Isogenies: an example over ❋ 11 E ✿ y 2 ❂ x 3 ✰ x E ✵ ✿ y 2 ❂ x 3 � 4 x Kernel generator in red. ✥ ✦ x 2 ✰ 1 y x 2 � 1 ✣ ✭ x ❀ y ✮ ❂ ❀ This is a degree 2 map. x 2 x Analogous to x ✼✦ x 2 in ❋ ✄ q . Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 9 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
Maps: isogenies Theorem Let ✣ ✿ E ✦ E ✵ be a map between elliptic curves. These conditions are equivalent: ✣ is a surjective group morphism, ✣ is a group morphism with finite kernel, ✣ is a non-constant algebraic map of projective varieties sending the point at infinity of E onto the point at infinity of E ✵ . If they hold ✣ is called an isogeny. Two curves are called isogenous if there exists an isogeny between them. Example: Multiplication-by- m On any curve, an isogeny from E to itself (i.e., an endomorphism): ❬ m ❪ ✿ E ✦ E ❀ P ✼✦ ❬ m ❪ P ✿ Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 10 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
Isogeny lexicon Degree ✙ degree of the rational fractions defining the isogeny; Rough measure of the information needed to encode it. Separable, inseparable, cyclic An isogeny ✣ is separable iff ❞❡❣ ✣ ❂ ★ ❦❡r ✣ . Given H ✚ E finite, write ✣ ✿ E ✦ E ❂ H for the unique separable isogeny s.t. ❦❡r ✣ ❂ H . ✣ inseparable ✮ p divides ❞❡❣ ✣ . Cyclic isogeny ✑ separable isogeny with cyclic kernel. ■ Non-example: the multiplication map ❬ m ❪ ✿ E ✦ E . Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 11 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
The dual isogeny Let ✣ ✿ E ✦ E ✵ be an isogeny of degree m . There is a unique isogeny ❫ ✣ ✿ E ✵ ✦ E such that ❫ ✣ ✍ ❫ ✣ ✍ ✣ ❂ ❬ m ❪ E ❀ ✣ ❂ ❬ m ❪ E ✵ ✿ ❫ ✣ is called the dual isogeny of ✣ ; it has the following properties: ❫ ✣ is defined over k if and only if ✣ is; 1 ✥ for any isogeny ✥ ✿ E ✵ ✦ E ✵✵ ; ❬ ✥ ✍ ✣ ❂ ❫ ✣ ✍ ❫ 2 ✥ ✰ ✣ ❂ ❫ ❭ ✥ ✰ ❫ ✣ for any isogeny ✥ ✿ E ✦ E ✵ ; 3 ❞❡❣ ✣ ❂ ❞❡❣ ❫ ✣ ; 4 ❫ ❫ ✣ ❂ ✣ . 5 Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 12 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
✣ ❂ ❂ ❂ ✰ ✰ � ✦ ✑ ✰ Up to isomorphism R Q P P ✰ Q Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 13 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
✣ ❂ ❂ ❂ ✰ ✰ � ✦ ✑ ✰ Up to isomorphism R Q P P ✰ Q Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 13 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
✣ ❂ ❂ ❂ ✰ ✰ � ✦ ✑ ✰ Up to isomorphism R Q P P ✰ Q Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 13 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
✣ ❂ ❂ ❂ ✰ ✰ � ✦ ✑ ✰ Up to isomorphism R Q P P ✰ Q Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 13 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
✣ ❂ ❂ ❂ ✰ ✰ � ✦ ✑ ✰ Up to isomorphism R Q P P ✰ Q Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 13 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
✣ ❂ ❂ ❂ ✰ ✰ � ✦ ✑ ✰ Up to isomorphism R Q P P ✰ Q Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 13 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
✣ ❂ ❂ ❂ ✰ ✰ � ✦ ✑ ✰ Up to isomorphism R Q P P ✰ Q Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 13 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
✣ ❂ ❂ ❂ ✰ ✰ � ✦ ✑ ✰ Up to isomorphism R Q P P ✰ Q Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 13 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
✣ ❂ ❂ ❂ ✰ ✰ � ✦ ✑ ✰ Up to isomorphism R Q P P ✰ Q Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 13 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
✣ ❂ ❂ ❂ ✰ ✰ � ✦ ✑ ✰ Up to isomorphism R Q P P ✰ Q Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 13 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
