Growth Management Growth Management Issues Issues STBR. v. - PDF document

�� !�!�� Decision Decision � 3��#(#��7�.#�� 3��#(#��7�.#�� %�,��#-��'�� %�,��#-��'�� )��(�� )��(�� !�� !�� !�� !�� '�� '��

OCTOBER TERM, 2009 1 (Slip Opinion) Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT, INC. v . FLOR- IDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC- TION ET AL . CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA No. 08–1151. Argued December 2, 2009—Decided June 17, 2010 Florida owns in trust for the public the land permanently submerged beneath navigable waters and the foreshore. The mean high-water line is the ordinary boundary between private beachfront, or littoral property, and state-owned land. Littoral owners have, inter alia, rights to have access to the water, to use the water for certain purposes, to have an unobstructed view of the water, and to receive accretions and relictions (collectively, accretions) to the littoral property. An accretion occurs gradually and imperceptibly, while a sudden change is an avulsion. The littoral owner automatically takes title to dry land added to his property by accretion. With avulsion, however, the seaward boundary of littoral property remains what it was: the mean high-water line before the event. Thus, when an avulsion has added new land, the littoral owner has no right to subsequent accretions, because the property abutting the water belongs to the owner of the seabed (ordinarily the State). Florida’s Beach and Shore Preservation Act establishes procedures for depositing sand on eroded beaches (restoration) and maintaining the deposited sand (nourishment). When such a project is under- taken, the State entity that holds title to the seabed sets a fixed “erosion control line” to replace the fluctuating mean high-water line as the boundary between littoral and state property. Once the new line is recorded, the common law ceases to apply. Thereafter, when accretion moves the mean high-water line seaward, the littoral property remains bounded by the permanent erosion-control line. Respondents the city of Destin and Walton County sought permits to restore 6.9 miles of beach eroded by several hurricanes, adding about 75 feet of dry sand seaward of the mean high-water line (to be

2 STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT, INC. v. FLOR- IDA DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION Syllabus denominated the erosion-control line). Petitioner, a nonprofit corporation formed by owners of beachfront property bordering the project (hereinafter Members) brought an unsuccessful administrative challenge. Respondent the Florida Department of Environmental Protec- tion approved the permits, and this suit followed. The State Court of Appeal concluded that the Department’s order had eliminated the Members’ littoral rights (1) to receive accretions to their property and (2) to have their property’s contact with the water remain intact. Concluding that this would be an unconstitutional taking and would require an additional administrative requirement to be met, it set aside the order, remanded the proceeding, and certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question whether the Act unconstitutionally deprived the Members of littoral rights without just compensation. The State Supreme Court answered “no” and quashed the remand, concluding that the Members did not own the property supposedly taken. Petitioner sought rehearing on the ground that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision effected a taking of the Members’ littoral rights contrary to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; rehearing was denied. Held: The judgment is affirmed. 998 So. 2d 1102, affirmed. J USTICE S CALIA delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, IV, and V, concluding that the Florida Supreme Court did not take property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Pp. 24–29. (a) Respondents’ arguments that petitioner does not own the property and that the case is not ripe were not raised in the briefs in opposition and thus are deemed waived. Pp. 24–25. (b) There can be no taking unless petitioner can show that, before the Florida Supreme Court’s decision, littoral property owners had rights to future accretions and to contact with the water superior to the State’s right to fill in its submerged land. That showing cannot be made. Two core Florida property-law principles intersect here. First, the State as owner of the submerged land adjacent to littoral property has the right to fill that land, so long as it does not interfere with the rights of the public and of littoral landowners. Second, if an avulsion exposes land seaward of littoral property that had previously been submerged, that land belongs to the State even if it interrupts the littoral owner’s contact with the water. Prior Florida law suggests that there is no exception to this rule when the State causes the avulsion. Thus, Florida law as it stood before the decision below allowed the State to fill in its own seabed, and the resulting sudden exposure of previously submerged land was treated like an avulsion for ownership purposes. The right to accretions was therefore subor-

Cite as: 560 U. S. ____ (2010) 3 Syllabus dinate to the State’s right to fill. Pp. 25–27. (c) The decision below is consistent with these principles. Cf. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council , 505 U. S. 1003, 1028–1029. It did not abolish the Members’ right to future accretions, but merely held that the right was not implicated by the beach-restoration project because of the doctrine of avulsion. Relying on dicta in the Florida Su- preme Court’s Sand Key decision, petitioner contends that the State took the Members’ littoral right to have the boundary always be the mean high-water line. But petitioner’s interpretation of that dictum contradicts the clear law governing avulsion. One cannot say the Florida Supreme Court contravened established property law by rejecting it. Pp. 27–29. J USTICE S CALIA , joined by T HE C HIEF J USTICE , J USTICE T HOMAS , and J USTICE A LITO , concluded in Parts II and III that if a court declares that what was once an established right of private property no longer exists, it has taken that property in violation of the Takings Clause. Pp. 7–24. (a) Though the classic taking is a transfer of property by eminent domain, the Clause applies to other state actions that achieve the same thing, including those that recharacterize as public property what was previously private property, see Webb’s Fabulous Pharma- cies, Inc. v. Beckwith , 449 U. S. 155, 163–165. The Clause is not addressed to the action of a specific branch or branches. It is concerned simply with the act, not with the governmental actor. This Court’s precedents provide no support for the proposition that takings effected by the judicial branch are entitled to special treatment, and in fact suggest the contrary. See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies , supra. Pp. 7–20. (b) For a judicial taking, respondents would add to the normal takings inquiry the requirement that the court’s decision have no “fair and substantial basis.” This test is not obviously appropriate, but it is no different in this context from the requirement that the property owner prove an established property right. Respondents’ additional arguments—that federal courts lack the knowledge of state law required to decide whether a state judicial decision purporting to clarify property rights has instead taken them; that common-law judging should not be deprived of needed flexibility; and that applying the Takings Clause to judicial decisions would force lower federal courts to review final state-court judgments, in violation of the Rooker - Feldman doctrine, see Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. , 263 U. S. 413, 415–416, District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U. S. 462, 476—are unpersuasive. And petitioner’s proposed “unpredictability test”—that a judicial taking consists of a decision that “constitutes a sudden change in state law, unpredictable in terms of rele-

4 STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT, INC. v. FLOR- IDA DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION Syllabus vant precedents,” Hughes v. Washington , 389 U. S. 290, 296 (Stewart, J., concurring)—is misdirected. What counts is not whether there is precedent for the allegedly confiscatory decision, but whether the property right allegedly taken was well established. Pp. 20–24. J USTICE K ENNEDY , joined by J USTICE S OTOMAYOR , agreed that the Florida Supreme Court did not take property without just compensation, but concluded that this case does not require the Court to determine whether, or when, a judicial decision determining property owners’ rights can violate the Takings Clause. If and when future cases show that the usual principles, including constitutional ones that constrain the judiciary like due process, are inadequate to protect property owners, then the question whether a judicial decision can effect a taking would be properly presented. Pp. 1–10. J USTICE B REYER , joined by J USTICE G INSBURG , agreed that no unconstitutional taking occurred here, but concluded that it is unnecessary to decide more than that to resolve this case. Difficult questions of constitutional law— e.g., whether federal courts may review a state court’s decision to determine if it unconstitutionally takes private property without compensation, and what the proper test is for evaluating whether a state-court property decision enacts an unconstitutional taking—need not be addressed in order to dispose “of the immediate case.” Whitehouse v. Illinois Central R. Co. , 349 U. S. 366, 373. Such questions are better left for another day. Pp. 1–3. S CALIA , J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, IV, and V, in which R OB- ERTS , C. J., and K ENNEDY , T HOMAS , G INSBURG , B REYER , A LITO , and S O- TOMAYOR , JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts II and III, in which R OBERTS , C. J., and T HOMAS and A LITO , JJ., joined. K ENNEDY , J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which S OTOMAYOR , J., joined. B REYER , J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which G INSBURG , J., joined. S TEVENS , J., took no part in the decision of the case.

Cite as: 560 U. S. ____ (2010) 1 Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash- ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 08–1151 _________________ STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT, INC., PETITIONER v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ET AL . ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA [June 17, 2010] J USTICE S CALIA announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, IV, and V, and an opinion with respect to Parts II and III, in which T HE C HIEF J USTICE , J USTICE T HOMAS , and J USTICE A LITO join. We consider a claim that the decision of a State’s court of last resort took property without just compensation in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as applied against the States through the Fourteenth, see Dolan v. City of Tigard , 512 U. S. 374, 383–384 (1994). I A Generally speaking, state law defines property interests, Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation , 524 U. S. 156, 164 (1998), including property rights in navigable waters and the lands underneath them, see United States v. Cress , 243 U. S. 316, 319–320 (1917); St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. St. Paul Water Comm’rs , 168 U. S. 349, 358–359 (1897). In Florida, the State owns in trust for the

2 STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT, INC. v. FLOR- IDA DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION Opinion of the Court public the land permanently submerged beneath navigable waters and the foreshore (the land between the low- tide line and the mean high-water line). Fla. Const., Art. X, §11; Broward v. Mabry , 58 Fla. 398, 407–409, 50 So. 826, 829–830 (1909). Thus, the mean high-water line (the average reach of high tide over the preceding 19 years) is the ordinary boundary between private beachfront, or littoral 1 property, and state-owned land. See Miller v. Bay-To-Gulf , Inc. , 141 Fla. 452, 458–460, 193 So. 425, 427–428 (1940) (per curiam); Fla. Stat. §§177.27(14)– (15), 177.28(1) (2007). Littoral owners have, in addition to the rights of the public, certain “special rights” with regard to the water and the foreshore, Broward , 58 Fla., at 410, 50 So., at 830, rights which Florida considers to be property, generally akin to easements, see ibid.; Thiesen v. Gulf, Florida & Alabama R. Co., 75 Fla. 28, 57, 78, 78 So. 491, 500, 507 (1918) (on rehearing). These include the right of access to the water, the right to use the water for certain purposes, the right to an unobstructed view of the water, and the right to receive accretions and relictions to the littoral property. Id., at 58–59, 78 So., at 501; Board of Trustees of Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Assoc., Ltd. , 512 So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla. 1987). This is generally in accord with well-established common law, although the precise property rights vary among jurisdictions. Com- pare Broward , supra , at 409–410, 50 So., at 830, with 1 J. Lewis, Law of Eminent Domain §100 (3d ed. 1909); 1 H. Farnham, Law of Waters and Water Rights §62, pp. 278– —————— 1 Many cases and statutes use “riparian” to mean abutting any body of water. The Florida Supreme Court, however, has adopted a more precise usage whereby “riparian” means abutting a river or stream and “littoral” means abutting an ocean, sea, or lake. Walton Cty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. , 998 So. 2d 1102, 1105, n. 3 (2008). When speaking of the Florida law applicable to this case, we follow the Florida Supreme Court’s terminology.

Cite as: 560 U. S. ____ (2010) 3 Opinion of the Court 280 (1904) (hereinafter Farnham). At the center of this case is the right to accretions and relictions. Accretions are additions of alluvion (sand, sediment, or other deposits) to waterfront land; relictions are lands once covered by water that become dry when the water recedes. F. Maloney, S. Plager, & F. Baldwin, Wa- ter Law and Administration: The Florida Experience §126, pp. 385–386 (1968) (hereinafter Maloney); 1 Farnham §69, at 320. (For simplicity’s sake, we shall refer to accretions and relictions collectively as accretions, and the process whereby they occur as accretion.) In order for an addition to dry land to qualify as an accretion, it must have occurred gradually and imperceptibly—that is, so slowly that one could not see the change occurring, though over time the difference became apparent. Sand Key , supra , at 936; County of St. Clair v. Lovingston , 23 Wall. 46, 66–67 (1874). When, on the other hand, there is a “sudden or perceptible loss of or addition to land by the action of the water or a sudden change in the bed of a lake or the course of a stream,” the change is called an avulsion. Sand Key , supra , at 936; see also 1 Farnham §69, at 320. In Florida, as at common law, the littoral owner automatically takes title to dry land added to his property by accretion; but formerly submerged land that has become dry land by avulsion continues to belong to the owner of the seabed (usually the State). See, e.g., Sand Key , supra , at 937; Maloney §126.6, at 392; 2 W. Blackstone, Commen- taries on the Laws of England 261–262 (1766) (hereinafter Blackstone). Thus, regardless of whether an avulsive event exposes land previously submerged or submerges land previously exposed, the boundary between littoral property and sovereign land does not change; it remains (ordinarily) what was the mean high-water line before the event. See Bryant v. Peppe , 238 So. 2d 836, 838–839 (Fla. 1970); J. Gould, Law of Waters §158, p. 290 (1883). It follows from this that, when a new strip of land has been

4 STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT, INC. v. FLOR- IDA DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION Opinion of the Court added to the shore by avulsion, the littoral owner has no right to subsequent accretions. Those accretions no longer add to his property, since the property abutting the water belongs not to him but to the State. See Maloney §126.6, at 393; 1 Farnham §71a, at 328. B In 1961, Florida’s Legislature passed the Beach and Shore Preservation Act, 1961 Fla. Laws ch. 61–246, as amended, Fla. Stat. §§161.011–161.45 (2007). The Act establishes procedures for “beach restoration and nourishment projects,” §161.088, designed to deposit sand on eroded beaches (restoration) and to maintain the deposited sand (nourishment). §§161.021(3), (4). A local government may apply to the Department of Environmental Protection for the funds and the necessary permits to restore a beach, see §§161.101(1), 161.041(1). When the project involves placing fill on the State’s submerged lands, authorization is required from the Board of Trus- tees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, see §253.77(1), which holds title to those lands, §253.12(1). Once a beach restoration “is determined to be under- taken,” the Board sets what is called “an erosion control line.” §§161.161(3)–(5). It must be set by reference to the existing mean high-water line, though in theory it can be located seaward or landward of that. 2 See §161.161(5). Much of the project work occurs seaward of the erosion- control line, as sand is dumped on what was once submerged land. See App. 87–88. The fixed erosion-control line replaces the fluctuating mean high-water line as the —————— 2 We assume, as the parties agree we should, that in this case the erosion-control line is the pre-existing mean high-water line. Tr. of Oral Arg. 11–12. Respondents concede that, if the erosion-control line were established landward of that, the State would have taken property. Brief for Respondent Department et al. 15; Brief for Respondent Walton County et al. 6.

