INFORMATION SHARING INITIATIVES INFORMATION SHARING INITIATIVES MATERIAL AND NON- -MATERIAL SOLUTIONS MATERIAL SOLUTIONS MATERIAL AND NON � Initiatives can be broken down into material and Initiatives can be broken down into material and � non- - material solutions to the information sharing material solutions to the information sharing non problem; problem; � Large and complex issues synchronizing Large and complex issues synchronizing � software, systems, etc.; software, systems, etc.; � Interim solutions have also evolved involving Interim solutions have also evolved involving � non- - material solutions material solutions – – the Human factor; the Human factor; non � The NJTTF is an example of a non The NJTTF is an example of a non- - material material � solution; solution; 3/ 8/ 2007 3/ 8/ 2007 Opinions are of the author and not the Opinions are of the author and not the FBI FBI
National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) Established In The Wake Of The 9/11 Attacks, the NJTTF Is A Multi-agency Task Force Consisting Of 41 Government Agencies Co-located Within The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) 3/8/2007
NJTTF Mission � To Enhance Communication, Coordination And Cooperation Between Federal, State, And Local Government Agencies Representing The Intelligence, Law Enforcement, Defense, Diplomatic, Public Safety And Homeland Security Communities By Providing A Point Of Fusion for The Sharing Of Intelligence. � To Provide Program Oversight Of The JTTFs. � To Provide Operational Support To CTD By Providing A Platform For Nationwide Intelligence and Trend Analysis Projects. 3/8/2007
BARRIERS TO INFORMATION SHARING BARRIERS TO INFORMATION SHARING TECHNOLOGICAL INCOMPATABILITY, HUMAN TECHNOLOGICAL INCOMPATABILITY, HUMAN , ORGANIZATIONAL/CULTURAL NATURE , ORGANIZATIONAL/CULTURAL NATURE DIFFERENCES, AND SYSTEMIC HURDLES DIFFERENCES, AND SYSTEMIC HURDLES COMPUTER PROGRAMMI NG I NCOMPATABI LI TI ES COMPUTER PROGRAMMI NG I NCOMPATABI LI TI ES � � ARE ONE DI MENSI ON OF THE PROBLEM; ARE ONE DI MENSI ON OF THE PROBLEM; A SECOND DI MENSI ON I NVOLVES HUMAN NATURE HUMAN NATURE A SECOND DI MENSI ON I NVOLVES � � W HI CH TRADI TI ONALLY RESI STS CHANGE; W HI CH TRADI TI ONALLY RESI STS CHANGE; ORGANI ZATI ONAL AUTHORI TI ES REI NFORCE ORGANI ZATI ONAL AUTHORI TI ES REI NFORCE � � I NFORMATI ON SEGREGATI ON - - - - AND BREEDS A AND BREEDS A I NFORMATI ON SEGREGATI ON CULTURAL TENDENCY NOT TO SHARE OVER TI ME OVER TI ME CULTURAL TENDENCY NOT TO SHARE LEADI NG TO A THI RD DI MENSI ONAL PROBLEM; LEADI NG TO A THI RD DI MENSI ONAL PROBLEM; FI NALLY, ORGANI ZATI ONAL AUTHORI TI ES AND FI NALLY, ORGANI ZATI ONAL AUTHORI TI ES AND � � POLI CI ES PROHI BI T SHARI NG I N SPECI FI C POLI CI ES PROHI BI T SHARI NG I N SPECI FI C CI RCUMSTANCES -- -- W HI CH I S A FOURTH CI RCUMSTANCES W HI CH I S A FOURTH DI MENSI ON AND A SYSTEMI C PROBLEM; SYSTEMI C PROBLEM; DI MENSI ON AND A 3/ 8/ 2007 3/ 8/ 2007
THE CURRENT FOCUS OF EFFORT TO SOLVE THE CURRENT FOCUS OF EFFORT TO SOLVE THE INFORMATION SHARING PROBLEM THE INFORMATION SHARING PROBLEM � THE MAJORITY OF GOVERNMENT EFFORT TO THE MAJORITY OF GOVERNMENT EFFORT TO � ENABLE GREATER INFORMATION SHARING ENABLE GREATER INFORMATION SHARING CENTERS ON SOLVING THE TECHNOLOGICAL CENTERS ON SOLVING THE TECHNOLOGICAL PROBLEM; PROBLEM; � WHILE MONUMENTAL BY ITSELF, SOLVING THIS WHILE MONUMENTAL BY ITSELF, SOLVING THIS � PROBLEM MAY NOT NOT SOLVE THE INFORMATION SOLVE THE INFORMATION PROBLEM MAY SHARING DILEMMA; SHARING DILEMMA; � THE HUMAN NATURE DIMENSION TAKES TIME THE HUMAN NATURE DIMENSION TAKES TIME � AND CAN EVENTUALLY BE RESOLVED; AND CAN EVENTUALLY BE RESOLVED; � A SECONDARY EFFORT IS BEING MADE ON THE A SECONDARY EFFORT IS BEING MADE ON THE � CULTURAL AND SYSTEMIC FRONTS BUT THESE CULTURAL AND SYSTEMIC FRONTS BUT THESE EFFORTS MAY NOT BE ENOUGH; EFFORTS MAY NOT BE ENOUGH; 3/ 8/ 2007 3/ 8/ 2007