✣ ❂ ❂ ❂ ✰ ✰ � ✦ ✑ ✰ Up to isomorphism R Q P P ✰ Q Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 13 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
✣ ❂ ❂ ❂ ✰ ✰ � ✦ ✑ ✰ Up to isomorphism R Q P P ✰ Q Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 13 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
✣ ❂ ❂ ❂ ✰ ✰ � ✦ ✑ ✰ Up to isomorphism R Q P P ✰ Q Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 13 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
✣ ❂ ❂ Up to isomorphism R Q P P ✰ Q y 2 ❂ x 3 ✰ ax ✰ b 4 a 3 j ✑ 1728 � ✦ 4 a 3 ✰ 27 b 2 Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 13 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
✣ ❂ ❂ ❂ ✰ ✰ � ✦ ✑ ✰ Up to isomorphism R Q P P ✰ Q Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 13 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
✣ ❂ ❂ ❂ ✰ ✰ � ✦ ✑ ✰ Up to isomorphism R Q P P ✰ Q Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 13 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
✣ ❂ ❂ ❂ ✰ ✰ � ✦ ✑ ✰ Up to isomorphism R Q P P ✰ Q Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 13 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
✣ ❂ ❂ ❂ ✰ ✰ � ✦ ✑ ✰ Up to isomorphism R Q P P ✰ Q Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 13 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
✣ ❂ ❂ ✰ ❂ ✰ ✰ � ✦ ✑ ✰ Up to isomorphism Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 13 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
✣ ❂ ✰ ❂ ✰ ✰ ❂ � ✦ ✑ ✰ Up to isomorphism Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 13 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
✰ ❂ ✰ ✰ � ✦ ✑ ✰ ✣ ❂ Up to isomorphism j ❂ 1728 Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 13 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
✰ ❂ ✰ ✰ � ✦ ✑ ✰ Up to isomorphism ✣ j ❂ 1728 j ❂ 287496 Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 13 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
✰ ❂ ✰ ✰ � ✦ ✑ ✰ ✣ Up to isomorphism j ❂ 1728 j ❂ 287496 Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 13 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
Isogeny graphs Serre-Tate theorem Two elliptic curves E ❀ E ✵ defined over a finite field ❋ q are isogenous (over ❋ q ) iff ★ E ✭ ❋ q ✮ ❂ ★ E ✵ ✭ ❋ q ✮ . Isogeny graphs Vertices are curves up to isomorphism, Edges are isogenies up to isomorphism. Isogeny volcanoes Curves are ordinary, Isogenies all have degree a prime ❵ . Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 14 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
The endomorphism ring The endomorphism ring ❊♥❞✭ E ✮ of an elliptic curve E is the ring of all isogenies E ✦ E (plus the null map) with addition and composition. Theorem (Deuring) Let E be an elliptic curve defined over a field k of characteristic p . ❊♥❞✭ E ✮ is isomorphic to one of the following: ❩ , only if p ❂ 0 E is ordinary. An order ❖ in a quadratic imaginary field: E is ordinary with complex multiplication by ❖ . Only if p ❃ 0 , a maximal order in a quaternion algebra a : E is supersingular. a (ramified at p and ✶ ) Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 15 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