Cite as: 560 U. S. ____ (2010) 5 Opinion of the Court boundary between privately owned littoral property and state property. §161.191(1). Once the erosion-control line is recorded, the common law ceases to increase upland property by accretion (or decrease it by erosion). §161.191(2). Thus, when accretion to the shore moves the mean high-water line seaward, the property of beachfront landowners is not extended to that line (as the prior law provided), but remains bounded by the permanent erosion- control line. Those landowners “continue to be entitled,” however, “to all common-law riparian rights” other than the right to accretions. §161.201. If the beach erodes back landward of the erosion-control line over a substantial portion of the shoreline covered by the project, the Board may, on its own initiative, or must, if asked by the owners or lessees of a majority of the property affected, direct the agency responsible for maintaining the beach to return the beach to the condition contemplated by the project. If that is not done within a year, the project is canceled and the erosion-control line is null and void. §161.211(2), (3). Finally, by regulation, if the use of submerged land would “unreasonably infringe on riparian rights,” the project cannot proceed unless the local governments show that they own or have a property interest in the upland property adjacent to the project site. Fla. Admin. Code Rule 18–21.004(3)(b) (2009). C In 2003, the city of Destin and Walton County applied for the necessary permits to restore 6.9 miles of beach within their jurisdictions that had been eroded by several hurricanes. The project envisioned depositing along that shore sand dredged from further out. See Walton Cty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. , 998 So. 2d 1102, 1106 (Fla. 2008). It would add about 75 feet of dry sand seaward of the mean high-water line (to be denominated the erosion-control line). The Department issued a notice of

6 STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT, INC. v. FLOR- IDA DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION Opinion of the Court intent to award the permits, App. 27–41, and the Board approved the erosion-control line, id. , at 49–50. The petitioner here, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., is a nonprofit corporation formed by people who own beachfront property bordering the project area (we shall refer to them as the Members). It brought an administrative challenge to the proposed project, see id. , at 10–26, which was unsuccessful; the Department approved the permits. Petitioner then challenged that action in state court under the Florida Administrative Procedure Act, Fla. Stat. §120.68 (2007). The District Court of Appeal for the First District concluded that, contrary to the Act’s preservation of “all common-law riparian rights,” the order had eliminated two of the Members’ littoral rights: (1) the right to receive accretions to their property; and (2) the right to have the contact of their property with the water remain intact. Save Our Beaches , Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Environmental Protection , 27 So. 3d 48, 57 (2006). This, it believed, would be an unconstitutional taking, which would “unreasonably infringe on riparian rights,” and therefore require the showing under Fla. Admin. Code Rule 18–21.004(3)(b) that the local governments owned or had a property interest in the upland property. It set aside the Department’s final order approving the permits and remanded for that showing to be made. 27 So. 3d, at 60. It also certified to the Florida Supreme Court the following question (as rephrased by the latter court): “On its face, does the Beach and Shore Preservation Act unconstitutionally deprive upland owners of littoral rights without just compensation?” 3 998 So. 2d, at 1105 (footnotes omitted). —————— 3 The Florida Supreme Court seemingly took the question to refer to constitutionality under the Florida Constitution, which contains a clause similar to the Takings Clause of the Federal Constitution. Compare Fla. Const., Art. X, §6, cl. (a), with U. S. Const., Amdt. 5.

Cite as: 560 U. S. ____ (2010) 7 Opinion of the Court Opinion of S CALIA , J. The Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative, and quashed the First District’s remand. Id. , at 1121. It faulted the Court of Appeal for not considering the doctrine of avulsion, which it concluded permitted the State to reclaim the restored beach on behalf of the public. Id., at 1116–1118. It described the right to accretions as a future contingent interest, not a vested property right, and held that there is no littoral right to contact with the water independent of the littoral right of access, which the Act does not infringe. Id., at 1112, 1119–1120. Petitioner sought rehearing on the ground that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision itself effected a taking of the Members’ littoral rights contrary to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution. 4 The request for rehearing was denied. We granted certiorari, 557 U. S. ___ (2009). II A Before coming to the parties’ arguments in the present case, we discuss some general principles of our takings jurisprudence. The Takings Clause—“nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation,” U. S. Const., Amdt. 5—applies as fully to the taking of a landowner’s riparian rights as it does to the taking of an estate in land. 5 See Yates v. Milwaukee , 10 Wall. 497, 504 (1871). Moreover, though the classic taking is a trans- —————— 4 We ordinarily do not consider an issue first presented to a state court in a petition for rehearing if the state court did not address it. See Adams v. Robertson , 520 U. S. 83, 89, n. 3 (1997) (per curiam) . But where the state-court decision itself is claimed to constitute a violation of federal law, the state court’s refusal to address that claim put forward in a petition for rehearing will not bar our review. See Brinker- hoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill , 281 U. S. 673, 677–678 (1930). 5 We thus need not resolve whether the right of accretion is an ease- ment, as petitioner claims, or, as Florida claims, a contingent future interest.

8 STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT, INC. v. FLOR- IDA DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION Opinion of the Court Opinion of S CALIA , J. fer of property to the State or to another private party by eminent domain, the Takings Clause applies to other state actions that achieve the same thing. Thus, when the government uses its own property in such a way that it destroys private property, it has taken that property. See United States v. Causby , 328 U. S. 256, 261–262 (1946); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co. , 13 Wall. 166, 177–178 (1872). Similarly, our doctrine of regulatory takings “aims to identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking.” Lingle v. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. , 544 U. S. 528, 539 (2005). Thus, it is a taking when a state regulation forces a property owner to submit to a permanent physical occupation, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhat- tan CATV Corp. , 458 U. S. 419, 425–426 (1982), or deprives him of all economically beneficial use of his property, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council , 505 U. S. 1003, 1019 (1992). Finally (and here we approach the situation before us), States effect a taking if they recharacterize as public property what was previously private property. See Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith , 449 U. S. 155, 163–165 (1980). The Takings Clause (unlike, for instance, the Ex Post Facto Clauses, see Art. I, §9, cl. 3; §10, cl. 1) is not addressed to the action of a specific branch or branches. It is concerned simply with the act, and not with the governmental actor (“nor shall private property be taken ” (emphasis added)). There is no textual justification for saying that the existence or the scope of a State’s power to expro- priate private property without just compensation varies according to the branch of government effecting the expropriation. Nor does common sense recommend such a principle. It would be absurd to allow a State to do by judicial decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative fiat. See Stevens v. Cannon Beach , 510 U. S. 1207, 1211–1212 (1994) (S CALIA , J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).

Cite as: 560 U. S. ____ (2010) 9 Opinion of the Court Opinion of S CALIA , J. Our precedents provide no support for the proposition that takings effected by the judicial branch are entitled to special treatment, and in fact suggest the contrary. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74 (1980), involved a decision of the California Supreme Court overruling one of its prior decisions which had held that the California Constitution’s guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press, and of the right to petition the government, did not require the owner of private property to accord those rights on his premises. The appellants, owners of a shopping center, contended that their private property rights could not “be denied by invocation of a state constitutional provision or by judicial reconstruction of a State’s laws of private property ,” id ., at 79 (emphasis added). We held that there had been no taking, citing cases involving legislative and executive takings, and applying standard Takings Clause analysis. See id., at 82–84. We treated the California Supreme Court’s application of the constitutional provisions as a regulation of the use of private property, and evaluated whether that regulation violated the property owners’ “right to exclude others,” id., at 80 (internal quotation marks omitted). Our opinion addressed only the claimed taking by the constitutional provision. Its failure to speak separately to the claimed taking by “judicial reconstruction of a State’s laws of private property” certainly does not suggest that a taking by judicial action cannot occur, and arguably suggests that the same analysis applicable to taking by constitutional provision would apply. Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies , supra , is even closer in point. There the purchaser of an insolvent corporation had interpleaded the corporation’s creditors, placing the purchase price in an interest-bearing account in the regis- try of the Circuit Court of Seminole County, to be distrib- uted in satisfaction of claims approved by a receiver. The Florida Supreme Court construed an applicable statute to

10 STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT, INC. v. FLOR- IDA DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION Opinion of the Court Opinion of S CALIA , J. mean that the interest on the account belonged to the county, because the account was “considered ‘public money,’” Beckwith v. Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies , 374 So. 2d 951, 952–953 (1979) (per curiam) . We held this to be a taking. We noted that “[t]he usual and general rule is that any interest on an interpleaded and deposited fund follows the principal and is to be allocated to those who are ultimately to be the owners of that principal,” 449 U. S., at 162. “Neither the Florida Legislature by statute, nor the Florida courts by judicial decree,” we said, “may accomplish the result the county seeks simply by rechar- acterizing the principal as ‘public money.’” Id., at 164. In sum, the Takings Clause bars the State from taking private property without paying for it, no matter which branch is the instrument of the taking. To be sure, the manner of state action may matter: Condemnation by eminent domain, for example, is always a taking, while a legislative, executive, or judicial restriction of property use may or may not be, depending on its nature and extent. But the particular state actor is irrelevant. If a legislature or a court declares that what was once an established right of private property no longer exists, it has taken that property, no less than if the State had physically appro- priated it or destroyed its value by regulation. “[A] State, by ipse dixit , may not transform private property into public property without compensation.” Ibid. B J USTICE B REYER ’s concurrence says that we need neither (1) to decide whether the judiciary can ever effect a taking, nor (2) to establish the standard for determining whether it has done so. See post , at 1–2 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment). The second part of this is surely incompatible with J USTICE B REYER ’s conclusion that the “Florida Supreme Court’s decision in this case did not amount to a ‘judicial taking.’” Post , at 3.

Cite as: 560 U. S. ____ (2010) 11 Opinion of the Court Opinion of S CALIA , J. One cannot know whether a takings claim is invalid without knowing what standard it has failed to meet. 6 Which means that J USTICE B REYER must either (a) grapple with the artificial question of what would constitute a judicial taking if there were such a thing as a judicial taking (reminiscent of the perplexing question how much wood would a woodchuck chuck if a woodchuck could chuck wood?), or (b) answer in the negative what he considers to be the “unnecessary” constitutional question whether there is such a thing as a judicial taking. It is not true that deciding the constitutional question in this case contradicts our settled practice. To the contrary, we have often recognized the existence of a constitutional right, or established the test for violation of such a right (or both), and then gone on to find that the claim at issue fails. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T. L. O. , 469 U. S. 325, 333, 341–343 (1985) (holding that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches and seizures conducted by public- school officials, establishing the standard for finding a violation, but concluding that the claim at issue failed); Strickland v. Washington , 466 U. S. 668, 687, 698–700 (1984) (recognizing a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, establishing the test for its violation, but holding that the claim at issue failed); Hill v. Lockhart , 474 U. S. 52, 58–60 (1985) (holding that a Strickland claim can be brought to challenge a guilty plea, but rejecting the claim at issue); Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U. S. 307, 313–320, 326 (1979) (recognizing a due process claim based on insufficiency of evidence, establishing the governing test, but concluding that the claim at issue failed); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. , 272 U. S. 365, 390, —————— 6 Thus, the landmark case of Penn Central Trans. Co. v. New York, 438 U. S. 104, 124–128, 138 (1978), held that there was no taking only after setting forth a multi-factor test for determining whether a regulation restricting the use of property effects a taking.

