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High-speed high-security cryptography: encrypting and authenticating the whole Internet D. J. Bernstein University of Illinois at Chicago wget -m -k -I / \ secspider.cs.ucla.edu cd secspider.cs.ucla.edu awk /GREEN.*GREEN.*GREEN.*Yes/

  1. High-speed high-security cryptography: encrypting and authenticating the whole Internet D. J. Bernstein University of Illinois at Chicago

  2. wget -m -k -I / \ secspider.cs.ucla.edu cd secspider.cs.ucla.edu awk ’ /GREEN.*GREEN.*GREEN.*Yes/ { split($0,x,/<TD>/) sub(/<\/TD>/,"",x[5]) print x[5] } ’ ./*--zone.html \ | sort -u | wc -l

  3. A brief history of DNSSEC server deployment: 1993.11: DNSSEC design begins.

  4. A brief history of DNSSEC server deployment: 1993.11: DNSSEC design begins. 2008.07: Kaminsky announces apocalypse, saves the world.

  5. A brief history of DNSSEC server deployment: 1993.11: DNSSEC design begins. 2008.07: Kaminsky announces apocalypse, saves the world. ✮ New focus on DNSSEC.

  6. A brief history of DNSSEC server deployment: 1993.11: DNSSEC design begins. 2008.07: Kaminsky announces apocalypse, saves the world. ✮ New focus on DNSSEC. 2009.08.09: 941 IP addresses worldwide are running DNSSEC servers.

  7. A brief history of DNSSEC server deployment: 1993.11: DNSSEC design begins. 2008.07: Kaminsky announces apocalypse, saves the world. ✮ New focus on DNSSEC. 2009.08.09: 941 IP addresses worldwide are running DNSSEC servers. 2010.12.24: 2536 IP addresses worldwide are running DNSSEC servers.

  8. What is DNSSEC?

  9. What is DNSSEC? Is it a lock for the Internet?

  10. What is DNSSEC? Is it a lock for the Internet? Or is it more like this?

  11. What is DNSSEC? Is it a lock for the Internet? Or is it more like this? Let’s see what DNSSEC can do as an amplification tool for denial-of-service attacks.

  12. Make list of DNSSEC domains: ( cd secspider.cs.ucla.edu awk ’ /^Zone <STRONG>/ { z = $2 sub(/<STRONG>/,"",z) sub(/<\/STRONG>/,"",z) } /GREEN.*GREEN.*GREEN.*Yes/ { split($0,x,/<TD>/) sub(/<\/TD>/,"",x[5]) print x[5],z,rand() }’ ./*--zone.html ) | sort -k3n \ | awk ’{print $1,$2}’ \ > SERVERS

  13. For each domain: Try query, estimate DNSSEC amplification. while read ip z do dig +dnssec +ignore +tries=1 \ +time=1 any "$z" "@$ip" | \ awk -v "z=$z" -v "ip=$ip" ’{ if ($1 != ";;") next if ($2 != "MSG") next if ($3 != "SIZE") next if ($4 != "rcvd:") next est = (22+$5)/(40+length(z)) print est,ip,z }’ done < SERVERS > AMP

  14. For each DNSSEC server, find domain estimated to have maximum DNSSEC amplification: sort -nr AMP | awk ’{ if (seen[$2]) next if ($1 < 30) next print $1,$2,$3 seen[$2] = 1 }’ > MAXAMP head -1 MAXAMP wc -l MAXAMP Output: 95.6279 156.154.102.26 fi. 2326 MAXAMP

  15. Can that really be true? ❃ 2000 DNSSEC servers around the Internet, each providing ❃ 30 ✂ amplification of incoming UDP packets?

  16. Can that really be true? ❃ 2000 DNSSEC servers around the Internet, each providing ❃ 30 ✂ amplification of incoming UDP packets? Let’s verify this. Choose quiet test machines on two different networks (without egress filters). e.g. Sender: 1.2.3.4. Receiver: 5.6.7.8.

  17. Run network-traffic monitors on 1.2.3.4 and 5.6.7.8. On 1.2.3.4, set response address to 5.6.7.8, and send 1 query/second: ifconfig eth0:1 \ 5.6.7.8 \ netmask 255.255.255.255 while read est ip z do dig -b 5.6.7.8 \ +dnssec +ignore +tries=1 \ +time=1 any "$z" "@$ip" done < MAXAMP >/dev/null 2>&1

  18. I sustained 51 ✂ amplification of actual network traffic in a US-to-Europe experiment on typical university computers.

  19. I sustained 51 ✂ amplification of actual network traffic in a US-to-Europe experiment on typical university computers. Attacker sending 10Mbps can trigger 500Mbps flood from the DNSSEC drone pool, taking down typical site.

  20. I sustained 51 ✂ amplification of actual network traffic in a US-to-Europe experiment on typical university computers. Attacker sending 10Mbps can trigger 500Mbps flood from the DNSSEC drone pool, taking down typical site. Attacker sending 200Mbps can trigger 10Gbps flood, taking down very large site.