Algebras, orders ♣ A quadratic imaginary number field is an extension of ◗ of the form ◗ ✭ � D ✮ for some D ❃ 0 . A quaternion algebra is an algebra of the form ◗ ✰ ☛ ◗ ✰ ☞ ◗ ✰ ☛☞ ◗ , where the generators satisfy the relations ☛ 2 ❀ ☞ 2 ✷ ◗ ❀ ☛ 2 ❁ 0 ❀ ☞ 2 ❁ 0 ❀ ☞☛ ❂ � ☛☞✿ Orders Let K be a finitely generated ◗ -algebra. An order ❖ ✚ K is a subring of K that is a finitely generated ❩ -module of maximal dimension. An order that is not contained in any other order of K is called a maximal order. Examples: ❩ is the only order contained in ◗ , ❩ ❬ i ❪ is the only maximal order of ◗ ✭ i ✮ , ♣ ♣ ❩ ❬ 5 ❪ is a non-maximal order of ◗ ✭ 5 ✮ , The ring of integers of a number field is its only maximal order, In general, maximal orders in quaternion algebras are not unique. Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 16 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
The finite field case Frobenius endomorphism ✙ ✿ ✭ x ❀ y ✮ ✼✦ ✭ x q ❀ y q ✮ Theorem (Hasse): ✙ satisfies a quadratic equation ✙ 2 � t ✙ ✰ q ❂ 0 ✿ t is the trace, D ✙ ❂ t 2 � 4 q ✔ 0 is the discriminant, t ❂ 0 ♠♦❞ p iff the curve is supersingular. In the ordinary case D ✙ ✻ ❂ 0 and ♣ ❩ ❬ ✙ ❪ ✚ ❊♥❞✭ E ✮ ✚ ◗ ✭ D ✙ ✮ ✿ Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 17 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
Volcanology (Kohel 1996) ❊♥❞✭ E ✮ Let E ❀ E ✵ be curves with respective endomorphism rings ❖ ❀ ❖ ✵ ✚ K . ❖ K Let ✣ ✿ E ✦ E ✵ be an isogeny of prime degree ❵ , then: if ❖ ❂ ❖ ✵ , ✣ is horizontal; ❩ ❬ ✙ ❪ if ❬ ❖ ✵ ✿ ❖ ❪ ❂ ❵ , ✣ is ascending; if ❬ ❖ ✿ ❖ ✵ ❪ ❂ ❵ , ✣ is descending. Ordinary isogeny volcano of degree ❵ ❂ 3 . Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 18 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
✿ ❩ ❬ ✙ ❪❪✮ ❂ ❵ ✭❬ ❖ Volcanology (Kohel 1996) Let E be ordinary, ❊♥❞✭ E ✮ ✚ K . � D K � D K ❖ K : maximal order of K , ✁ ✁ ❂ � 1 ❂ 0 ❵ ❵ D K : discriminant of K . � D K ✁ ❂ ✰ 1 ❵ Horizontal Ascending Descending ✏ ✑ D K ❵ ✲ ❬ ❖ K ✿ ❖ ❪ ❵ ✲ ❬ ❖ ✿ ❩ ❬ ✙ ❪❪ 1 ✰ ❵ ✏ ✑ ✏ ✑ D K D K ❵ ✲ ❬ ❖ K ✿ ❖ ❪ ❵ ❥ ❬ ❖ ✿ ❩ ❬ ✙ ❪❪ 1 ✰ ❵ � ❵ ❵ ❵ ❥ ❬ ❖ ✿ ❩ ❬ ✙ ❪❪ ❵ ❥ ❬ ❖ K ✿ ❖ ❪ ❵ 1 ❵ ✲ ❬ ❖ ✿ ❩ ❬ ✙ ❪❪ ❵ ❥ ❬ ❖ K ✿ ❖ ❪ 1 Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 19 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
Volcanology (Kohel 1996) Let E be ordinary, ❊♥❞✭ E ✮ ✚ K . � D K � D K ❖ K : maximal order of K , ✁ ✁ ❂ � 1 ❂ 0 ❵ ❵ D K : discriminant of K . Height ❂ v ❵ ✭❬ ❖ K ✿ ❩ ❬ ✙ ❪❪✮ . � D K ✁ ❂ ✰ 1 ❵ Horizontal Ascending Descending ✏ ✑ D K ❵ ✲ ❬ ❖ K ✿ ❖ ❪ ❵ ✲ ❬ ❖ ✿ ❩ ❬ ✙ ❪❪ 1 ✰ ❵ ✏ ✑ ✏ ✑ D K D K ❵ ✲ ❬ ❖ K ✿ ❖ ❪ ❵ ❥ ❬ ❖ ✿ ❩ ❬ ✙ ❪❪ 1 ✰ ❵ � ❵ ❵ ❵ ❥ ❬ ❖ ✿ ❩ ❬ ✙ ❪❪ ❵ ❥ ❬ ❖ K ✿ ❖ ❪ ❵ 1 ❵ ✲ ❬ ❖ ✿ ❩ ❬ ✙ ❪❪ ❵ ❥ ❬ ❖ K ✿ ❖ ❪ 1 Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 19 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
Volcanology (Kohel 1996) Let E be ordinary, ❊♥❞✭ E ✮ ✚ K . � D K � D K ❖ K : maximal order of K , ✁ ✁ ❂ � 1 ❂ 0 ❵ ❵ D K : discriminant of K . Height ❂ v ❵ ✭❬ ❖ K ✿ ❩ ❬ ✙ ❪❪✮ . How large is the crater? � D K ✁ ❂ ✰ 1 ❵ Horizontal Ascending Descending ✏ ✑ D K ❵ ✲ ❬ ❖ K ✿ ❖ ❪ ❵ ✲ ❬ ❖ ✿ ❩ ❬ ✙ ❪❪ 1 ✰ ❵ ✏ ✑ ✏ ✑ D K D K ❵ ✲ ❬ ❖ K ✿ ❖ ❪ ❵ ❥ ❬ ❖ ✿ ❩ ❬ ✙ ❪❪ 1 ✰ ❵ � ❵ ❵ ❵ ❥ ❬ ❖ ✿ ❩ ❬ ✙ ❪❪ ❵ ❥ ❬ ❖ K ✿ ❖ ❪ ❵ 1 ❵ ✲ ❬ ❖ ✿ ❩ ❬ ✙ ❪❪ ❵ ❥ ❬ ❖ K ✿ ❖ ❪ 1 Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 19 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
Vortex Surfer E 3 Vertices are elliptic curves with E 4 E 2 complex multiplication by ❖ K (i.e., ♣ ❊♥❞✭ E ✮ ✬ ❖ K ✚ ◗ ✭ � D ✮ ). E 5 E 1 E 6 E 12 E 7 E 11 E 8 E 10 E 9 Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 20 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
Vortex Surfer E 3 Vertices are elliptic curves with E 4 E 2 complex multiplication by ❖ K (i.e., ♣ ❊♥❞✭ E ✮ ✬ ❖ K ✚ ◗ ✭ � D ✮ ). E 5 E 1 Edges are horizontal isogenies of bounded prime degree. degree 2 E 6 E 12 E 7 E 11 E 8 E 10 E 9 Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 20 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
