Internet Resiliency to Attacks and Failures under BGP Policy Routing D. Dolev, S. Jamin, O. Morkyn, Y. Shavitt Presenter: Shiva Kasiviswanathan Pennsylvania State University University Park Internet Resiliency to Attacks and Failures under BGP Policy Routing – p. 1/12
Layout of the Presentation Introduction to Resiliency Internet Resiliency to Attacks and Failures under BGP Policy Routing – p. 2/12
Layout of the Presentation Introduction to Resiliency Drawbacks of Related Works Internet Resiliency to Attacks and Failures under BGP Policy Routing – p. 2/12
Layout of the Presentation Introduction to Resiliency Drawbacks of Related Works BGP protocol Internet Resiliency to Attacks and Failures under BGP Policy Routing – p. 2/12
Layout of the Presentation Introduction to Resiliency Drawbacks of Related Works BGP protocol AS Connectivity and Internet Topology Internet Resiliency to Attacks and Failures under BGP Policy Routing – p. 2/12
Layout of the Presentation Introduction to Resiliency Drawbacks of Related Works BGP protocol AS Connectivity and Internet Topology Graph Theoretic Modeling Internet Resiliency to Attacks and Failures under BGP Policy Routing – p. 2/12
Resiliency in Internet Internet collection of Autonomous systems. Internet Resiliency to Attacks and Failures under BGP Policy Routing – p. 3/12
Resiliency in Internet Internet collection of Autonomous systems. Path 1: Stability of Routing protocols. Internet Resiliency to Attacks and Failures under BGP Policy Routing – p. 3/12
Resiliency in Internet Internet collection of Autonomous systems. Path 1: Stability of Routing protocols. Path 2: Random Failures of nodes or Attack on key elements. Internet Resiliency to Attacks and Failures under BGP Policy Routing – p. 3/12
Resiliency in Internet Internet collection of Autonomous systems. Path 1: Stability of Routing protocols. Path 2: Random Failures of nodes or Attack on key elements. Internet topology as Scale Free, i.e., follows Power law. Internet Resiliency to Attacks and Failures under BGP Policy Routing – p. 3/12
Resiliency in Internet Internet collection of Autonomous systems. Path 1: Stability of Routing protocols. Path 2: Random Failures of nodes or Attack on key elements. Internet topology as Scale Free, i.e., follows Power law. Phase Transition Phenomena: Random Deletion doest’t disconnect. Internet Resiliency to Attacks and Failures under BGP Policy Routing – p. 3/12
Resiliency in Internet Internet collection of Autonomous systems. Path 1: Stability of Routing protocols. Path 2: Random Failures of nodes or Attack on key elements. Internet topology as Scale Free, i.e., follows Power law. Phase Transition Phenomena: Random Deletion doest’t disconnect. Internet Susceptible to attacks on high degree nodes. Internet Resiliency to Attacks and Failures under BGP Policy Routing – p. 3/12
Resiliency in Internet Internet collection of Autonomous systems. Path 1: Stability of Routing protocols. Path 2: Random Failures of nodes or Attack on key elements. Internet topology as Scale Free, i.e., follows Power law. Phase Transition Phenomena: Random Deletion doest’t disconnect. Internet Susceptible to attacks on high degree nodes. Internet Resiliency to Attacks and Failures under BGP Policy Routing – p. 3/12
Drawbacks of Related Works Treat Internet as undirected graph. Internet Resiliency to Attacks and Failures under BGP Policy Routing – p. 4/12
Drawbacks of Related Works Treat Internet as undirected graph. Routing in Internet is governed by policies with aid of BGP. Internet Resiliency to Attacks and Failures under BGP Policy Routing – p. 4/12
Drawbacks of Related Works Treat Internet as undirected graph. Routing in Internet is governed by policies with aid of BGP. Physical Path alone not enough for information exchange. Internet Resiliency to Attacks and Failures under BGP Policy Routing – p. 4/12
Drawbacks of Related Works Treat Internet as undirected graph. Routing in Internet is governed by policies with aid of BGP. Physical Path alone not enough for information exchange. A valid path conforming to the policies of AS should exist. Internet Resiliency to Attacks and Failures under BGP Policy Routing – p. 4/12
Drawbacks of Related Works Treat Internet as undirected graph. Routing in Internet is governed by policies with aid of BGP. Physical Path alone not enough for information exchange. A valid path conforming to the policies of AS should exist. Data used reflect partial view of Internet. Internet Resiliency to Attacks and Failures under BGP Policy Routing – p. 4/12
