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Kevin Henry Kevin Henry Rory Rory MacKenzie MacKenzie Launched in Dec 1998 as part of the Mars Surveyor Program Program Objective


  1. �������������������� Kevin Henry Kevin Henry Rory Rory MacKenzie MacKenzie

  2. ������������ • Launched in Dec 1998 as part of the Mars Surveyor Program Program • Objective was enter the Mars atmosphere and collect scientific data • Crashed on entry to atmosphere in Sep 1999 • Metric mix-up meant Orbiter entered atmosphere at wrong altitude • Mishap Investigation Report issued report I only six weeks later later • Second report followed in March 2000 • Mishap blamed on miscommunication and poor project management

  3. ���������������� • Orbiter carried two Instruments: – Pressure Modulator Infrared Radiometer (PMIRR) – Pressure Modulator Infrared Radiometer (PMIRR) – Mars Colour Imager (MARCI) • Science Objectvives: – Monitor daily weather and atmospheric conditions – Record surface changes due to wind and other effects – Determine temperature profiles – Determine temperature profiles – Monitor water vapor and dust content – Look for evidence of past climate change

  4. ����������������� ������� • Science mission to last 2 years, then last 2 years, then act as relay station for 5 years • Data relay station would be used by would be used by Mars Polar Lander and future Mars missions.

  5. ���������������� • Expected Timeline: – 1993: Mars Surveyor Program is Launched – 1995: Mars Surveyor Project ’98 Missions are Identified – 1995: Mars Surveyor Project ’98 Missions are Identified – Dec 11, 1998: Launch – September 23, 1999: Mars Orbiter Insertion – September 27 1999: Mars Aerobraking Begins – November 10, 1999: Mars Aerobraking Ends – December 1, 1999: Transfer to Mapping Orbit – December 3, 1999: Mars Polar Lander Support – March 3, 2000: Mars Mapping Begins – March 3, 2000: Mars Mapping Begins – January 15, 2002: Mars Relay Mission Begins – December 1, 2004: End of Primary Mission • Projected cost: $327.6 Million for MCO and MPL

  6. ������������������������ • Used by Spacecraft to perform trajectory adjustments • 4 thruster manoeuvres planned during the flight of the MCO the flight of the MCO • Trajectory Correction Maneuver-4 executed as planned on Sep 15, 1999 • Mars Orbit Insertion planned for Sep 23 • Signal lost at 09:04:52, early than expected, and never reaquired • Software calculating trajectory models used English units of pound-seconds rather than Metric units of Newton- rather than Metric units of Newton- seconds • Effect of spacecraft trajectory underestimated by factor of 4.45 • Altitude for entry was 57km instead of 220km

  7. ������������������ • Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) of California – Lead flight centre • Locheed Martin Astronautics (LMA) of Denver, Colorado – Prime contractor – Design and Development of Spacecraft – Flight System Integration and testing – Supporting launch operations • • Mars Surveyor Operations Project Mars Surveyor Operations Project Mars Surveyor Operations Project Mars Surveyor Operations Project – Created by JPL Created by JPL – Responsible from MCO and MPL flight Responsible from MCO and MPL flight • operations operations

  8. �������������������������� • Phase I Report released Nov 10 1999 • Focuses on issues that must be resolved • Focuses on issues that must be resolved before Mars Polar Lander (MPL) reaches Mars Surface • Purpose: Determine root causes and contributing factors • Recommendations to improve MPL operations • Meetings conducted at Jet Propulsion Lab with members of JPL and LMA.

  9. ���������� • Failure to use metric units in the coding of a ground software file “Small Forces” a ground software file “Small Forces” • Angular Momentum Desaturation (AMD) contained output data from small forces • Trajectory modellers assumed the data was in the correct units • AMD events during the journey occurred 10-14 times more often than expected 10-14 times more often than expected • Small errors introduced in trajectory estimates over 9 months • Discrepancies were only informally reported

  10. ������������������� 1) Undetected mis-modelling of spacecraft velocity changes changes • AMD files unused for first four months • When files were used the underestimation was noticed 2) Navigation team unfamiliar with spacecraft • Operations navigation team not involved in key development stages • Critical information passed on 3) Trajectory correction manoeuvre number 5 not performed performed • Contingency manoeuvre plan was in place but not prepared for • TCM-5 was discussed verbally but not executed 4) System engineering process did not adequately address transition from development to operations • Inadequate transition from development to operations • Navigation team unfamiliar with spacecraft design characteristics

  11. ��������������������������� 5) Inadequate communications between project elements • • Development and operations teams; project management and Development and operations teams; project management and technical teams; project and technical line management • Assumptions were made and key knowledge not passed between project teams 6) Inadequate operations navigation team staffing • Only 2 full time staff 7) Inadequate Training • • Unaware of reporting procedure Unaware of reporting procedure • Not enough emphasis on end-to-end testing 8) Verification and validation • Small forces file not validated

  12. ��������������������������� • Throughout all the project elements there was an absence peer reviews was an absence peer reviews • Those held were without key personnel • Recommendations from these causes included the obvious (checking units) and changes to project structure • Face to face meetings between elements • Face to face meetings between elements and long term support to improve communications

  13. ����������������� • Launched Jan 3 1999 • Second of Mars Surveyor ’98 programme programme • Expected to touch down on • Expected to touch down on South Polar Region • Purpose was to record weather conditions and collect samples from surface • Communication lost during landing procedure on Dec 3 1999 • Software error is most likely • Software error is most likely reason • Incorrectly indicated the ‘touch down’ signal and cut off engines 40 metres above surface

  14. ������������� ������������������ !"#"� • MCO mission was conducted under MCO mission was conducted under NASA’s “Faster, better, cheaper” NASA’s “Faster, better, cheaper” NASA’s “Faster, better, cheaper” NASA’s “Faster, better, cheaper” philosophy. philosophy. • Failure to instil sufficient rigor in risk Failure to instil sufficient rigor in risk management throughout the mission management throughout the mission lifecycle. lifecycle. lifecycle. lifecycle. • Increased risk to an unacceptable level. Increased risk to an unacceptable level. • Cuts in money and resources available to Cuts in money and resources available to support MCO mission. support MCO mission.

  15. ��� ��������������������� • Roles and responsibilities of team members on Roles and responsibilities of team members on MCO mission were not clearly defined. MCO mission were not clearly defined. MCO mission were not clearly defined. MCO mission were not clearly defined. • Authority and accountability an issue Authority and accountability an issue – Who is in charge? Who is in charge? – Who is the mission manager? Who is the mission manager? • Project plan did not provide a careful handover Project plan did not provide a careful handover from the development project to the operations from the development project to the operations project. project. • Inadequate training • Inadequate training Inadequate training Inadequate training • “The board found that the project management “The board found that the project management team appeared more focused on meeting mission team appeared more focused on meeting mission cost and schedule objectives and did not cost and schedule objectives and did not adequately focus on mission risk.” adequately focus on mission risk.”

  16. �����������������$����$������� �������������������������� • • Outlines lack of peer reviews over majority of NASA Outlines lack of peer reviews over majority of NASA projects projects • • Poor risk management Poor risk management • • Inadequate testing and quality control Inadequate testing and quality control • • Poor intercommunication between teams Poor intercommunication between teams

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