Vortex Surfer E 3 Vertices are elliptic curves with E 4 E 2 complex multiplication by ❖ K (i.e., ♣ ❊♥❞✭ E ✮ ✬ ❖ K ✚ ◗ ✭ � D ✮ ). E 5 E 1 Edges are horizontal isogenies of bounded prime degree. degree 2 E 6 E 12 degree 3 E 7 E 11 E 8 E 10 E 9 Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 20 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
Vortex Surfer E 3 Vertices are elliptic curves with E 4 E 2 complex multiplication by ❖ K (i.e., ♣ ❊♥❞✭ E ✮ ✬ ❖ K ✚ ◗ ✭ � D ✮ ). E 5 E 1 Edges are horizontal isogenies of bounded prime degree. degree 2 E 6 E 12 degree 3 E 7 E 11 degree 5 E 8 E 10 E 9 Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 20 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
Vortex Surfer E 3 Vertices are elliptic curves with E 4 E 2 complex multiplication by ❖ K (i.e., ♣ ❊♥❞✭ E ✮ ✬ ❖ K ✚ ◗ ✭ � D ✮ ). E 5 E 1 Edges are horizontal isogenies of bounded prime degree. degree 2 E 6 E 12 degree 3 E 7 E 11 degree 5 E 8 E 10 What’s happening here? Algebra! E 9 Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 20 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
❵ ❵ ✣ ✵ ❂ ✣ ❖ Isogenies ✩ Ideals of ❊♥❞✭ E ✮ Horizontal Isogenies Invertible Ideals ❦❡r ✣ a ❂ ❢ P ✷ E ❥ ☛ ✭ P ✮ ❂ 0 for all ☛ ✷ a ❣ a ✚ ❊♥❞✭ E ✮ Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 21 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
✣ ✵ ❂ ✣ ❖ Isogenies ✩ Ideals of ❊♥❞✭ E ✮ Horizontal Isogenies Invertible Ideals ❦❡r ✣ a ❂ ❢ P ✷ E ❥ ☛ ✭ P ✮ ❂ 0 for all ☛ ✷ a ❣ a ✚ ❊♥❞✭ E ✮ degree norm dual conjugate composition product “direction” on the ❵ -isogeny cycle ideal of norm ❵ Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 21 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
❖ Isogenies ✩ Ideals of ❊♥❞✭ E ✮ Horizontal Isogenies Invertible Ideals ❦❡r ✣ a ❂ ❢ P ✷ E ❥ ☛ ✭ P ✮ ❂ 0 for all ☛ ✷ a ❣ a ✚ ❊♥❞✭ E ✮ degree norm dual conjugate composition product “direction” on the ❵ -isogeny cycle ideal of norm ❵ endomorphism principal ✣ b E ✵ E a ❂ b is principal ✣ a Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 21 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
Isogenies ✩ Ideals of ❊♥❞✭ E ✮ Horizontal Isogenies Invertible Ideals ❦❡r ✣ a ❂ ❢ P ✷ E ❥ ☛ ✭ P ✮ ❂ 0 for all ☛ ✷ a ❣ a ✚ ❊♥❞✭ E ✮ degree norm dual conjugate composition product “direction” on the ❵ -isogeny cycle ideal of norm ❵ endomorphism principal ✣ b E ✵ E a ❂ b is principal ✣ a Elliptic curves with CM by ❖ Invertible ideals / Principal ideals Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 21 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
Class group action Class group ♣ The class group of an order ❖ ✚ ◗ ✭ � D ✮ is the quotient ❈❧✭ ❖ ✮ ❂ ■ ✭ ❖ ✮ ❂ P ✭ ❖ ✮ ✿ It is a finite abelian group. Main theorem of complex multiplication The class group of ❖ acts faithfully and transitively on the set of elliptic curves with CM by ❖ by ❈❧✭ ❖ ✮ ✂ Ell ✭ ❖ ✮ ✦ Ell ✭ ❖ ✮ a ✄ E ✑ E ❂ E ❬ a ❪ Corollary ★ ❈❧✭ ❖ ✮ ❂ ★ Ell ✭ ❖ ✮ . Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 22 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
Supersingular endomorphisms Recall, a curve E over a field ❋ q of characteristic p is supersingular iff ✙ 2 � t ✙ ✰ q ❂ 0 with t ❂ 0 ♠♦❞ p . Case: t ❂ 0 ✮ D ✙ ❂ � 4 q Only possibility for E ❂ ❋ p , E ❂ ❋ p has CM by an order of ◗ ✭ ♣� p ✮ , similar to the ordinary case. t ❂ ✝ 2 ♣ q Case: ✮ D ✙ ❂ 0 General case for E ❂ ❋ q , when q is an even power. ✙ ❂ ✝♣ q ✷ ❩ , hence no complex multiplication. We will ignore marginal cases: t ❂ ✝♣ q ❀ ✝♣ 2 q ❀ ✝♣ 3 q . Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 23 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
