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Measuring Risk Ron Gula NSA Pen Tester Cloud Security Network IDS - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Measuring Risk Ron Gula NSA Pen Tester Cloud Security Network IDS Who is Ron Gula??? Vuln Management Cyber Companies THREAT X VULNERABILITY = RISK THREAT X VULNERABILITY = RISK Out of date browser on server One


  1. Measuring Risk Ron Gula

  2. • NSA Pen Tester • Cloud Security • Network IDS Who is Ron Gula??? • Vuln Management • Cyber Companies

  3. THREAT X VULNERABILITY = RISK

  4. THREAT X VULNERABILITY = RISK

  5. • Out of date browser on server • One server with 10 vulns versus Ten servers with 1 vulns • “Low” and “Medium” vulns

  6. • Severity • Exploit • Asset • Malware • Age • Patch Rollups

  7. EVEN IF WE PATCHED 100% WE STILL HAVE ZERO DAYS

  8. • Patch Management • Vuln Scanners • System Hardening • Network Monitors • EDR & Forensics • Web Proxy • GRC & Compliance • SIEM & Logs • Authentication • Asset Management • IT Provisioning • NAC and Firewall • Procurement

  9. If you know the enemy and know yourself you need not fear the results of a hundred battles.

  10. If you know the enemy and know yourself you need not fear the results of a hundred battles. • Complex OSes • BYOD and Mobile • On-Prem Apps • Cloud Apps • All Users • User Access

  11. If you know the enemy and know yourself you need not fear the results of a hundred battles. • Complex OSes • Vulnerabilities • BYOD and Mobile • Activity Logging • On-Prem Apps • System Configurations • Cloud Apps • Network Monitoring • All Users • Change Detection • User Access • Privileged Access

  12. Can you build a list of all Access Control and Authentication enclaves Can you build a map of all ACLs and enclaves? and access control lists on them?

  13. Can you build a list of all users and their authorized apps?

  14. MONITORING AUDIT

  15. DATA DATA DATA & APPS & APPS & APPS DATA & APPS DATA & APPS DATA & APPS

  16. TELEMETRY Logs, Packets, Flows, Cloud APIs, Auth, Files, .etc LOOK FOR BADNESS NIDS, AV, BOTs, UBA, NBAD, APT, .etc AUDIT FOR GOODNESS Apps, Users, Transactions, Normal

  17. WHY CAN’T WE MODEL RISK? • Periodic & Imperfect Assessments • Imperfect Threat Model • Collection of Data • Lack of standards on “risk”

  18. RISK MEASURING ENABLES • Better Security Policy • Better Security Budgets • Fact based Security WHAT IS THE #1 THING?

  19. FRAMEWORKS • Vendor Neutral • Cross-Organizational • Prescriptive • Written by Pen Tests & I.R.

  20. CONCLUSIONS Conclusions

  21. CONCLUSIONS Conclusions

  22. CONCLUSIONS Conclusions

  23. Questions and Contact Information

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