitalization, and ACS rates  At the state level, little indication that a higher volume of mental health services or more prescription drug fills are associated with lower hospitalization rates 36