The full endomorphism ring Theorem (Deuring) Let E be a supersingular elliptic curve, then E is isomorphic to a curve defined over ❋ p 2 ; Every isogeny of E is defined over ❋ p 2 ; Every endomorphism of E is defined over ❋ p 2 ; ❊♥❞✭ E ✮ is isomorphic to a maximal order in a quaternion algebra ramified at p and ✶ . In particular: If E is defined over ❋ p , then ❊♥❞ ❋ p ✭ E ✮ is strictly contained in ❊♥❞✭ E ✮ . Some endomorphisms do not commute! Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 24 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
An example The curve of j -invariant 1728 E ✿ y 2 ❂ x 3 ✰ x is supersingular over ❋ p iff p ❂ � 1 ♠♦❞ 4 . Endomorphisms ❊♥❞✭ E ✮ ❂ ❩ ❤ ✓❀ ✙ ✐ , with: ✙ the Frobenius endomorphism, s.t. ✙ 2 ❂ � p ; ✓ the map ✓ ✭ x ❀ y ✮ ❂ ✭ � x ❀ iy ✮ ❀ where i ✷ ❋ p 2 is a 4-th root of unity. Clearly, ✓ 2 ❂ � 1 . And ✓✙ ❂ � ✙✓ . Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 25 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
❈❧✭ � ✮ ❂ ❈❧✭ � ✮ ❈❧✭ � ✮ ❈❧✭ � ✮ ❈❧✭ � ✮ Class group action party j ❂ 1728 Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 26 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
❈❧✭ � ✮ ❂ ❈❧✭ � ✮ ❈❧✭ � ✮ ❈❧✭ � ✮ Class group action party j ❂ 1728 ❈❧✭ � 4 p ✮ Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 26 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
❈❧✭ � ✮ ❂ ❂ ❈❧✭ � ✮ ❈❧✭ � ✮ Class group action party ❈❧✭ � 4 ✮ ❈❧✭ � 4 p ✮ Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 26 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
❈❧✭ � ✮ ❂ ❈❧✭ � ✮ ❈❧✭ � ✮ Class group action party j ❂ 0 ❈❧✭ � 4 ✮ ❈❧✭ � 4 p ✮ Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 26 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
❂ ❂ ❈❧✭ � ✮ ❈❧✭ � ✮ Class group action party ❈❧✭ � 3 ✮ ❈❧✭ � 4 ✮ ❈❧✭ � 4 p ✮ Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 26 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
❂ ❂ Class group action party ❈❧✭ � 3 ✮ ❈❧✭ � 4 ✮ ❈❧✭ � 4 p ✮ ❈❧✭ � 23 ✮ ❈❧✭ � 79 ✮ Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 26 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
Supersingular graphs Quaternion algebras have many maximal orders. For every maximal order type of B p ❀ ✶ there are 1 or 2 curves over ❋ p 2 having endomorphism ring isomorphic to it. There is a unique isogeny class of supersingular curves over ✖ ❋ p of size ✙ p ❂ 12 . Lef ideals act on the set of maximal orders like isogenies. Figure: 3 -isogeny graph on ❋ 97 2 . The graph of ❵ -isogenies is ✭ ❵ ✰ 1 ✮ -regular. Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 27 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
Graphs lexicon Degree: Number of (outgoing/ingoing) edges. k -regular: All vertices have degree k . Connected: There is a path between any two vertices. Distance: The length of the shortest path between two vertices. Diameter: The longest distance between two vertices. ✕ 1 ✕ ✁ ✁ ✁ ✕ ✕ n : The (ordered) eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix. Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 28 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
Expander graphs Proposition If G is a k -regular graph, its largest and smallest eigenvalues satisfy k ❂ ✕ 1 ✕ ✕ n ✕ � k ✿ Expander families An infinite family of connected k -regular graphs on n vertices is an expander family if there exists an ✎ ❃ 0 such that all non-trivial eigenvalues satisfy ❥ ✕ ❥ ✔ ✭ 1 � ✎ ✮ k for n large enough. Expander graphs have short diameter: O ✭❧♦❣ n ✮ ; Random walks mix rapidly: afer O ✭❧♦❣ n ✮ steps, the induced distribution on the vertices is close to uniform. Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 29 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