12 STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT, INC. v. FLOR- IDA DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION Opinion of the Court Opinion of S CALIA , J. 395–397 (1926) (recognizing that block zoning ordinances could constitute a taking, but holding that the challenged ordinance did not do so); Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chi- cago , 166 U. S. 226, 241, 255–257 (1897) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohib- its uncompensated takings, but concluding that the court below made no errors of law in assessing just compensation). In constitutional-tort suits against public officials, we have found the defendants entitled to immunity only after holding that their action violated the Constitution. See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne , 526 U. S. 603, 605–606 (1999). Indeed, up until last Term, we required federal courts to address the constitutional question before the immunity question. See Saucier v. Katz , 533 U. S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled by Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at 10). “Assuming without deciding” would be less appropriate here than it was in many of those earlier cases, which established constitutional rights quite separate from any that had previously been acknowledged. Compared to Strickland ’s proclamation of a right to effective assistance of counsel, for example, proclaiming that a taking can occur through judicial action addresses a point of relative detail. In sum, J USTICE B REYER cannot decide that petitioner’s claim fails without first deciding what a valid claim would consist of. His agreement with Part IV of our opinion necessarily implies agreement with the test for a judicial taking (elaborated in Part II–A) which Part IV applies: whether the state court has “declare[d] that what was once an established right of private property no longer exists,” supra , at 10. J USTICE B REYER must either agree with that standard or craft one of his own. And agreeing to or crafting a hypothetical standard for a hypothetical constitutional right is sufficiently unappealing (we have eschewed that course many times in the past) that

Cite as: 560 U. S. ____ (2010) 13 Opinion of the Court Opinion of S CALIA , J. J USTICE B REYER might as well acknowledge the right as well. Or he could avoid the need to agree with or craft a hypothetical standard by denying the right. But embrac- ing a standard while being coy about the right is, well, odd; and deciding this case while addressing neither the standard nor the right is quite impossible. J USTICE B REYER responds that he simply advocates resolving this case without establishing “ the precise standard under which a party wins or loses.” Post , at 3 (emphasis added). But he relies upon no standard at all, precise or imprecise. He simply pronounces that this is not a judicial taking if there is such a thing as a judicial taking. The cases he cites to support this Queen-of-Hearts approach provide no precedent. In each of them the existence of the right in question was settled, 7 and we faced a choice between competing standards that had been applied by the courts. 8 We simply held that the right in question had not been infringed under any of them. There is no established right here, and no competing standards. —————— 7 See Smith v. Spisak , 558 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 9–16) (ineffective assistance of counsel); Quilloin v. Walcott , 434 U. S. 246, 255 (1978) (equal protection); Mercer v. Theriot , 377 U. S. 152, 155 (1964) (per curiam) (right to judgment notwithstanding the verdict where evidence is lacking). 8 See Spisak, supra , at ___ (slip op., at 16). Quilloin ’s cryptic rejection of the claim “[u]nder any standard of review,” 434 U. S., at 256, could only refer to the various levels of scrutiny—such as “strict” or “rational basis”—that we had applied to equal-protection claims, see Loving v. Virginia , 388 U. S. 1, 8–9 (1967). And in Mercer , which found the evidence “sufficient under any standard which might be appropriate— state or federal,” 377 U. S., at 156, one of the parties had argued for an established standard under Louisiana law, and the other for an established federal standard. Compare Brief for Petitioner in Mercer v. Theriot , O. T. 1963, No. 336, pp. 18–22, with Brief for Respondent in Mercer v. Theriot , p. 5.

14 STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT, INC. v. FLOR- IDA DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION Opinion of the Court Opinion of S CALIA , J. C Like J USTICE B REYER ’s concurrence, J USTICE K ENNEDY ’s concludes that the Florida Supreme Court’s action here does not meet the standard for a judicial taking, while purporting not to determine what is the standard for a judicial taking, or indeed whether such a thing as a judicial taking even exists. That approach is invalid for the reasons we have discussed. J USTICE K ENNEDY says that we need not take what he considers the bold and risky step of holding that the Tak- ings Clause applies to judicial action, because the Due Process Clause “would likely prevent a State from doing by judicial decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative fiat,” post , at 4–5 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted). He invokes the Due Process Clause “in both its substantive and procedural aspects,” post, at 3, not specifying which of his arguments relates to which. The first respect in which J USTICE K ENNEDY thinks the Due Process Clause can do the job seems to sound in Procedural Due Process. Because, he says, “[c]ourts, unlike the executive or legislature, are not designed to make policy decisions” about expropriation, “[t]he Court would be on strong footing in ruling that a judicial decision that eliminates or substantially changes established property rights” violates the Due Process Clause. Post , at 4. Let us be clear what is being proposed here. This Court has held that the separation-of-powers principles that the Constitution imposes upon the Federal Government do not apply against the States. See Dreyer v. Illinois , 187 U. S. 71, 83–84 (1902). But in order to avoid the bold and risky step of saying that the Takings Clause applies to all government takings, J USTICE K ENNEDY would have us use Procedural Due Process to impose judicially crafted separation-of-powers limitations upon the States: courts cannot be used to perform the governmental function of ex-

Cite as: 560 U. S. ____ (2010) 15 Opinion of the Court Opinion of S CALIA , J. propriation. The asserted reasons for the due-process limitation are that the legislative and executive branches “are accountable in their political capacity” for takings, post , at 2, and “[c]ourts . . . are not designed to make policy decisions” about takings, post, at 4. These reasons may have a lot to do with sound separation-of-powers principles that ought to govern a democratic society, but they have nothing whatever to do with the protection of individual rights that is the object of the Due Process Clause. Of course even taking those reasons at face value, it is strange to proclaim a democracy deficit and lack of special competence for the judicial taking of an individual property right, when this Court has had no trouble deciding matters of much greater moment, contrary to congres- sional desire or the legislated desires of most of the States, with no special competence except the authority we pos- sess to enforce the Constitution. In any case, our opinion does not trust judges with the relatively small power J USTICE K ENNEDY now objects to. It is we who propose setting aside judicial decisions that take private property; it is he who insists that judges cannot be so limited. Un- der his regime, the citizen whose property has been judicially redefined to belong to the State would presumably be given the Orwellian explanation: “The court did not take your property. Because it is neither politically accountable nor competent to make such a decision, it cannot take property.” J USTICE K ENNEDY ’s injection of separation-of-powers principles into the Due Process Clause would also have the ironic effect of preventing the assignment of the expropriation function to the branch of government whose procedures are, by far, the most protective of individual rights. So perhaps even this first respect in which J USTICE K EN- NEDY would have the Due Process Clause do the work of the Takings Clause pertains to Substantive, rather than Procedural, Due Process. His other arguments undoubt-

16 STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT, INC. v. FLOR- IDA DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION Opinion of the Court Opinion of S CALIA , J. edly pertain to that, as evidenced by his assertion that “[i]t is . . . natural to read the Due Process Clause as limiting the power of courts to eliminate or change established property rights,” post , at 3, his endorsement of the proposition that the Due Process Clause imposes “limits on government’s ability to diminish property values by regulation,” ibid. , and his contention that “the Due Process Clause would likely prevent a State from doing by judicial decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative fiat,” post, at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). The first problem with using Substantive Due Process to do the work of the Takings Clause is that we have held it cannot be done. “Where a particular Amendment ‘provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of government behavior, ‘that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of “substantive due process,” must be the guide for analyzing these claims.’” Albright v. Oliver , 510 U. S. 266, 273 (1994) (four-Justice plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor , 490 U. S. 386, 395 (1989)); see also 510 U. S., at 281 (K ENNEDY , J., concurring in judgment) (“I agree with the plurality that an allegation of arrest without probable cause must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment without reference to more general considerations of due process”). The second problem is that we have held for many years (logically or not) that the “liberties” protected by Substantive Due Process do not include economic liberties. See, e.g., Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co. , 335 U. S. 525, 536 (1949). J USTICE K ENNEDY ’s language (“If a judicial decision . . . eliminates an established property right, the judgment could be set aside as a deprivation of property without due process of law,” post , at 3) propels us back to what is referred to (usually deprecatingly) as “the Lochner era.” See Lochner v. New York , 198 U. S 45, 56–58 (1905). That is a step of much greater novelty, and much more unpredictable

Cite as: 560 U. S. ____ (2010) 17 Opinion of the Court Opinion of S CALIA , J. effect, than merely applying the Takings Clause to judicial action. And the third and last problem with using Sub- stantive Due Process is that either (1) it will not do all that the Takings Clause does, or (2) if it does all that the Takings Clause does, it will encounter the same supposed difficulties that J USTICE K ENNEDY finds troublesome. We do not grasp the relevance of J USTICE K ENNEDY ’s speculation, post , at 6, that the Framers did not envision the Takings Clause would apply to judicial action. They doubtless did not, since the Constitution was adopted in an era when courts had no power to “change” the common law. See 1 Blackstone 69–70 (1765); Rogers v. Tennessee , 532 U. S. 451, 472–478 (2001) (S CALIA , J., dissenting). Where the text they adopted is clear, however (“nor shall private property be taken for public use”), what counts is not what they envisioned but what they wrote. Of course even after courts, in the 19th century, did assume the power to change the common law, it is not true that the new “common-law tradition . . . allows for incremental modifications to property law,” post , at 4, so that “owners may reasonably expect or anticipate courts to make certain changes in property law,” post, at 6. In the only sense in which this could be relevant to what we are discussing, that is an astounding statement. We are talking here about judicial elimination of established private property rights. If that is indeed a “common-law tradition,” J USTICE K ENNEDY ought to be able to provide a more solid example for it than the only one he cites, post , at 5, a state-court change (from “noxious” to “harmful”) of the test for determining whether a neighbor’s vegetation is a tor- tious nuisance. Fancher v. Fagella , 274 Va. 549, 555–556, 650 S. E. 2d 519, 522 (2007). But perhaps he does not really mean that it is a common-law tradition to eliminate property rights, since he immediately follows his statement that “owners may reasonably expect or anticipate courts to make certain changes in property law” with the

18 STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT, INC. v. FLOR- IDA DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION Opinion of the Court Opinion of S CALIA , J. contradictory statement that “courts cannot abandon settled principles,” post, at 6. If no “settled principl[e]” has been abandoned, it is hard to see how property law could have been “change[d],” rather than merely clarified. J USTICE K ENNEDY has added “two additional practical considerations that the Court would need to address before recognizing judicial takings,” post , at 7. One of them is simple and simply answered: the assertion that “it is unclear what remedy a reviewing court could enter after finding a judicial taking,” post, at 8. J USTICE K ENNEDY worries that we may only be able to mandate compensation. That remedy is even rare for a legislative or executive taking, and we see no reason why it would be the exclusive remedy for a judicial taking. If we were to hold that the Florida Supreme Court had effected an uncompensated taking in the present case, we would simply reverse the Florida Supreme Court’s judgment that the Beach and Shore Preservation Act can be applied to the property in question. J USTICE K ENNEDY ’s other point, post, at 7–8—that we will have to decide when the claim of a judicial taking must be asserted—hardly presents an awe-inspiring prospect. These, and all the other “difficulties,” post, at 1, “difficult questions,” post, at 5, and “practical considerations” post, at 7, that J USTICE K ENNEDY worries may perhaps stand in the way of recognizing a judicial taking, are either nonexistent or insignificant. Finally, we cannot avoid comment upon J USTICE K ENNEDY ’s donning of the mantle of judicial restraint— his assertion that it is we, and not he, who would empower the courts and encourage their expropriation of private property. He warns that if judges know that their action is covered by the Takings Clause, they will issue “sweeping new rule[s] to adjust the rights of property owners,” comfortable in the knowledge that their innovations will be preserved upon payment by the State. Post , at 6. That is quite impossible. As we have said, if we were to hold

Cite as: 560 U. S. ____ (2010) 19 Opinion of the Court Opinion of S CALIA , J. that the Florida Supreme Court had effected an uncompensated taking in this case, we would not validate the taking by ordering Florida to pay compensation. We would simply reverse the Florida Supreme Court’s judgment that the Beach and Shore Preservation Act can be applied to the Members’ property. The power to effect a compensated taking would then reside, where it has always resided, not in the Florida Supreme Court but in the Florida Legislature—which could either provide compensation or acquiesce in the invalidity of the offending features of the Act. Cf. Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury , 489 U. S. 803, 817–818 (1989). The only realistic incentive that subjection to the Takings Clause might provide to any court would be the incentive to get reversed, which in our experience few judges value. J USTICE K ENNEDY , however, while dismissive of the Takings Clause, places no other constraints on judicial action. He puts forward some extremely vague applications of Substantive Due Process, and does not even say that they (whatever they are) will for sure apply. (“It is thus natural to read the Due Process Clause as limiting the power of courts to eliminate or change established property rights,” post , at 3; “courts . . . may not have the power to eliminate established property rights by judicial decision,” post , at 4; “the Due Process Clause would likely prevent a State from doing by judicial decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative fiat,” post , at 4–5 (internal quotation marks omitted); we must defer applying the Takings Clause until “[i]f and when future cases show that the usual principles, including constitutional principles that constrain the judiciary like due process, are somehow inadequate to protect property owners,” post , at 10.) Moreover, and more importantly, J USTICE K ENNEDY places no constraints whatever upon this Court. Not only does his concurrence only think about applying Substan-

