IAEA Programme on Nuclear Security: Activities, Goals and Priorities Muhammad KHALIQ SH-MAFA Division of Nuclear Security Department of Nuclear Safety and Security 17 May 2018 1
What Are the Materials? • Nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium and thorium in different forms) • Radioactive sources • Radioactively contaminated materials 2
Scope of application • Over 440 operating nuclear power plants, providing ~ 11 % total electricity worldwide • Nearly 250 research reactors • Over 300 fuel cycle facilities • More than 70 new nuclear power plants are being built in 15 countries • About 30 new countries embarking on nuclear power programmes • Millions of radioactive sources used in medicine, agriculture, industry, research…etc. • Establishing an effective and sustainable nuclear security infrastructure is crucial for the protection of individual, people, society and the environment 3
Potential Consequences Health Economic Environmental Societal • Property damage • Contamination • Blast • Effects on • Decontamination • Radiation of air, soil, and human • Evacuation / Exposure water resources behavior, relocation • Deterministic • Disruption of • Business relationships, • Stochastic ecosystems disruption and organization • Effects on political processes 4
Nuclear Security Prevention Detection Response … theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear or other radioactive material or their associated facilities 5
Nuclear Security Prevention, Detection and Response Measures Preventive Detection Response Measures Measures Measures Material Origin Material Transport Material Use Nuclear Security Material Loss Material Event or Theft Disposal Material Under Material Out of Regulatory Control Regulatory Control 6
Domains of Nuclear Security Computer and Nuclear material accounting information and inventory control for security Physical nuclear security protection Transport National detection security architecture Response to nuclear Threat and risk security events involving Protection of assessment MORC materials and facilities National laws and regulations Materials out of Nuclear regulatory forensics Nuclear control Security Legal and regulatory framework Radiological crime scene management International legal framework Human factor Nuclear security at Human resource major public events development Preventing and protecting against the insider threat Nuclear security culture 7
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK Legally Binding Legally Non-binding IAEA UN IMO ICAO IAEA General Security Assembly Council 8
IAEA NON-BINDING Code of Early INSTRUMENTS Conduct and INFCIRC/ Notification & CPPNM CPPNM Import/ 225/Revision 5 Assistance Amendment Export Conventions Guidance NON-BINDING BINDING INSTRUMENTS INSTRUMENTS 9
The Role of the IAEA Nuclear security is a national responsibility. The IAEA: • Supports States, upon request, in their efforts to establish and maintain effective nuclear security through assistance in capacity building, guidance or standards, human resource development and risk reduction • Facilitates adherence to implementation of international legal instruments related to nuclear security 10
IAEA Nuclear Security Activities All IAEA nuclear security activities are implemented in accordance with the nuclear security plan. • Latest NSP 2018-2021 approved by BoG and adopted by the GC61 on 17 September 2017 • Reaffirms the Agency central role in international nuclear security • Follows the programmatic outline of the Agency’s Programme and Budget for 2018-2019 (Programme 3.5) 11
NSP 2018-2021 Programme Elements 12
Information Management • Assessing nuclear security needs and priorities – Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans (INSSPs) – NUSIMS Self-assessment Tool – States’ requests and offers of assistance matrix • Information sharing – Incident & Trafficking Database (ITDB) – Sharing of other information voluntarily provided by States (under A/CPPNM, IPPAS good practices, etc.) Information and computer security, and information technology services • – Guidance – Training courses – Technical assistance – Coordinated Research Projects 13
Nuclear Security of Materials and Associated Facilities (MAFA) • Nuclear security approaches for the whole nuclear fuel cycle – Physical protection – Nuclear security culture – IPPAS missions, good practices • Enhancing nuclear materials security using accounting and control – NMAC – Insider threat • Upgrading security of radioactive material and associated facilities – Capacity building, lifecycle management of disused sources, CoC, IPPAS missions – Physical protection upgrades • Nuclear security in the transport of nuclear and other radioactive material – Training, exercises, practical assistance, regulatory framework 14
This is focus of MAFA for 2018: 1 . International Conference on the Security of Radioactive Material: The Way Forward for Prevention and Detection 2 . Assist Seibersdorf in meeting IPPAS Nuclear Security recommendations 3. Three ongoing CRPs: Research Reactors and Associated Facilities, Improvements in Preventive and Protective Measures against Insider Threats, Development of Nuclear Security Culture Enhancement Solutions. 4. Enhancement of regulatory regime for physical protection in Member States embarking on nuclear power and research programmes. 5. Technical guidance in revision and development (10) 6 . Advisory Service missions (6) New Challenges: Addressing risk of sabotage, computer security for transport, evolving security threats and advanced security technologies, addressing interfaces.
Nuclear Security of Materials Out of Regulatory Control • Institutional infrastructure for material out of regulatory control – National MORC infrastructure – INSServ missions, good practices – Capacity building • Nuclear security detection and response architecture – Technical support for States to establish detection and response measures for MORC – Major public events – Capacity building – Radiation detection equipment • Radiological crime scene management and nuclear forensic science – Guidance – Training and education – CRPs – National nuclear material databases and national nuclear forensic libraries 16
Programme Development and International Cooperation • International cooperation on nuclear security networks and partnerships – Information Exchange Meetings and other coordination – ICONS (2019) – Universalization of A/CPPNM, POC meetings, Review Conference (2021) • Education and training for human resource development – IAEA training and train-the-trainer – NSSCs and NSSC Networks – INSEN and educational materials, guidance and programmes – E-learning • Coordinating nuclear security guidance and advice services – Nuclear Security Guidance Committee (NSGC) – Advisory Group on Nuclear Security (AdSec) 17
External Coordination • Border Monitoring Working Group meetings in May and November 2017 • Information Exchange Meetings in April and November 2017 • 7 th Meeting of the Working Group on Radioactive Source Security (WGRSS) held in April 2017 18
Supporting the Nuclear Security Framework Globally • Technical Meeting of the Representatives of States Parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the CPPNM Amendment • As of today 156 States are party to the CPPNM • So far, 116 States ratified the A/CPPNM • During 2017, 8 States ratified A/CPPNM (Bangladesh, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Madagascar, Monaco, Namibia, Senegal) 19
IAEA Nuclear Security Series (NSS) The Nuclear Security Series (NSS) , developed in close consultation with Member State experts, bring together good practices suitable for broad implementation. The Nuclear Security Guidance Committee (NSGC ), open to all Member States, makes recommendations on the development and review of the Nuclear Security Series. 28 NSS Publications include : 1 Fundamentals 3 Recommendations 15 Implementing Guides 9 Technical Guidance 20
Development of the NSS Guidance • Published in 2017-2018: – One Technical Guidance (NSS-28-G) – One Implementing Guide (NSS-27-G) – Six translations • Previously approved by NSGC, awaiting publication: – Six Implementing Guides (4 new, 2 revisions) – Two Technical Guidance publications • Approved by the NSGC in 2017: – Three Implementing Guides – Two Technical Guidance publications 21
Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP) • The overall objectives of an INSSP are: – To identify and consolidate the nuclear security needs of an individual State an integrated document that includes the necessary nuclear security improvements, based on the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Series documents. – To provide a customized framework for coordinating and implementing nuclear security activities conducted by the State concerned and the IAEA. • All States are encouraged to develop and approve INSSPs and to take advantage of the Nuclear Security Information Management system (NUSIMS) self-assessment tool 22
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