  21. I sustained 51 ✂ amplification of actual network traffic in a US-to-Europe experiment on typical university computers. Attacker sending 10Mbps can trigger 500Mbps flood from the DNSSEC drone pool, taking down typical site. Attacker sending 200Mbps can trigger 10Gbps flood, taking down very large site. Want even more: 100Gbps? Tell people to install DNSSEC!

  22. Cryptographic failure patterns Alice and Bob are communicating. Eve is eavesdropping. Alice and Bob have several standard security goals: Confidentiality despite espionage. Maybe Eve wants to acquire data. Integrity despite corruption. Maybe Eve wants to change data. Availability despite sabotage. Maybe Eve wants to destroy data.

  23. Failure pattern #1: “The attacker isn’t sniffing our network packets so we’re secure.” Example of this “security”: Typical HTTP user cookies.

  24. Failure pattern #1: “The attacker isn’t sniffing our network packets so we’re secure.” Example of this “security”: Typical HTTP user cookies.

  25. Failure pattern #2: “The attacker isn’t forging network packets so we’re secure.” Examples of this “security”: ✎ TCP checking IP address. ✎ DNS checking IP address. ✎ New: Tcpcrypt.

  26. Failure pattern #2: “The attacker isn’t forging network packets so we’re secure.” Examples of this “security”: ✎ TCP checking IP address. ✎ DNS checking IP address. ✎ New: Tcpcrypt. “Compare this tcpdump output, which appears encrypted ✿ ✿ ✿ with the cleartext packets you would see without tcpcryptd running. ✿ ✿ ✿ Active attacks are much harder as they require listening and modifying network traffic.”

  27. Failure pattern #3: “We detect corrupt data so we’re secure.”

  28. Failure pattern #3: “We detect corrupt data so we’re secure.” What about confidentiality? DNSSEC encrypts nothing, and broadcasts private DNS names (such as acadmedpa.org.br ). dnscurve.org/nsec3walker.html

  29. Failure pattern #3: “We detect corrupt data so we’re secure.” What about confidentiality? DNSSEC encrypts nothing, and broadcasts private DNS names (such as acadmedpa.org.br ). dnscurve.org/nsec3walker.html What about availability? Eve destroys an SSH connection or an HTTPS connection or a DNSSEC lookup by forging one packet. Eve uses the DNSSEC drones to amplify DDoS attacks.

  30. Failure pattern #4: “The attacker doesn’t control these trusted third parties so we’re secure.”

  31. Failure pattern #4: “The attacker doesn’t control these trusted third parties so we’re secure.” Are the HTTPS certificate authorities all trustworthy?

  32. Failure pattern #4: “The attacker doesn’t control these trusted third parties so we’re secure.” Are the HTTPS certificate authorities all trustworthy? Is the DNS root trustworthy?

  33. Failure pattern #5: “We’re cryptographically protecting ❳ so we’re secure.”

  34. Failure pattern #5: “We’re cryptographically protecting ❳ so we’re secure.” Is ❳ the complete communication from Alice to Bob, all the way from Alice to Bob?

  35. Failure pattern #5: “We’re cryptographically protecting ❳ so we’re secure.” Is ❳ the complete communication from Alice to Bob, all the way from Alice to Bob? Often ❳ doesn’t reach Bob.

  36. Failure pattern #5: “We’re cryptographically protecting ❳ so we’re secure.” Is ❳ the complete communication from Alice to Bob, all the way from Alice to Bob? Often ❳ doesn’t reach Bob. Example: Bob views Alice’s web page on his Android phone. Phone asked hotel DNS cache for web server’s address. Eve forged the DNS response! DNS cache checked DNSSEC but the phone didn’t.

  37. Often ❳ isn’t Alice’s data.

  38. Often ❳ isn’t Alice’s data. “.ORG becomes the first open TLD to sign their zone with DNSSEC ✿ ✿ ✿ Today we reached a significant milestone in our effort to bolster online security for the .ORG community. We are the first open generic Top-Level Domain to successfully sign our zone with Domain Name Security Extensions (DNSSEC). To date, the .ORG zone is the largest domain registry to implement this needed security measure.”

  39. What did .org actually sign? 2010.12.25 test: Look up wikipedia.org . The response has a signed statement “There might be names with hashes between hh91kmqm332a7m6egn74ln9afi3fgk84 , hheprfsv14o44rv9pgcndkt4thnraomv but we haven’t signed any of those names. Sincerely, .org ” Plus an unsigned statement “The wikipedia.org servers are 208.80.152.130, 208.80.152.142, 91.198.174.4.”

  40. Often ❳ is horribly incomplete.

  41. Often ❳ is horribly incomplete. Example: ❳ is a server address, with a DNSSEC signature. What Alice is sending to Bob are web pages, email, etc. Those aren’t the same as ❳ !

  42. Often ❳ is horribly incomplete. Example: ❳ is a server address, with a DNSSEC signature. What Alice is sending to Bob are web pages, email, etc. Those aren’t the same as ❳ ! Alice can use HTTPS to protect her web pages ✿ ✿ ✿ but then what attack is stopped by DNSSEC?

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