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Comments on International taxation and company tax policy in small open economies by George R. Zodrow Iris Claus Victoria University of Wellington Tax Policy Conference New Zealand Tax Reform Where To Next? 11-13 February 2009


  1. Comments on International taxation and company tax policy in small open economies by George R. Zodrow Iris Claus Victoria University of Wellington Tax Policy Conference “New Zealand Tax Reform – Where To Next?” 11-13 February 2009

  2. Summary of paper � The paper discusses the implications of the global Sum m ary of paper economic environment for company income taxation in New Zealand. I nternational � It argues that small open economies face capital m obility increasing international capital mobility, tax competition and tax avoidance. I m portance of econom ic � An Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) tax might rents be an attractive business tax reform option for New Scope for Zealand in the current environment. incom e � The ACE tax achieves many benefits. shifting � It is consumption based tax. W here to � It eliminates the taxation of normal returns by next? giving deductions for the return on equity. � But it would be radical reform.

  3. Implications for NZ tax reform � Should medium term tax reform in New Zealand Sum m ary of paper aim for radical change? � What are the specific circumstances in New Zealand I nternational capital (capital mobility, economic rents, income shifting)? m obility � Do they argue for or against a complete re-design I m portance of the New Zealand tax system? of econom ic rents Scope for i ncom e shifting W here to next?

  4. International capital mobility � If international capital is perfectly mobile, it should Sum m ary of not be taxed and the company tax rate should be paper zero. I nternational � International capital has been found to be mobile. capital � Capital is responsive to tax. m obility � But the empirical evidence suggests some barriers I m portance to capital mobility: of econom ic – Home bias in equity portfolios (i.e. investors rents engaging in a sub-optimal degree of international Scope for diversification) incom e – Lack of financial integration of equity markets shifting – Existence of liquidity premiums W here to � Barriers to capital mobility arise because of: next? – Costs of adjusting capital stocks – Credit markets frictions

  5. Credit market frictions � Credit market frictions arise because of information Sum m ary of paper asymmetries: borrowers know more about their investment projects than lenders. I nternational � They may be larger in a small open economy like capital m obility New Zealand. � New Zealand has a relatively large number of small I m portance of econom ic businesses – acquiring information about small rents firms is more costly. Scope for � Additional information asymmetries may exist for incom e foreign investors compared to domestic investors. shifting W here to next?

  6. Credit market frictions � With credit market frictions, the supply of capital Sum m ary of paper becomes upward sloping as the level of external financing increases. I nternational � Capital supply is no longer infinitely elastic in a capital m obility small open economy. � An aside: I m portance of econom ic – Credit market frictions do not suggest capital rents income subsidies. Scope for – They are reduced by government policies that incom e encourage the production of information. shifting – Subsidies and concessions worsen credit market W here to frictions and can lead to financial instability … next? … as is demonstrated by current events.

  7. Importance of economic rents � A qualification to the zero tax argument for Sum m ary of paper companies is the existence of economic rents. � Economic rents arise because of imperfect I nternational capital competition. m obility � One condition for perfect competition is that buyers I m portance and sellers are price takers, i.e. there is large of econom ic number of buyers and sellers. rents � New Zealand is an economy with not even 4.3 Scope for million buyers and only about 471,100 sellers incom e (businesses). shifting � It has access to international markets with few W here to constraints to trade integration. next?

  8. Importance of economic rents Sum m ary of New Zealand: World Trade Indicators 2008 (ranking) paper External environment 14 (out of 126) I nternational Trade policy 19 (out of 125) capital m obility Institutional environment 2 (out of 181) I m portance Trade facilitation 19 (out of 151) of econom ic Trade outcome 87 (out of 161) rents Source: World Bank Scope for incom e � A low ranking for trade outcome reflects fewer shifting tradable goods and services in New Zealand (measured by imports plus exports as a percent of W here to gross domestic product, GDP). next? � Non-tradable goods and services (not subject to international competition) make up at least 31 percent of GDP.

  9. Importance of economic rents � Indicative evidence supporting the existence of Sum m ary of paper imperfect competition and economic rents: – sluggish price adjustments by firms I nternational capital – imperfect pass through of exchange rate m obility changes to consumer prices I m portance – relative high rates of return to capital in New of econom ic Zealand rents Scope for incom e shifting W here to next?

  10. Scope for income shifting � Conclusions of the literature on international tax Sum m ary of paper avoidance: – Multinationals aggressively engage in tax I nternational capital minimisation. m obility – Transfer pricing I m portance – Profit shifting of econom ic – Thin capitalisation rents – Most of the literature has focused on the United Scope for States and Europe. incom e � What is the scope of international tax avoidance in shifting New Zealand? W here to next? � Multinationals in New Zealand?

  11. Scope for income shifting � In 2007 according to the New Zealand Management Sum m ary of paper magazine … � Of the top 10 non-financial firms in terms of total I nternational capital assets, only one was foreign (Australian) m obility controlled. The top 10 firms held over 40 percent of total assets. I m portance of econom ic � In terms of turnover, the top 10 non-financial firms rents contributed almost 37 percent to turnover. Three Scope for were foreign (Australian and UK) controlled. incom e � New Zealand largest firms are not multinationals shifting but domestically owned and not publicly held in W here to some cases. next?

  12. Scope for income shifting � Conclusion of the literature in terms of income Sum m ary of paper shifting between personal and company tax bases: – High income individuals are very responsive to I nternational capital tax changes. m obility � Given that some of New Zealand’s largest firms are I m portance closely held, income shifting between personal and of econom ic company tax bases could be large. rents � Also New Zealand has a large number of self Scope for employed. incom e � Some indicative evidence of income shifting is shifting provided in other papers at this conference. W here to next?

  13. Where to next? � Will international company tax rates continue to Sum m ary of decline putting pressure on the NZ rate? paper Maybe not in the medium term … given I nternational governments’ rising indebtednesses. capital � What are the economic costs of company income m obility taxation in New Zealand? I m portance Maybe not as high as in other small open of econom ic economies given the specific circumstances in New rents Zealand (capital mobility, economic rents, income Scope for shifting). incom e � Is it time for a complete re-design of the New shifting Zealand tax system? W here to Maybe not yet. next? But the conclusion may need to be re-visited at a future VUW tax policy conference!

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