20 STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT, INC. v. FLOR- IDA DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION Opinion of the Court Opinion of S CALIA , J. tive Due Process; but because Substantive Due Process is such a wonderfully malleable concept, see, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas , 539 U. S. 558, 562 (2003) (referring to “liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions”), even a firm commitment to apply it would be a firm commitment to nothing in particular. J USTICE K ENNEDY ’s desire to substitute Substantive Due Process for the Takings Clause suggests, and the rest of what he writes confirms, that what holds him back from giving the Takings Clause its natural meaning is not the intrusive- ness of applying it to judicial action, but the definiteness of doing so; not a concern to preserve the powers of the States’ political branches, but a concern to preserve this Court’s discretion to say that property may be taken, or may not be taken, as in the Court’s view the circumstances suggest. We must not say that we are bound by the Con- stitution never to sanction judicial elimination of clearly established property rights. Where the power of this Court is concerned, one must never say never. See, e.g. , Vieth v. Jubelirer , 541 U. S. 267, 302–305 (2004) (plurality opinion); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain , 542 U. S. 692, 750–751 (2004) (S CALIA , J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). The great attraction of Substantive Due Proc- ess as a substitute for more specific constitutional guarantees is that it never means never—because it never means anything precise. III Respondents put forward a number of arguments which contradict, to a greater or lesser degree, the principle discussed above, that the existence of a taking does not depend upon the branch of government that effects it. First, in a case claiming a judicial taking they would add to our normal takings inquiry a requirement that the court’s decision have no “fair and substantial basis.” This is taken from our jurisprudence dealing with the question

Cite as: 560 U. S. ____ (2010) 21 Opinion of the Court Opinion of S CALIA , J. whether a state-court decision rests upon adequate and independent state grounds, placing it beyond our jurisdiction to review. See E. Gressman, K. Geller, S. Shapiro, T. Bishop, & E. Hartnett, Supreme Court Practice, ch. 3.26, p. 222 (9th ed. 2007). To assure that there is no “evasion” of our authority to review federal questions, we insist that the nonfederal ground of decision have “fair support.” Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina ex rel. Daniel , 281 U. S. 537, 540 (1930); see also Ward v. Board of Comm’rs of Love Cty ., 253 U. S. 17, 22–23 (1920). A test designed to determine whether there has been an evasion is not obviously appropriate for determining whether there has been a taking of property. But if it is to be extended there it must mean (in the present context) that there is a “fair and substantial basis” for believing that petitioner’s Members did not have a property right to future accretions which the Act would take away. This is no different, we think, from our requirement that petitioners’ Members must prove the elimination of an established property right. 9 Next, respondents argue that federal courts lack the knowledge of state law required to decide whether a judi- —————— 9 J USTICE B REYER complains that we do not set forth “procedural limitations or canons of deference” to restrict federal-court review of state- court property decisions. See post , at 2. (1) To the extent this is true it is unsurprising, but (2) fundamentally, it is false: (1) It is true that we make our own determination, without deference to state judges, whether the challenged decision deprives the claimant of an established property right. That is unsurprising because it is what this Court does when determining state-court compliance with all constitutional imperatives. We do not defer to the judgment of state judges in determining whether, for example, a state-court decision has deprived a defendant of due process or subjected him to double jeopardy. (2) The test we have adopted, however (deprivation of an established property right), contains within itself a considerable degree of deference to state courts. A property right is not established if there is doubt about its existence; and when there is doubt we do not make our own assessment but accept the determination of the state court.

22 STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT, INC. v. FLOR- IDA DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION Opinion of the Court Opinion of S CALIA , J. cial decision that purports merely to clarify property rights has instead taken them. But federal courts must often decide what state property rights exist in nontakings contexts, see, e.g., Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth , 408 U. S. 564, 577–578 (1972) (Due Process Clause). And indeed they must decide it to resolve claims that legislative or executive action has effected a taking. For example, a regulation that deprives a property owner of all economically beneficial use of his property is not a taking if the restriction “inhere[s] in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.” Lucas , 505 U. S., at 1029. A constitutional provision that forbids the uncompensated taking of property is quite simply insusceptible of enforcement by federal courts unless they have the power to decide what property rights exist under state law. Respondents also warn us against depriving common- law judging of needed flexibility. That argument has little appeal when directed against the enforcement of a constitutional guarantee adopted in an era when, as we said supra , at 17, courts had no power to “change” the common law. But in any case, courts have no peculiar need of flexibility. It is no more essential that judges be free to overrule prior cases that establish property entitlements than that state legislators be free to revise pre-existing statutes that confer property entitlements, or agency- heads pre-existing regulations that do so. And insofar as courts merely clarify and elaborate property entitlements that were previously unclear, they cannot be said to have taken an established property right. Finally, the city and county argue that applying the Takings Clause to judicial decisions would force lower federal courts to review final state-court judgments, in violation of the so-called Rooker - Feldman doctrine. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. , 263 U. S. 413, 415–416

Cite as: 560 U. S. ____ (2010) 23 Opinion of the Court Opinion of S CALIA , J. (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U. S. 462, 476 (1983). That does not necessarily follow. The finality principles that we regularly apply to takings claims, see Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172, 186–194 (1985), would require the claimant to appeal a claimed taking by a lower court to the state supreme court, whence certiorari would come to this Court. If certiorari were denied, the claimant would no more be able to launch a lower-court federal suit against the taking effected by the state supreme-court opinion than he would be able to launch such a suit against a legislative or executive taking approved by the state supreme-court opinion; the matter would be res judicata. And where the claimant was not a party to the original suit, he would be able to challenge in federal court the taking effected by the state supreme-court opinion to the same extent that he would be able to challenge in federal court a legislative or executive taking previously approved by a state supreme-court opinion. For its part, petitioner proposes an unpredictability test. Quoting Justice Stewart’s concurrence in Hughes v. Wash- ington , 389 U. S. 290, 296 (1967), petitioner argues that a judicial taking consists of a decision that “‘constitutes a sudden change in state law, unpredictable in terms of relevant precedents.’” See Brief for Petitioner 17, 34–50. The focus of petitioner’s test is misdirected. What counts is not whether there is precedent for the allegedly confiscatory decision, but whether the property right allegedly taken was established. A “predictability of change” test would cover both too much and too little. Too much, because a judicial property decision need not be predictable, so long as it does not declare that what had been private property under established law no longer is. A decision that clarifies property entitlements (or the lack thereof) that were previously unclear might be difficult to predict,

24 STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT, INC. v. FLOR- IDA DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION Opinion of the Court but it does not eliminate established property rights. And the predictability test covers too little, because a judicial elimination of established private-property rights that is foreshadowed by dicta or even by holdings years in advance is nonetheless a taking. If, for example, a state court held in one case, to which the complaining property owner was not a party, that it had the power to limit the acreage of privately owned real estate to 100 acres, and then, in a second case, applied that principle to declare the complainant’s 101st acre to be public property, the State would have taken an acre from the complainant even though the decision was predictable. IV We come at last to petitioner’s takings attack on the decision below. At the outset, respondents raise two preliminary points which need not detain us long. The city and the county argue that petitioner cannot state a cause of action for a taking because, though the Members own private property, petitioner itself does not; and that the claim is unripe because petitioner has not sought just compensation. Neither objection appeared in the briefs in opposition to the petition for writ of certiorari, and since neither is jurisdictional, 10 we deem both waived. See this Court’s Rule 15.2; cf. Oklahoma City v. Tuttle , 471 U. S. 808, 815–816 (1985). Petitioner argues that the Florida Supreme Court took two of the property rights of the Members by declaring that those rights did not exist: the right to accretions, and the right to have littoral property touch the water (which —————— 10 Petitioner meets the two requirements necessary for an association to assert the Article III standing of its Members. See Food and Com- mercial Workers v. Brown Group, Inc. , 517 U. S. 544, 555–557 (1996). And the claim here is ripe insofar as Article III standing is concerned, since (accepting petitioner’s version of Florida law as true) petitioner has been deprived of property.

Cite as: 560 U. S. ____ (2010) 25 Opinion of the Court petitioner distinguishes from the mere right of access to the water). 11 Under petitioner’s theory, because no prior Florida decision had said that the State’s filling of submerged tidal lands could have the effect of depriving a littoral owner of contact with the water and denying him future accretions, the Florida Supreme Court’s judgment in the present case abolished those two easements to which littoral property owners had been entitled. This puts the burden on the wrong party. There is no taking unless petitioner can show that, before the Florida Su- preme Court’s decision, littoral-property owners had rights to future accretions and contact with the water superior to the State’s right to fill in its submerged land. Though some may think the question close, in our view the showing cannot be made. Two core principles of Florida property law intersect in this case. First, the State as owner of the submerged land adjacent to littoral property has the right to fill that land, so long as it does not interfere with the rights of the public and the rights of littoral landowners. See Hayes v. Bow- man , 91 So. 2d 795, 799–800 (Fla. 1957) (right to fill con- veyed by State to private party); State ex rel. Buford v. Tampa , 88 Fla. 196, 210–211, 102 So. 336, 341 (1924) —————— 11 Petitioner raises two other claims that we do not directly address. First, petitioner tries to revive its challenge to the beach restoration project, contending that it (rather than the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion) constitutes a taking. Petitioner’s arguments on this score are simply versions of two arguments it makes against the Florida Su- preme Court’s opinion: that the Department has replaced the Members’ littoral property rights with versions that are inferior because statutory; and that the Members previously had the right to have their property contact the water. We reject both, infra , at 28–29, and n. 12. Second, petitioner attempts to raise a challenge to the Act as a deprivation of property without due process. Petitioner did not raise this challenge before the Florida Supreme Court, and only obliquely raised it in the petition for certiorari. We therefore do not reach it. See Adams , 520 U. S., at 86–87.

26 STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT, INC. v. FLOR- IDA DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION Opinion of the Court (same). Second, as we described supra , at 3–4, if an avulsion exposes land seaward of littoral property that had previously been submerged, that land belongs to the State even if it interrupts the littoral owner’s contact with the water. See Bryant , 238 So. 2d, at 837, 838–839. The issue here is whether there is an exception to this rule when the State is the cause of the avulsion. Prior law suggests there is not. In Martin v. Busch , 93 Fla. 535, 112 So. 274 (1927), the Florida Supreme Court held that when the State drained water from a lakebed belonging to the State, causing land that was formerly below the mean high- water line to become dry land, that land continued to belong to the State. Id ., at 574, 112 So., at 287; see also Bryant , supra , at 838–839 (analogizing the situation in Martin to an avulsion). “‘The riparian rights doctrine of accretion and reliction,’” the Florida Supreme Court later explained, “‘does not apply to such lands.’” Bryant , supra , at 839 (quoting Martin , supra , at 578, 112 So., at 288 (Brown, J., concurring)). This is not surprising, as there can be no accretions to land that no longer abuts the water. Thus, Florida law as it stood before the decision below allowed the State to fill in its own seabed, and the resulting sudden exposure of previously submerged land was treated like an avulsion for purposes of ownership. The right to accretions was therefore subordinate to the State’s right to fill. Thiesen v. Gulf, Florida & Alabama R. Co. suggests the same result. That case involved a claim by a riparian landowner that a railroad’s state-authorized filling of submerged land and construction of tracks upon it interfered with the riparian landowners’ rights to access and to wharf out to a shipping channel. The Florida Su- preme Court determined that the claimed right to wharf out did not exist in Florida, and that therefore only the right of access was compensable. 75 Fla., at 58–65, 78 So. , at 501–503. Significantly, although the court recognized that the riparian-property owners had rights to accretion,

Cite as: 560 U. S. ____ (2010) 27 Opinion of the Court see id., at 64–65, 78 So., at 502–503, the only rights it even suggested would be infringed by the railroad were the right of access (which the plaintiff had claimed) and the rights of view and use of the water (which it seems the plaintiff had not claimed), see id., at 58–59, 78, 78 So., at 501, 507. The Florida Supreme Court decision before us is consistent with these background principles of state property law. Cf. Lucas , 505 U. S., at 1028–1029; Scranton v. Wheeler , 179 U. S. 141, 163 (1900). It did not abolish the Members’ right to future accretions, but merely held that the right was not implicated by the beach-restoration project, because the doctrine of avulsion applied. See 998 So. 2d, at 1117, 1120–1121. The Florida Supreme Court’s opinion describes beach restoration as the reclamation by the State of the public’s land, just as Martin had described the lake drainage in that case. Although the opinion does not cite Martin and is not always clear on this point, it suffices that its characterization of the littoral right to accretion is consistent with Martin and the other relevant principles of Florida law we have discussed. What we have said shows that the rule of Sand Key, which petitioner repeatedly invokes, is inapposite. There the Florida Supreme Court held that an artificial accretion does not change the right of a littoral-property owner to claim the accreted land as his own (as long as the owner did not cause the accretion himself). 512 So. 2d, at 937– 938. The reason Martin did not apply, Sand Key explained, is that the drainage that had occurred in Martin did not lower the water level by “‘imperceptible degrees,’” and so did not qualify as an accretion. 512 So. 2d, at 940– 941. The result under Florida law may seem counter- intuitive. After all, the Members’ property has been deprived of its character (and value) as oceanfront property by the State’s artificial creation of an avulsion. Perhaps