WHY TERRORISTS SUCCEED IN THE WHY TERRORISTS SUCCEED IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY International Law is based on relationships between International Law is based on relationships between � � nation- - states, individual sovereignty concepts, and states, individual sovereignty concepts, and nation mutual and bilateral state agreements. mutual and bilateral state agreements. Sovereign authority, whether by country boundary or Sovereign authority, whether by country boundary or � � agreement, is geographical in nature. agreement, is geographical in nature. Terrorist, asymmetric threats operate and successfully Terrorist, asymmetric threats operate and successfully � � exploit the seams of international geography and exploit the seams of international geography and agreements either because nations are unwilling or agreements either because nations are unwilling or are unable to stop this threat. are unable to stop this threat. Authority, responsibility, and response to terrorist Authority, responsibility, and response to terrorist � � threats are geographically limited unless there is threats are geographically limited unless there is close, coordinated action between nation states. close, coordinated action between nation states. Typically, the international ability to respond to Typically, the international ability to respond to � � terrorist threats is too slow because nations are terrorist threats is too slow because nations are unwilling to compromise on sovereignty issues. unwilling to compromise on sovereignty issues. 3/ 8/ 2007 3/ 8/ 2007
HOW THE U.S GOVERNMENT AND HOW THE U.S GOVERNMENT AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS HAVE SIMILAR OTHER GOVERNMENTS HAVE SIMILAR VULNERABILITIES VULNERABILITIES The U.S. and many Government’ ’s structures, authorities, s structures, authorities, The U.S. and many Government � � and responsibilities are similarly segregated or aligned with and responsibilities are similarly segregated or aligned with defined roles, missions, policies, and funding lines that are defined roles, missions, policies, and funding lines that are analogous to the territorial boundaries of nation states. analogous to the territorial boundaries of nation states. Terrorist asymmetric threats are therefore able to operate Terrorist asymmetric threats are therefore able to operate � � in these governmental gaps and seams just as they are in these governmental gaps and seams just as they are able to operate in the territorial gaps and seams of able to operate in the territorial gaps and seams of countries. countries. The U.S. Government ’ The U.S. Government ’s structure and authorities are s structure and authorities are � � contained in the National Security Act (NSA) of 1947. contained in the National Security Act (NSA) of 1947. The NSA of 1947 was built on a Cold- - War paradigm of War paradigm of The NSA of 1947 was built on a Cold � � perceived conventional war and its reliance on international perceived conventional war and its reliance on international agreements founded on concepts of sovereignty. agreements founded on concepts of sovereignty. Governmental statutory authorities, policies, and Governmental statutory authorities, policies, and � � procedures, DoD areas of responsibility for Combatant procedures, DoD areas of responsibility for Combatant Commanders, and fiscal laws governing the necessary Commanders, and fiscal laws governing the necessary funding for these endeavors are not favorably organized or funding for these endeavors are not favorably organized or structured to combat terrorist threats. structured to combat terrorist threats. 3/ 8/ 2007 3/ 8/ 2007
AN INITIAL ATTEMPT AT FIXING THE SYSTEMIC PROBLEM IN THE U.S. • The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act provides an effort at consolidation and organization of the United States IC under one structure to combat asymmetric threats, but the necessary statutory and regulatory changes to operationalize this effort may not exist. (There is power for the DNI to make policy but a shortage in methodology to conduct operations consistent with it). • Absent organizational, statutory, and budgetary changes, there is little incentive for governmental agencies to cooperate. System s Collection, Analysis Strategic Identify Deter & Production Plans DNI To Enable Define Disrupt Monitor Defeat I ntelligence I nform ation Tradecraft Dom inance 3/8/2007
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