Expander graphs from isogenies Theorem (Pizer) Let ❵ be fixed. The family of graphs of supersingular curves over ❋ p 2 with ❵ -isogenies, as p ✦ ✶ , is an expander family a . a Even better, it has the Ramanujan property. Theorem (Jao, Miller, Venkatesan) ♣ Let ❖ ✚ ◗ ✭ � D ✮ be an order in a quadratic imaginary field. The graphs of all curves over ❋ q with complex multiplication by ❖ , with isogenies of prime degree bounded a by ✭❧♦❣ q ✮ 2 ✰ ✍ , are expanders. a May contain traces of GRH. Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 30 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
Executive summary Separable ❵ -isogeny = finite kernel = subgroup of E ❬ ❵ ❪ (= ideal of norm ❵ ), Isogeny graphs have j -invariants for vertices and “some” isogenies for edges. By varying the choices for the vertex and the isogeny set, we obtain graphs with different properties. ❵ -isogeny graphs of ordinary curves are volcanoes, (full) ❵ -isogeny graphs of supersingular curves are finite ✭ ❵ ✰ 1 ✮ -regular. CM theory naturally leads to define graphs of horizontal isogenies (both in the ordinary and the supersingular case) that are isomorphic to Cayley graphs of class groups. CM graphs are expanders. Supersingular full ❵ -isogeny graphs are Ramanujan. Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 31 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
Isogeny Based Cryptography: an Introduction Luca De Feo IBM Research Zürich November 28, 2019 NTNU, Trondheim Slides online at https://defeo.lu/docet
The beauty and the beast (credit: Lorenz Panny) Components of particular isogeny graphs look like this: Which of these is good for crypto? Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 33 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
The beauty and the beast (credit: Lorenz Panny) Components of particular isogeny graphs look like this: Which of these is good for crypto? Both. Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 33 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
The beauty and the beast (credit: Lorenz Panny) At this time, there are two distinct families of systems: ❋ p ❋ p 2 CSIDH [pron.: sea-side] SIDH https://csidh.isogeny.org https://sike.org Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 33 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
Brief history of isogeny-based cryptography 1997 Couveignes introduces the Hard Homogeneous Spaces framework. His work stays unpublished for 10 years. 2006 Rostovtsev & Stolbunov independently rediscover Couveignes ideas, suggest isogeny-based Diffie–Hellman as a quantum-resistant primitive. 2006-2010 Other isogeny-based protocols by Teske and Charles, Goren & Lauter. 2011-2012 D., Jao & Plût introduce SIDH, an efficient post-quantum key exchange inspired by Couveignes, Rostovtsev, Stolbunov, Charles, Goren, Lauter. 2017 SIDH is submitted to the NIST competition (with the name SIKE, only isogeny-based candidate). 2018 D., Kieffer & Smith resurrect the Couveignes–Rostovtsev–Stolbunov protocol, Castryck, Lange, Martindale, Panny & Renes create an efficient variant named CSIDH. 2019 The year of proofs of isogeny knowledge: SeaSign (D. & Galbraith; Decru, Panny & Vercauteren), CSI-FiSh (Beullens, Kleinjung & Vercauteren), VDF (D., Masson, Petit & Sanso), threshold (D. & Meyer). Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 34 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
Elliptic curves Let E ✿ y 2 ❂ x 3 ✰ ax ✰ b be an elliptic curve... R Q P P ✰ Q Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 35 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