28 STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT, INC. v. FLOR- IDA DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION Opinion of the Court state-created avulsions ought to be treated differently from other avulsions insofar as the property right to accretion is concerned. But nothing in prior Florida law makes such a distinction, and Martin suggests, if it does not indeed hold, the contrary. Even if there might be different interpretations of Martin and other Florida property-law cases that would prevent this arguably odd result, we are not free to adopt them. The Takings Clause only protects property rights as they are established under state law, not as they might have been established or ought to have been established. We cannot say that the Florida Su- preme Court’s decision eliminated a right of accretion established under Florida law. Petitioner also contends that the State took the Mem- bers’ littoral right to have their property continually maintain contact with the water. To be clear, petitioner does not allege that the State relocated the property line, as would have happened if the erosion-control line were landward of the old mean high-water line (instead of identical to it). Petitioner argues instead that the Mem- bers have a separate right for the boundary of their property to be always the mean high-water line. Petitioner points to dicta in Sand Key that refers to “the right to have the property’s contact with the water remain intact,” 512 So. 2d, at 936. Even there, the right was included in the definition of the right to access, ibid. , which is consistent with the Florida Supreme Court’s later description that “there is no independent right of contact with the water” but it “exists to preserve the upland owner’s core littoral right of access to the water,” 998 So. 2d, at 1119. Peti- tioner’s expansive interpretation of the dictum in Sand Key would cause it to contradict the clear Florida law governing avulsion. One cannot say that the Florida Supreme Court contravened established property law by

Cite as: 560 U. S. ____ (2010) 29 Opinion of the Court rejecting it. 12 V Because the Florida Supreme Court’s decision did not contravene the established property rights of petitioner’s Members, Florida has not violated the Fifth and Four- teenth Amendments. The judgment of the Florida Su- preme Court is therefore affirmed. It is so ordered. J USTICE S TEVENS took no part in the decision of this case. —————— 12 Petitioner also argues that the Members’ other littoral rights have been infringed because the Act replaces their common-law rights with inferior statutory versions. Petitioner has not established that the statutory versions are inferior; and whether the source of a property right is the common law or a statute makes no difference, so long as the property owner continues to have what he previously had.

Cite as: 560 U. S. ____ (2010) 1 Opinion of K ENNEDY , J. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 08–1151 _________________ STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT, INC., PETITIONER v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ET AL . ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA [June 17, 2010] J USTICE K ENNEDY , with whom J USTICE S OTOMAYOR joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. The Court’s analysis of the principles that control ownership of the land in question, and of the rights of petitioner’s members as adjacent owners, is correct in my view, leading to my joining Parts I, IV, and V of the Court’s opinion. As J USTICE B REYER observes, however, this case does not require the Court to determine whether, or when, a judicial decision determining the rights of property owners can violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. This separate opinion notes certain difficulties that should be considered before accepting the theory that a judicial decision that eliminates an “established property right,” ante , at 21, constitutes a violation of the Takings Clause. The Takings Clause is an essential part of the constitutional structure, for it protects private property from expropriation without just compensation; and the right to own and hold property is necessary to the exercise and preservation of freedom. The right to retain property without the fact or even the threat of that sort of expropriation is, of course, applicable to the States under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chi- cago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago , 166 U. S. 226, 239 (1897).

2 STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT, INC. v. FLOR- IDA DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION Opinion of K ENNEDY , J. The right of the property owner is subject, however, to the rule that the government does have power to take property for a public use, provided that it pays just compensation. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles , 482 U. S. 304, 314–315 (1987). This is a vast governmental power. And typically, legislative bodies grant substantial discretion to executive officers to decide what property can be taken for authorized projects and uses. As a result, if an authorized executive agency or official decides that Black- acre is the right place for a fire station or Greenacre is the best spot for a freeway interchange, then the weight and authority of the State are used to take the property, even against the wishes of the owner, who must be satisfied with just compensation. In the exercise of their duty to protect the fisc, both the legislative and executive branches monitor, or should monitor, the exercise of this substantial power. Those branches are accountable in their political capacity for the proper discharge of this obligation. To enable officials to better exercise this great power in a responsible way, some States allow their officials to take a second look after property has been condemned and a jury returns a verdict setting the amount of just compensation. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. §1268.510 (2007). If the condemning authority, usually acting through the executive, deems the compensation too high to pay for the project, it can decide not to take the property at all. The landowner is reimbursed for certain costs and expenses of litigation and the property remains in his or her hands. See, e.g., §1268.610(a). This is just one aspect of the exercise of the power to select what property to condemn and the responsibility to ensure that the taking makes financial sense from the State’s point of view. And, as a matter of custom and practice, these are matters for the political branches—the

Cite as: 560 U. S. ____ (2010) 3 Opinion of K ENNEDY , J. legislature and the executive—not the courts. See First English , supra , at 321 (“[T]he decision to exercise the power of eminent domain is a legislative function”). If a judicial decision, as opposed to an act of the executive or the legislature, eliminates an established property right, the judgment could be set aside as a deprivation of property without due process of law. The Due Process Clause, in both its substantive and procedural aspects, is a central limitation upon the exercise of judicial power. And this Court has long recognized that property regulations can be invalidated under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. , 544 U. S. 528, 542 (2005); Goldblatt v. Hempstead , 369 U. S. 590, 591, 592– 593 (1962); Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. , 321 U. S. 36, 42–43 (1944); Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina ex rel. Daniel , 281 U. S. 537, 539, 540–541 (1930); Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge , 278 U. S. 116, 121 (1928); Nectow v. Cambridge , 277 U. S. 183, 188 (1928); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. , 272 U. S. 365, 395 (1926); see also Pennsyl- vania Coal Co. v. Mahon , 260 U. S. 393, 413 (1922) (there must be limits on government’s ability to diminish property values by regulation “or the contract and due process clauses are gone”). It is thus natural to read the Due Process Clause as limiting the power of courts to eliminate or change established property rights. The Takings Clause also protects property rights, and it “operates as a conditional limitation, permitting the government to do what it wants so long as it pays the charge.” Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel , 524 U. S. 498, 545 (1998) (K ENNEDY , J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part). Unlike the Due Process Clause, therefore, the Takings Clause implicitly recognizes a governmental power while placing limits upon that power. Thus, if the Court were to hold that a judicial taking exists, it would presuppose that a judicial decision eliminating established

4 STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT, INC. v. FLOR- IDA DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION Opinion of K ENNEDY , J. property rights is “otherwise constitutional” so long as the State compensates the aggrieved property owners. Ibid. There is no clear authority for this proposition. When courts act without direction from the executive or legislature, they may not have the power to eliminate established property rights by judicial decision. “Given that the constitutionality” of a judicial decision altering property rights “appears to turn on the legitimacy” of whether the court’s judgment eliminates or changes established property rights “rather than on the availability of compensation, . . . the more appropriate constitutional analysis arises under general due process principles rather than under the Takings Clause.” Ibid. Courts, unlike the executive or legislature, are not designed to make policy decisions about “the need for, and likely effec- tiveness of, regulatory actions.” Lingle , supra , at 545. State courts generally operate under a common-law tradition that allows for incremental modifications to property law, but “this tradition cannot justify a carte blanch judicial authority to change property definitions wholly free of constitutional limitations.” Walston, The Constitution and Property: Due Process, Regulatory Takings, and Judicial Takings, 2001 Utah L. Rev. 379, 435. The Court would be on strong footing in ruling that a judicial decision that eliminates or substantially changes established property rights, which are a legitimate expec- tation of the owner, is “arbitrary or irrational” under the Due Process Clause. Lingle , 544 U. S., at 542; see id. , at 548–549 (K ENNEDY , J., concurring); see also Perry v. Sindermann , 408 U. S. 593, 601 (1972) (“‘[P]roperty’” interests protected by the Due Process Clauses are those “that are secured by ‘existing rules or understandings’ ” (quoting Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth , 408 U. S. 564, 577 (1972))). Thus, without a judicial takings doctrine, the Due Process Clause would likely prevent a State from doing “by judicial decree what the Takings

Cite as: 560 U. S. ____ (2010) 5 Opinion of K ENNEDY , J. Clause forbids it to do by legislative fiat.” Ante, at 8. The objection that a due process claim might involve close questions concerning whether a judicial decree extends beyond what owners might have expected is not a sound argument; for the same close questions would arise with respect to whether a judicial decision is a taking. See Apfel , supra , at 541 (opinion of K ENNEDY , J.) (“Cases attempting to decide when a regulation becomes a taking are among the most litigated and perplexing in current law”); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City , 438 U. S. 104, 123 (1978) (“The question of what constitutes a ‘taking’ for purposes of the Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty”). To announce that courts too can effect a taking when they decide cases involving property rights, would raise certain difficult questions. Since this case does not require those questions to be addressed, in my respectful view, the Court should not reach beyond the necessities of the case to announce a sweeping rule that court decisions can be takings, as that phrase is used in the Takings Clause. The evident reason for recognizing a judicial takings doctrine would be to constrain the power of the judicial branch. Of course, the judiciary must respect private ownership. But were this Court to say that judicial decisions become takings when they overreach, this might give more power to courts, not less. Consider the instance of litigation between two property owners to determine which one bears the liability and costs when a tree that stands on one property extends its roots in a way that damages adjacent property. See, e.g., Fancher v. Fagella, 274 Va. 549, 650 S. E. 2d 519 (2007). If a court deems that, in light of increasing urbanization, the former rule for allocation of these costs should be changed, thus shifting the rights of the owners, it may well increase the value of one property and decrease the value of the other. This might be the type of incremental

6 STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT, INC. v. FLOR- IDA DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION Opinion of K ENNEDY , J. modification under state common law that does not violate due process, as owners may reasonably expect or anticipate courts to make certain changes in property law. The usual due process constraint is that courts cannot abandon settled principles. See, e.g., Rogers v. Tennessee , 532 U. S. 451, 457 (2001) (citing Bouie v. City of Columbia , 378 U. S. 347, 354 (1964)); Apfel , 524 U. S., at 548–549 (opinion of K ENNEDY , J.); see also Perry , supra , at 601; Roth , supra , at 577. But if the state court were deemed to be exercising the power to take property, that constraint would be removed. Because the State would be bound to pay owners for takings caused by a judicial decision, it is conceivable that some judges might decide that enacting a sweeping new rule to adjust the rights of property owners in the context of changing social needs is a good idea. Knowing that the resulting ruling would be a taking, the courts could go ahead with their project, free from constraints that would otherwise confine their power. The resulting judgment as between the property owners likely could not be set aside by some later enactment. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. , 514 U. S. 211, 217 (1995) (leaving open whether legislation reopening final judgments violates Due Process Clause). And if the litigation were a class action to decide, for instance, whether there are public rights of access that diminish the rights of private ownership, a State might find itself obligated to pay a substantial judgment for the judicial ruling. Even if the legislature were to subsequently rescind the judicial decision by statute, the State would still have to pay just compensation for the temporary taking that occurred from the time of the judicial decision to the time of the statutory fix. See First English , 482 U. S., at 321. The idea, then, that a judicial takings doctrine would constrain judges might just well have the opposite effect. It would give judges new power and new assurance that

Cite as: 560 U. S. ____ (2010) 7 Opinion of K ENNEDY , J. changes in property rights that are beneficial, or thought to be so, are fair and proper because just compensation will be paid. The judiciary historically has not had the right or responsibility to say what property should or should not be taken. Indeed, it is unclear whether the Takings Clause was understood, as a historical matter, to apply to judicial decisions. The Framers most likely viewed this Clause as applying only to physical appropriation pursuant to the power of eminent domain. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council , 505 U. S. 1003, 1028, n. 15 (1992). And it appears these physical appropriations were traditionally made by legislatures. See 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §1784, p. 661 (1833). Courts, on the other hand, lacked the power of eminent domain. See 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 135 (W. Lewis ed. 1897). The Court’s Takings Clause jurisprudence has expanded beyond the Framers’ understanding, as it now applies to certain regulations that are not physical appropriations. See Lucas , supra , at 1014 (citing Mahon , 260 U. S. 393). But the Court should consider with care the decision to extend the Takings Clause in a manner that might be inconsistent with historical practice. There are two additional practical considerations that the Court would need to address before recognizing judicial takings. First, it may be unclear in certain situations how a party should properly raise a judicial takings claim. “[I]t is important to separate out two judicial actions—the decision to change current property rules in a way that would constitute a taking, and the decision to require compensation.” Thompson, Judicial Takings, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1449, 1515 (1990). In some contexts, these issues could arise separately. For instance, assume that a state- court opinion explicitly holds that it is changing state property law, or that it asserts that is not changing the