Drawbacks of Related Works Treat Internet as undirected graph. Routing in Internet is governed by policies with aid of BGP. Physical Path alone not enough for information exchange. A valid path conforming to the policies of AS should exist. Data used reflect partial view of Internet. Data collected from few nodes and contain neighbors on shortest BGP path. Internet Resiliency to Attacks and Failures under BGP Policy Routing – p. 4/12
Drawbacks of Related Works Treat Internet as undirected graph. Routing in Internet is governed by policies with aid of BGP. Physical Path alone not enough for information exchange. A valid path conforming to the policies of AS should exist. Data used reflect partial view of Internet. Data collected from few nodes and contain neighbors on shortest BGP path. Also BGP doesn’t advertise backup path. Internet Resiliency to Attacks and Failures under BGP Policy Routing – p. 4/12
AS connectivity and Internet Topology BGP protocol enables each administrative domain to decide which path to use. Internet Resiliency to Attacks and Failures under BGP Policy Routing – p. 5/12
AS connectivity and Internet Topology BGP protocol enables each administrative domain to decide which path to use. Paths in Internet not shortest paths, but shortest conforming to AS policies. Internet Resiliency to Attacks and Failures under BGP Policy Routing – p. 5/12
AS connectivity and Internet Topology BGP protocol enables each administrative domain to decide which path to use. Paths in Internet not shortest paths, but shortest conforming to AS policies. Commercial agreements between AS create relationships. Internet Resiliency to Attacks and Failures under BGP Policy Routing – p. 5/12
AS connectivity and Internet Topology BGP protocol enables each administrative domain to decide which path to use. Paths in Internet not shortest paths, but shortest conforming to AS policies. Commercial agreements between AS create relationships. Customer-Provider, Peer to Peer, Siblings. Internet Resiliency to Attacks and Failures under BGP Policy Routing – p. 5/12
AS connectivity and Internet Topology BGP protocol enables each administrative domain to decide which path to use. Paths in Internet not shortest paths, but shortest conforming to AS policies. Commercial agreements between AS create relationships. Customer-Provider, Peer to Peer, Siblings. Peer to Peer and Siblings differ in amount of transit information. Internet Resiliency to Attacks and Failures under BGP Policy Routing – p. 5/12
AS connectivity and Internet Topology BGP protocol enables each administrative domain to decide which path to use. Paths in Internet not shortest paths, but shortest conforming to AS policies. Commercial agreements between AS create relationships. Customer-Provider, Peer to Peer, Siblings. Peer to Peer and Siblings differ in amount of transit information. Paper by Lixin Gao defines algorithm for inferring relation- ships from BGP paths. Internet Resiliency to Attacks and Failures under BGP Policy Routing – p. 5/12
Connectivity and Internet Topology Contd.. Define uphill path as customer-provider links. Internet Resiliency to Attacks and Failures under BGP Policy Routing – p. 6/12
Connectivity and Internet Topology Contd.. Define uphill path as customer-provider links. Define downhill path as provider-customer links. Internet Resiliency to Attacks and Failures under BGP Policy Routing – p. 6/12
Connectivity and Internet Topology Contd.. Define uphill path as customer-provider links. Define downhill path as provider-customer links. One legal AS path is uphill followed by downhill. Internet Resiliency to Attacks and Failures under BGP Policy Routing – p. 6/12
Connectivity and Internet Topology Contd.. Define uphill path as customer-provider links. Define downhill path as provider-customer links. One legal AS path is uphill followed by downhill. Other is uphill followed by peer link followed by downhill. Internet Resiliency to Attacks and Failures under BGP Policy Routing – p. 6/12
Connectivity and Internet Topology Contd.. Define uphill path as customer-provider links. Define downhill path as provider-customer links. One legal AS path is uphill followed by downhill. Other is uphill followed by peer link followed by downhill. AS relationship studies also reveal that Internet is hierar- chical. Internet Resiliency to Attacks and Failures under BGP Policy Routing – p. 6/12
AS Graph Model AS is modeled as directed graph with nodes as AS systems and edges if they have peering relationship and BGP neighbors. Internet Resiliency to Attacks and Failures under BGP Policy Routing – p. 7/12
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