✰ Elliptic curves Let E ✿ y 2 ❂ x 3 ✰ ax ✰ b be an elliptic curve... Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 35 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
✰ Elliptic curves Let E ✿ y 2 ❂ x 3 ✰ ax ✰ b be an elliptic curve... Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 35 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
✰ Elliptic curves Let E ✿ y 2 ❂ x 3 ✰ ax ✰ b be an elliptic curve... Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 35 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
✰ Elliptic curves Let E ✿ y 2 ❂ x 3 ✰ ax ✰ b be an elliptic curve... Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 35 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
✰ Elliptic curves Let E ✿ y 2 ❂ x 3 ✰ ax ✰ b be an elliptic curve... Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 35 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
Elliptic curves Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 36 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
The QUANTHOM Menace Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 37 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
Basically every isogeny-based key-exchange... Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 38 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
Basically every isogeny-based key-exchange... Public curve Public curve Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 38 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
Basically every isogeny-based key-exchange... Public curve Shared secret Public curve Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 38 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
Hard Homogeneous Spaces 1 Principal Homogeneous Space ● ✟ ❊ : A (finite) set ❊ acted upon by a group ● faithfully and transitively: ✄ ✿ ● ✂ ❊ � ✦ ❊ ✦ E ✵ g ✄ E ✼� Compatibility: g ✵ ✄ ✭ g ✄ E ✮ ❂ ✭ g ✵ g ✮ ✄ E for all g ❀ g ✵ ✷ ● and E ✷ ❊ ; Identity: e ✄ E ❂ E if and only if e ✷ ● is the identity element; Transitivity: for all E ❀ E ✵ ✷ ❊ there exist a unique g ✷ ● such that g ✄ E ✵ ❂ E . Example: the set of elliptic curves with complex multiplication by ❖ is a PHS for the class group ❈❧✭ ❖ ✮ . 1 Couveignes 2006. Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 39 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
Hard Homogeneous Spaces Hard Homogeneous Space (HHS) A Principal Homogeneous Space ● ✟ ❊ such that ● is commutative and: Evaluating E ✵ ❂ g ✄ E is easy; Inverting the action is hard. Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 40 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
HHS Diffie–Hellman Goal: Alice and Bob have never met before. They are chatting over a public channel, and want to agree on a shared secret to start a private conversation. Setup: They agree on a (large) HHS ● ✟ ❊ of order N . Bob Alice pick random a ✷ ● pick random b ✷ ● compute E A ❂ a ✄ E 0 compute E B ❂ b ✄ E 0 E A E B Shared secret is a ✄ E B ❂ ✭ ab ✮ ✄ E 0 ❂ b ✄ E A Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 41 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
HHSDH from complex multiplication Obstacles: E 3 E 4 E 2 The group size of ❈❧✭ ❖ ✮ is unknown. Only ideals of small norm (isogenies of small degree) E 5 E 1 are efficient to evaluate. Solution: E 6 E 12 Restrict to elements of ❈❧✭ ❖ ✮ of the form ❨ a e i g ❂ E 7 E 11 i for a basis of a i of small norm. E 8 E 10 E 9 Equivalent to doing isogeny walks of smooth degree. Luca De Feo (IBM Research Zürich) Isogeny Based Cryptography NTNU 42 / 73 https://defeo.lu/docet
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