8 STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT, INC. v. FLOR- IDA DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION Opinion of K ENNEDY , J. law but there is no “fair or substantial basis” for this statement. Broad River , 281 U. S., at 540. (Most of these cases may arise in the latter posture, like inverse condemnation claims where the State says it is not taking property and pays no compensation.) Call this Case A. The only issue in Case A was determining the substance of state property law. It is doubtful that parties would raise a judicial takings claim on appeal, or in a petition for a writ of certiorari, in Case A, as the issue would not have been litigated below. Rather, the party may file a separate lawsuit—Case B—arguing that a taking occurred in light of the change in property law made by Case A. After all, until the state court in Case A changes the law, the party will not know if his or her property rights will have been eliminated. So res judicata probably would not bar the party from litigating the takings issue in Case B. Second, it is unclear what remedy a reviewing court could enter after finding a judicial taking. It appears under our precedents that a party who suffers a taking is only entitled to damages, not equitable relief: The Court has said that “[e]quitable relief is not available to enjoin an alleged taking of private property for a public use . . . when a suit for compensation can be brought against the sovereign subsequent to the taking,” Ruckelshaus v. Mon- santo Co. , 467 U. S. 986, 1016 (1984), and the Court subsequently held that the Takings Clause requires the availability of a suit for compensation against the States, First English , supra , at 321–322. It makes perfect sense that the remedy for a Takings Clause violation is only damages, as the Clause “does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking without just compensation.” Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamil- ton Bank of Johnson City , 473 U. S. 172, 194 (1985). It is thus questionable whether reviewing courts could invalidate judicial decisions deemed to be judicial takings; they may only be able to order just compensation. In the

Cite as: 560 U. S. ____ (2010) 9 Opinion of K ENNEDY , J. posture discussed above where Case A changes the law and Case B addresses whether that change is a taking, it is not clear how the Court, in Case B, could invalidate the holding of Case A. If a single case were to properly address both a state court’s change in the law and whether the change was a taking, the Court might be able to give the state court a choice on how to proceed if there were a judicial taking. The Court might be able to remand and let the state court determine whether it wants to insist on changing its property law and paying just compensation or to rescind its holding that changed the law. Cf. First English , 482 U. S., at 321 (“Once a court determines that a taking has occurred, the government retains the whole range of options already available—amendment of the regulation, withdrawal of the invalidated regulation, or exercise of eminent domain”). But that decision would rest with the state court, not this Court; so the state court could still force the State to pay just compensation. And even if the state court decided to rescind its decision that changed the law, a temporary taking would have occurred in the interim. See ibid. These difficult issues are some of the reasons why the Court should not reach beyond the necessities of the case to recognize a judicial takings doctrine. It is not wise, from an institutional standpoint, to reach out and decide questions that have not been discussed at much length by courts and commentators. This Court’s dicta in William- son County , supra , at 194–197, regarding when regulatory takings claims become ripe, explains why federal courts have not been able to provide much analysis on the issue of judicial takings. See San Remo Hotel, L. P. v. City and County of San Francisco , 545 U. S. 323, 351 (2005) (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in judgment) (“ Williamson County ’s state-litigation rule has created some real anomalies, justifying our revisiting the issue”). Until Williamson County is reconsidered, litigants will have to

10 STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT, INC. v. FLOR- IDA DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION Opinion of K ENNEDY , J. press most of their judicial takings claims before state courts, which are “presumptively competent . . . to adjudi- cate claims arising under the laws of the United States.” Tafflin v. Levitt , 493 U. S. 455, 458 (1990). If and when future cases show that the usual principles, including constitutional principles that constrain the judiciary like due process, are somehow inadequate to protect property owners, then the question whether a judicial decision can effect a taking would be properly presented. In the mean- time, it seems appropriate to recognize that the substantial power to decide whose property to take and when to take it should be conceived of as a power vested in the political branches and subject to political control.

Cite as: 560 U. S. ____ (2010) 1 Opinion of B REYER , J. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 08–1151 _________________ STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT, INC., PETITIONER v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ET AL . ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA [June 17, 2010] J USTICE B REYER , with whom J USTICE G INSBURG joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I agree that no unconstitutional taking of property occurred in this case, and I therefore join Parts I, IV, and V of today’s opinion. I cannot join Parts II and III, however, for in those Parts the plurality unnecessarily addresses questions of constitutional law that are better left for another day. In Part II of its opinion, see ante, at 7–10, the plurality concludes that courts, including federal courts, may review the private property law decisions of state courts to determine whether the decisions unconstitutionally take “private property” for “public use without just compensation.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 5. And in doing so it finds “irrelevant” that the “particular state actor ” that takes private property (or unconstitutionally redefines state property law) is the judicial branch, rather than the executive or legislative branch. Ante , at 10; cf. Hughes v. Washington , 389 U. S. 290, 296–298 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring). In Part III, the plurality determines that it is “not obviously appropriate” to apply this Court’s “‘fair and substantial basis’” test, familiar from our adequate and independent state ground jurisprudence, when evaluating whether

2 STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT, INC. v. FLOR- IDA DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION Opinion of B REYER , J. a state-court property decision enacts an unconstitutional taking. Ante , at 21. The plurality further concludes that a state-court decision violates the Takings Clause not when the decision is “unpredictab[le]” on the basis of prior law, but rather when the decision takes private property rights that are “established.” Ante, at 23–24. And finally, it concludes that all those affected by a state-court property law decision can raise a takings claim in federal court, but for the losing party in the initial state-court proceeding, who can only raise her claim (possibly for the first time) in a petition for a writ of certiorari here. Ante, at 23. I do not claim that all of these conclusions are unsound. I do not know. But I do know that, if we were to express our views on these questions, we would invite a host of federal takings claims without the mature consideration of potential procedural or substantive legal principles that might limit federal interference in matters that are primarily the subject of state law. Property owners litigate many thousands of cases involving state property law in state courts each year. Each state-court property decision may further affect numerous nonparty property owners as well. Losing parties in many state-court cases may well believe that erroneous judicial decisions have deprived them of property rights they previously held and may consequently bring federal takings claims. And a glance at Part IV makes clear that such cases can involve state property law issues of considerable complexity. Hence, the approach the plurality would take today threatens to open the federal court doors to constitutional review of many, perhaps large numbers of, state-law cases in an area of law familiar to state, but not federal, judges. And the failure of that approach to set forth procedural limitations or canons of deference would create the distinct possibility that federal judges would play a major role in the shaping of a matter of significant state interest—state property law.

Cite as: 560 U. S. ____ (2010) 3 Opinion of B REYER , J. The plurality criticizes me for my cautious approach, and states that I “cannot decide that petitioner’s claim fails without first deciding what a valid claim would consist of.” Ante, at 12. But, of course, courts frequently find it possible to resolve cases—even those raising constitutional questions—without specifying the precise standard under which a party wins or loses. See, e.g., Smith v. Spisak , 558 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 16) (“With or without such deference, our conclusion is the same”); Quilloin v. Walcott , 434 U. S. 246, 256 (1978) (rejecting an equal protection claim “[u]nder any standard of review”); Mercer v. Theriot , 377 U. S. 152, 156 (1964) (per curiam) (finding evidence sufficient to support a verdict “under any standard”). That is simply what I would do here. In the past, Members of this Court have warned us that, when faced with difficult constitutional questions, we should “confine ourselves to deciding only what is necessary to the disposition of the immediate case.” Whitehouse v. Illinois Central R. Co. , 349 U. S. 366, 373 (1955); see also Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn. , 485 U. S. 439, 445 (1988) (“A fundamental and longstand- ing principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them”); Ashwander v. TVA , 297 U. S. 288, 346–347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“The Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). I heed this advice here. There is no need now to decide more than what the Court decides in Parts IV and V, namely, that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in this case did not amount to a “judicial taking.”

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA ARBOR PROPERTIES, INC., NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO SUMMERFIELD PUD, LLC, and FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND SUMMERFIELD PUD II, LLC., DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED Appellants, CASE NO. 1D09-5211 v. LAKE JACKSON PROTECTION ALLIANCE, INC.; JEFFREY S. PHIPPS; JOANNE E. KOWAL; C. TOMOKA BRADY; and C. PERRY BROWN, Appellees. _____________________________/ Opinion filed December 8, 2010. An appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County. James O. Shelfer, Judge. W. Douglas Hall and Christine Davis-Graves of Carlton Fields, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellants. Terrell Arline, Panama City; George E. Lewis, II, Tallahassee, for Appellees. THOMAS, J. We have before us the trial court’s order purporting to invalidate the Leon County Commission’s development order approving Appellant’s Planned Unit

Development (“PUD”) concept plan known as Summerfield. We reverse and remand with directions that summary judgment be entered in Appellants’ favor. We hold as a matter of law that the Special Development Zones defined in the Tallahassee/Leon County Comprehensive Plan (“Plan”) do not apply within the Summerfield land areas known as “closed basins.” Under the Plan, these areas are not subject to the more stringent provisions meant to control development in order to prevent discharge into Lake Jackson. The County’s ordinance was not unlawfully inconsistent with its Plan. Although the trial court commendably scrutinized the Plan’s text, the order incorrectly interpreted the text as a whole in relation to the governmental action. The Comprehensive Plan and Land Development Code The Plan established density and land use regulations within the Urban Service Area to promote the effective use of infrastructure and discourage urban sprawl by authorizing more development under certain conditions, where appropriate. The Plan’s Conservation Element created Special Development Zones within certain lands surrounding Lake Jackson; these areas were defined by elevation. Under Policy 2.2.12 of the Conservation Element, “Special Development zones with accompanying criteria shall be established and implemented through the [land development regulations] for . . . Lake Jackson.” These Special Development Zones imposed development limitations on areas 2

below certain elevations. Under Policy 2.3.1 of the Conservation Element, “Local government shall designate special development zones for Lake Jackson that restrict activities that impact the quality of stormwater.” (Hereinafter “rainwater runoff.”) (Emphasis added.) In the Plan’s Land Use Element, a special category called “Lake Protection” required development density limitations in certain areas which are relevant here. The Land Use Element provided that residential development clusters could be allowed on “portions of parcels not located within the Lake Jackson Special Development Zone and lying below [defined elevations]. . . . Future development will not be subject to the limitations of the Lake Protection category if . . . competent scientific evidence [shows] that the development is located in a closed basin that does not . . . discharge [rainwater runoff] to the larger Lake Jackson Basin .” (Emphasis added.) Policy 1.1.8 of the Land Use Element provided that “compliance with the Conservation Element shall be met prior to consideration of requirements in the Land Use Element.” Leon County adopted a land development regulation, section 10-192(b)(3) of the Land Development Code. That section provided that closed basins within the Lake Jackson Basin lake protection area were not subject to Special Development Zone restrictions, if competent scientific evidence showed that the relevant land area did not discharge water into the lake, post-development runoff 3

would be retained on-site or discharged into an approved runoff facility, and all other development standards within the Plan were met regarding land located below certain elevations. Facts Summerfield consists of about 107 acres located in the Urban Service Area southwest of Lake Jackson. It is separated from Lake Jackson by Highway 27, a four-lane divided road. Little Lake Jackson, an arm of Lake Jackson, is northwest of the property. The property is situated within a series of natural basins or depressions. It is undisputed that much of the property is located within “closed basins.” In a closed basin, the only outlet for rainwater is percolation, evaporation or transpiration; thus, these land areas cannot send water runoff into Lake Jackson. Appellants applied for a conceptual site and development approval for the Summerfield PUD. The PUD process is a two-step function in which the local government approves a PUD concept plan. Approval of the PUD concept plan does not grant any right to develop the property; the owner must submit and receive approval of a final PUD concept plan before actually developing the land. In 2004, Leon County adopted Ordinance 04-40, which rezoned the 107-acre parcel to mixed use and significantly increased permissible development in the closed basin areas. The County’s approval of the PUD imposed numerous conditions, including a requirement that any future application for final 4

development approval must comply with all applicable requirements of the Land Development Code. We note that state law defines a “development order” as “any order granting, denying, or granting with conditions an application for a development permit.” § 163.3164(7), Fla. Stat. Development orders must be consistent with the local government’s comprehensive plan. § 163.3194(3)(a), Fla. Stat. Appellees filed a complaint against the County under section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, seeking to invalidate the development order on the basis of inconsistency with the Plan. Notably, Appellees also sought certiorari review in the trial court regarding the County’s approval of the conceptual PUD; a different trial court denied relief, finding that under the County’s Land Development Code, the Special Development Zones did not apply to closed basins. This court subsequently denied certiorari in a second-tier certiorari proceeding. See Phipps v. Leon County, 935 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). In 2005, Appellees moved for summary judgment. Appellants filed a cross- motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Special Development Zones did not apply to closed basins on their property, because the basins could not discharge rainwater runoff to Lake Jackson. Thus, Appellants asserted that under Policy 2.3.1 of the Plan, Special Development Zones only applied to “restrict activities that impact the quality of stormwater.” Appellants supported their motion with an 5

affidavit from an engineer stating that the majority of their property was in a closed basin. Significantly, Appellants also submitted an affidavit from the Leon County Director of Environmental Compliance Division of Growth and Environmental Management stating that only the area designated “Basin 1” was not a closed basin. In its order on summary judgment, the trial court found that the Special Development Zones applied to closed basins, but acknowledged that Appellants’ arguments were persuasive. It went on to find that it was undisputed that Appellants’ property contained elevations that triggered the Special Development Zones, and that the Plan did not contain an exception for closed basins, despite such language in the Land Development Code and the Land Use Element. The trial court was not persuaded by the argument that the Special Development Zones were established to “restrict activities that impact the quality of stormwater” under Policy 2.3.1, which would limit such Zones to open basins. Instead, the trial court found that because the plain language of Policy 2.2.12 which defined and established Special Development Zones did not contain any exception for closed basins in the Lake Jackson area, the development order allowing increased development in those areas in contravention of the Zones was purportedly invalid. We respectfully disagree with the trial court’s careful analysis, and find the better 6

interpretation of the Plan as a whole, and the local government’s interpretation of the Plan, compels us to uphold the development order and the ordinance. Standard of Review and Analysis We have recently recognized that our standard of review of the consistency of a development order with a comprehensive plan is de novo. Bay County v. Harrison, 13 So. 3d 115, 118 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). We have further held that a development order is considered consistent with a comprehensive plan where the “‘land uses . . . and other aspects of . . . [the] order . . . are compatible with and further the objectives, policies, land uses, and densities or intensities in the comprehensive plan . . . .” Id. (quoting § 163.3194(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005)). The Florida Legislature has established that in reviewing consistency, a court may consider the “reasonableness of the comprehensive plan, or element or elements thereof, relating to the issue justiciably raised or the appropriateness and completeness of the comprehensive plan, or element or elements thereof, in relation to the governmental action or development regulation under consideration.” § 163.3194(4)(a), Fla. Stat. Here, the trial court’s order incorrectly reviewed the development order and the Plan by neglecting to consider the “reasonableness of the comprehensive plan, or element or elements thereof.” By reviewing the applicable provisions of the Plan as a whole, the most reasonable and holistic interpretation, based on both the 7

text and the synthesis of the document, we have no doubt that the development order is consistent with the Plan. This is necessarily so, because when read in pari materia, it is clear that the Plan and its elements provide that within certain Zones that actually discharge rainwater runoff into Lake Jackson, Leon County has established much more stringent development limitations for one primary purpose: to protect Lake Jackson from polluted rainwater runoff. Appellees make an interesting argument in this regard. They assert that Appellants’ argument would produce an absurd result because only Lake Jackson’s watershed is affected by the provisions of policy 2.3.1. Thus, Appellees argue that under Appellants’ view, the Special Development Zones would apply in closed basins around all other lakes except Lake Jackson. Appellees’ argument might have merit if they were challenging the application of the Special Development Zones in those closed basins, but that argument is not presented here. Whether it is absurd to provide greater protections to water bodies other than Lake Jackson is not an issue raised here, and as we have recently held, we are extremely reluctant to apply the absurdity doctrine. See Nassau County v. Willis, 41 So. 3d 270, 279 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (“Courts should exercise great caution before deviating from the plain text . . . to purportedly avoid reaching what a court considers an ‘absurd result.’”). What is certainly not absurd, however, is to recognize that Leon County 8

has determined that rainwater runoff policies and regulations should not apply where there is no discharge of runoff. We find that under any proper interpretation of the Plan, the Special Development Zones do not apply to closed basins within Summerfield. Furthermore, we note that the Special Development Zones applied different elevations to other water bodies, and apparently do not apply at all to water bodies not listed, so we decline to speculate regarding how Appellees’ argument would apply in such cases where a landowner asserted that a closed basin was entitled to an exemption from the Special Development Zones. We agree with Appellants that under Conservation Element Policy 2.3.1 and the similar provisions in the Land Use Element regarding the Lake Protection category, as well as the regulations promulgated in the Land Development Code, it is clear that the Special Development Zones were drafted to protect Lake Jackson and other receiving water bodies from polluted rainwater runoff. To accomplish this, the Plan established polices that prohibit disturbance of vegetation and natural features within certain elevation Zones near those water bodies. The Plan expressed a repeated provision that these Zones were created to ensure cleaner runoff from development. If land cannot discharge runoff into Lake Jackson, landowners are provided some relief, based on the appropriate conclusion that the more stringent 9

Zones were designed to protect water bodies, and not to impose general environmental controls unrelated to water quality. REVERSED and REMANDED with directions to enter judgment in favor of Appellants. HAWKES and MARSTILLER, JJ., CONCUR. 10

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida, January Term, A.D. 2010 Opinion filed June 9, 2010. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. ________________ No. 3D08-2864 Lower Tribunal No. 05-313 ________________ Gordon Beyer and Molly Beyer, Appellants, vs. City of Marathon and The State of Florida, Appellees. An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Monroe County, David J. Audlin, Jr., Judge. James S. Mattson (Key Largo); Andrew M. Tobin (Tavernier), for appellants. Stearns Weaver Miller Weissler Alhadeff & Sitterson and Mark D. Solov and Adam M. Schachter (Marathon); Bill McCollum, Attorney General and Jonathan A. Glogau, Chief, Complex Litigation, for appellees. Before RAMIREZ, C.J., GERSTEN, and CORTIÑAS, JJ. CORTIÑAS, J.

In 1970, Gordon and Molly Beyer purchased Bamboo Key, an offshore island of approximately nine acres in unincorporated Monroe County (the “Property”). At the time of the purchase, undeveloped off-shore islands were zoned “General Use” and were allowed development at a density of one dwelling unit per acre. In late 1986, Monroe County adopted the State Comprehensive Plan which, among other impacts, changed the zoning designation of the Property to “Offshore Island.” The new designation came with a density limit of one unit per ten acres. A decade later, in early 1996, Monroe County’s Year 2010 Comprehensive Plan (the “1996 Plan”) was adopted. 1 Pursuant to the 1996 Plan, development on the Property was prohibited because it was classified as a “bird rookery.” However, the Property could still be used for camping, bird watching, and other types of nature-related activities. The Beyers, in 1997, applied to Monroe County for a beneficial use determination (“BUD”) as provided in the 1996 Plan. The City of Marathon (the “City”) was incorporated in November 1999, and the Property consequently became part of the City. The 1996 Plan and Monroe County’s land development regulations were adopted by the City, but at the time of incorporation, no action had been taken on the Beyers’ BUD application. In compliance with the City’s instructions, the Beyers filed a new BUD application in November 2002. In 2003, 1 Part I of the 1996 Plan went into effect in January 1996, and Part II became effective in mid-July 1997. 2

the Beyers filed yet another application after having been informed that the previous one had been lost. In 2004, following the filing of a mandamus action by the Beyers, the City agreed to render a final BUD determination within six months of November 1, 2004. A BUD hearing was subsequently held in front of a special master. Among the findings made by the special master was that “[u]nder the [1996 Plan] . . . the [P]roperty became completely unbuildable due to no development allowed on off shore islands documented as a bird rookery.” Following the hearing, the special master recommended denial of the BUD application for various reasons, including that “the [Beyers] sat on the investment in the [P]roperty for 30 years watching the environmental restrictions on the use of the [P]roperty become more and more strict,” and that “the award of ROGO 2 points and recreational uses allowed [the Beyers], reasonably met [the Beyers’] investment-based expectations.” 3 Following the City’s adoption of the special master’s recommendation on September 27, 2005, the Beyers filed a complaint for inverse condemnation against the City on December 14, 2005 and, on December 11, 2007, sued the State of Florida. The trial court eventually granted summary judgment against the Beyers, 2 Rate of Growth Ordinance. 3 The special master valued the Property’s ROGO points at approximately $150,000.00. 3

finding that they had exceeded the four-year statute of limitations imposed by section 95.11 (3)(p), Florida Statutes. We reverse. We review the trial court’s order granting of summary judgment de novo. Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, LP, 760 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 2000). The trial court based its grant of summary judgment on the premise that the statute of limitations accrued with the enactment of the 1996 Plan because the Beyers’ claim was “for a facial taking . . . [and] there is no ripeness requirement for a facial taking claim. . . . [A] facial taking claim accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, on the date of enactment of the regulation alleged to have caused the taking.” As we set forth in Collins v. Monroe County, 999 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008), “[a] facial taking, also known as a per se or categorical taking, occurs when the mere enactment of a regulation precludes all development of the property, and deprives the property owner of all reasonable economic use of the property.” Id. at 713 (citing Lucas v. So. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992)). We disagree that the mere enactment of the 1996 Plan, on its face, deprived the Beyers of all reasonable economic use of the Property. The City and State, while arguing that no taking has occurred, concede in their answer brief that “[t]he evidence will ultimately reveal that the Property can be used for camping and other recreational uses. The Property also has additional beneficial economic value because it has transferable development rights.” (Emphasis 4

added). As such, the Beyers were not at all precluded from claiming an as-applied taking of their property. In Shands v. City of Marathon, 999 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008), we stated that An as-applied takings claim challenging the application of a land use ordinance is not ripe until the plaintiff has obtained a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the plaintiff’s property. The [plaintiffs] obtained a decision as to the application of the regulations to the property when they went through the BUD process and obtained a decision from the Marathon City Council. Id. at 725. Moreover, as we noted in Collins, “[o]rdinarily, before a takings claim becomes ripe, a property owner is required to follow ‘reasonable and necessary’ steps to permit the land use authority to exercise its discretion in considering development plans, ‘including the opportunity to grant any variances or waivers allowed by law.’” Collins, 999 So. 2d at 716 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 620-21 (2001)). In the case before us, the Beyers, in close proximity to the time the 1996 Plan was enacted, sought the quasi-judicial relief available to them via the BUD process. Based upon the information in the record, it appears that any delay in the processing of the Beyers’ BUD applications, was not caused by any action or inaction on their part. It would be patently unfair, if not absurd, to allow the county, and later the City, to delay the timely processing of the BUD 5

application, provide a determination after the expiration of the purported limitations period, and then claim the expiration of the limitations period as a defense. We find that the City’s adoption of the special master’s recommended BUD denial on September 27, 2005 effectively started the limitations period on the Beyers’ as-applied taking claim and, therefore, the inverse condemnation complaints against the City and the State of Florida were timely filed. See Collins, 999 So. 2d at 717. Entry of summary judgment on the basis of the statute of limitations was therefore improper and, accordingly, we reverse. Reversed and remanded. 6

D ISTRICT C OURT O F A PPEAL O F T HE S TATE O F F LORIDA F OURTH D ISTRICT January Term 2011 BARBARA GRAVES, GARY KAST, RANDI MARTIN and LILLIAN THAMES, Appellants, v. CITY OF POMPANO BEACH , by and through its City Commission, a Florida Municipality, and PPI, INC., Appellees. No. 4D09-3790 [April 13, 2011] S TEVENSON , J. This appeal stems from dismissal of appellants’ complaint filed against the City of Pompano Beach and PPI, Inc., which challenged a plat approval as inconsistent with the City’s comprehensive plan. See § 163.3215(3), Fla. Stat. (2009) (“Any aggrieved or adversely affected party may maintain a de novo action for declaratory, injunctive, or other relief against any local government to challenge . . . a development order . . . which is not consistent with the comprehensive plan . . . .”) (emphasis added). Because a plat approval is not a “development order” under section 163.3215, we affirm. Appellants filed their complaint after the City adopted Resolution 2009-120, which approved recordation of the Pompano Park Racino plat. PPI, Inc., the entity that owns the Park, sought to develop it and filed an application for a plat approval with the City. Pursuant to section 157.44(A)(1)(a) of the City of Pompano Beach Land Development Code, a plat approval must be obtained from the City before any building permits may be issued for the subject property. The approved plat outlines several structures and uses that already exist on the property, as well as the development PPI sought to pursue, including expansion of the existing racetrack and casino. Appellants, who all live around or near the Park, alleged in their complaint that the plat was a development order under section 163.3215 and had to comply with the City’s comprehensive plan. The City and PPI

filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that a plat approval was not the equivalent of a development order. The trial court agreed and granted the motion to dismiss. In reviewing dismissal of a complaint seeking relief under section 163.3215, the standard of review is de novo. See Lutz Lake Fern Rd. Neighborhood Grps., Inc. v. Hillsborough Cnty. , 779 So. 2d 380, 383 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). All well pleaded facts and reasonable inferences from them must be accepted as true. See Wells v. Wells , 24 So. 3d 579, 582 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). The test is not whether the complaint shows that the plaintiff is likely to succeed in getting a declaration of rights, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to a declaration of rights at all. See id. at 583. We agree with the trial court’s inherent conclusion that a plat approval is not a development order under section 163.3215. A development order is defined as “any order granting, denying, or granting with conditions an application for a development permit.” § 163.3164(7). A development permit includes “any building permit, zoning permit, subdivision approval, rezoning, certification, special exception, variance, or any other official action of local government having the effect of permitting the development of land.” § 163.3164(8). Further, development means “the carrying out of any building activity . . . [or] the making of any material change in the use or appearance of any structure or land.” § 380.04(1). A plat, on the other hand, is simply “a map or delineated representation of the subdivision of lands, being a complete exact representation of the subdivision.” § 177.031(14). Resolution 2009-120 only approved a map of the Park, but did not permit PPI to begin building on the land or make any alterations to structures existing on the land. As indicated by the land development code, additional steps must be taken in order for development to begin. See C ITY OF P OMPANO B EACH , F LA . C ODE O RDINANCES §§ 157.03, .45 (2009) (listing requirements for site plan approval that must be met prior to issuance of building permits). Thus, the plat approval may not b e challenged as a development order under section 163.3215. Accordingly, the trial court’s order dismissing the complaint is affirmed, and appellants will need to wait until later in the process, if the plans continue, to challenge the proposed facilities and uses. Affirmed. G ROSS , C.J., and G ERBER , J., concur. 2

* * * Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Robert B. Carney, Judge; L.T. Case No. 09-17793 (04). Andrew J. Baumann, Kenneth G. Spillias and James E. Charles of Lewis, Longman & Walker, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellants. Gordon B. Linn, City Attorney, and Erin Gill Robles, Assistant City Attorney, Pompano Beach, for appellee City of Pompano Beach. Daniel L. Wallach, Gary C. Rosen and Alan B. Koslow of Becker & Poliakoff, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee PPI, Inc. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. 3

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA KATHERINE'S BAY, LLC, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO INTERVENOR, FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED Appellant, CASE NO. 1D10-939 v. RONALD J. FAGAN and CITRUS COUNTY, Appellees. _____________________________/ Opinion filed December 14, 2010. An appeal from an order of the Department of Administration. Clark A. Stillwell, Inverness, for Appellant. Shaw P. Stiller, General Counsel, Department of Community Affairs, Tallahassee, and Denise A. Lyn, Inverness, for Appellees. LEWIS, J. Katherine‟s Bay, LLC, Appellant , seeks review of a final order issued by the Administration Commission (“the Commission”) , which adopted an administrative law judge‟s (“ALJ”) holding that a small-scale development amendment (“the Amendment”) to Citrus County‟s Comprehensive Plan (“the Plan”) was invalid because it rendered the Plan internally inconsistent. The ALJ and the Commission

recognized two grounds for finding the Amendment inconsistent with the Plan: first, that it violated a policy in the Plan‟s Future Land Use Element (“FLUE”) requiring compatibility of land uses; and second, that it violated a policy in the Plan‟s FLUE requiring the County to guide future development to areas with minimal environmental limitations. Appellant challenges both grounds. As to the first ground, Appellant argues that there was a lack of competent, substantial evidence to support the ALJ‟s finding that the Amendment approved a future land use designation that was incompatible with the surrounding uses. We agree. As to the second ground, Appellant argues both that there was a lack of competent, substantial evidence to support the ALJ‟s factual findings and that the ALJ‟s ultimate conclusion resulted from an erroneous construction of the Plan. While we do find competent, substantial evidence of the findings the ALJ made in relation to the second ground, we hold that the findings did not support the conclusion that the Amendment rendered the Plan internally inconsistent. Because the ALJ‟s conclusion that the Amendment rendered the Plan internally inconsistent is not supported by either of the FLUE policies at issue, we reverse and remand to the Commission for reinstatement of the ordinance. I. Facts and Procedural History On May 26, 2009, the Citrus County Board of County Commissioners adopted an ordinance that amended the Plan‟s Generalized Future Land Use Map 2

(“GFLUM” ), which is a part of the FLUE. The Amendment changed the future land use designation of a 9.9-acre parcel of land owned by Appellant, based on Appellant‟s application for such a change. The subject property is located in a geographic region defined by Citrus County as the “Coastal Area.” According to the Plan, “[t]he Coastal Area parallels the Gulf of Mexico, and the boundary may be described as following the west side of US- 19 north from the Hernando County line to the Withlacoochee River.” The Plan notes that “[t]his boundary is the basis for an environmentally sensitive overlay zone to be used for land use regulatory purposes.” Before the Amendment, the subject property was designated Low Intensity Coastal and Lakes (“CL”), which the Plan defines in pertinent part as follows: Low Intensity Coastal and Lakes (CL) This land use category designates those areas having environmental characteristics that are sensitive to development and therefore should be protected. Residential development in this district is limited to a maximum of one dwelling unit per 20 acres . . . . . . . . In addition to single family residential development, the following land uses may be allowed provided the permitted use is compatible with the surrounding area, and standards for development are met as specified in the Citrus County Land Development Code (LDC)[:]  Multifamily residences (in existing platted areas only or in lieu of clustering single family units at a density of one unit per lot of record and requiring the recombination of said lots. For example, a 3

duplex requires two lots to be recombined into a single parcel, a quadruplex four lots, etc.)  Recreational uses  Agricultural and Silviculture uses  Public/Semi-Public, Institutional facilities  Home occupations  New railroad right-of-way, storage facilities, or related structures  Communication towers  Utilities  Commercial fishing and marina related uses  Commercial uses that are water related, water dependent, or necessary for the support of the immediate population[.] The Amendment changed the subject property‟s future land use category from CL to Recreational Vehicle Park/Campground (“RVP”), which the Plan defines in pertinent part as follows: Recreational Vehicle Park/Campground (RVP) This category is intended to recognize existing Recreational Vehicle (RV) Parks and Campgrounds, as well as to provide for the location and development of new parks for recreational vehicles. Such parks are intended specifically to allow temporary living accommodation for recreation, camping, or travel use. . . . . New RV parks shall be required to preserve thirty percent (30%) of the gross site area as permanent open space, consistent with Policy 17.15.11 of this Plan. In addition to RV/campsite development, the following land uses as detailed in the Land Development Code, shall be allowed provided the permitted use is compatible with the surrounding area, and standards for development 4

are met as specified in the County Land Development Code:  Recreational Uses  Agricultural and Silvicultural Uses  Public/Semi-Public, Institutional Facilities  Convenience retail and personal services to serve park visitors and guests up to one percent of the gross site area, not to exceed 5,000 square feet, located within the development and not accessible from any external road[.] After the Amendment changing the subject property‟s future land use category from CL to RVP was adopted, Appellee, the owner of neighboring property, challenged the Amendment under the procedure set forth in section 163.3187(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2008). Appellee argued that the Amendment was not “in compliance” with the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Lan d Development Regulation Act (“the Act”) because it rendered the Plan internally inconsistent. Appellee identified two policies in the FLUE, among others, that he claimed were inconsistent with the Amendment. Those policies are 17.2.7 and 17.2.8, and they provide as follows: Policy 17.2.7 The County shall guide future development to the most appropriate areas, as depicted on the GFLUM, specifically those with minimal environmental limitations and the availability of necessary services. Policy 17.2.8 The County shall utilize land use techniques and development standards to achieve a functional and compatible land use framework which reduces incompatible land uses. 5

Appellant intervened in the proceedings, and the matter proceeded to a section 120.57 hearing. The parties stipulated that the subject property is located across the road from Appellee‟s property , which is on the Homosassa River, and that the subject property is bordered in all directions by property designated as either CL or Coastal and Lakes Residential (“CLR”). They also stipulated that there exists on Appellant‟s property a parcel designated Coastal/Lakes - Commercial (“CLC”) 1 and that this property is being used as an RV park because this use of the property is vested. Further, they stipulated that Appellee‟s property was in the Coastal High Hazard Area (“CHHA”) . At the hearing, Appellee supported his argument that the Amendment rendered the subject property incompatible with the surrounding uses primarily by presenting his own testimony and that of his neighbor. Appellee described the beauty and peacefulness of the area and opined that the introduction of another RV park into the area would lead to increased traffic, litter, noise, and light pollution. He testified that the vested RV park currently existing on Appellant‟s property is an “eyesore” that “looks like a bunch of junk stored on the front lawn.” Appellee 1 As provided in the Plan, the CLC category allows commercial uses that are “water related, water dependent, or necessary for the support of th e immediate population,” i.e. “neighborhood commercial uses, personal services, or professional services.” This category is intended “for a single business entity on a single parcel of property.” 6

also testified that, in 1993, there was a major flood in the area around his home, which was so severe that he had to tie boats to his mailbox to keep them from floating down the road. He was concerned that the RV park Appellant planned to develop on the subject property would require him to manage even more debris in the event of a natural disaster. Appellee also expressed concern that the RV park would decrease his property value. A neighbor expressed the same concerns about the potential for increased traffic and decreased property values in the area. The evidence concerning the subje ct property‟s environmental limitations came in the form of the County Staff‟s report and the testimony of Dr. Timothy Pitts and Sue Farnsworth, both of whom were employed by the County as planners. The report was prepared by Dr. Pitts, who was the County‟ s Senior Planner of Community Development at the time. According to the County Staff‟s report, the subject property was studied by officials in the fire prevention, engineering, utilities, and environmental divisions. The fire prevention and engineering representatives recommended approval of the application with conditions, and the utilities representative recommended approval. The environmental planner did not recommend approval or denial but noted that the subject property was within a “Karst Sensitive Area.” 2 Additionally, the report indicated that a “traffic analysis” had revealed that “adequate capacity exists on Halls River Road for anticipated 2 According to Dr. Pitts, karst is a “limestone underground sort of rock structure that is very porous” and through which “pollutants can very easily travel.” 7

traffic at the maximum development potential of the site.” The report also noted that the subject property was within the CHHA and that it containe d “significant wetland areas.” According to the report, if the application was granted, Appellant would still need to “design a Master Plan of Development that minimizes wetland alterations.” One of the policies of the Plan that the report indicated may be cause for concern was Policy 3.18.11, which provides as follows: The County shall protect springs by prohibiting increases in allowed land use intensity at the Generalized Future Land Use level within a Karst Sensitive Area without a hydrogeological analysis that addresses impacts to groundwater resources. The analysis shall be performed by a professional geologist or professional engineer licensed in Florida. Karst Sensitive Area shall be defined as an area in which limestone lies within five (5) feet of depth from natural grade. In relation to this policy, the report stated that Appellant had “provided a letter from a professional engineer that adequately meets the intent of this policy” and that Appellant inte nded “to develop the site using methods that will meet the intent of the Comprehensive Plan.” The report also contained the following observations: This site has some severe environmental restrictions — extensive wetlands, proximity to an Outstanding Florida Waterbody, Karst sensitive landscape — and it will be difficult to design a site that meets the standards of the Comprehensive Plan and the Land Development Code. The following policy would potentially restrict development if this application were to be approved: Policy 3.16.3 Development shall not be allowed at the maximum densities and intensities of the underlying land use district if those densities would be harmful to 8

natural resources. So, the applicant should be cautioned that given the environmental sensitivity of the property, development may be limited on this site to less than the allowable maximum intensity. If this application is approved, an appropriately designed master plan of development will be required which meets all standards of the Comprehensive Plan and the Land Development Code and is approved by the Board of County Commissioners. Ultimately, despite the environmental limitations, the County Staff concluded that the site was “ appropriate for some type of RV Park development subject to an approp riately designed master plan.” In making this recommendation, the County Staff emphasized that, “based on the environmental limitations of the area, the applicant is cautioned that the site may not be able to be designed at the maximum intens ity for this land use district.” Dr. Pitts testified consistently with the County Staff‟s report. He noted that neither the Plan nor the Land Development Code (“LDC”) prohibit s RV parks in either karst sensitive areas or the CHHA. He explained, however, that the County has regulations limiting the density or intensity of RV parks in such areas and indicated that the professional studies he had received on the subject property represented that the site could be developed to meet those standards. Dr. Pitts t estified that, in his opinion, “just about anything west of [U.S. Highway 19] is . . . karst sensitive.” Dr. Pitts acknowledged that the subject property had 1.64 acres of wetlands and that there were wetlands in the surrounding areas. He explained that 9

th e Plan requires “setbacks” to mitigate wetland impacts and that the LDC required one-hundred percent protection of the wetlands. Additionally, he explained that the regulations required fifty percent open space in the Coastal Area. Based on these regulations, Dr. Pitts testified that it was highly unlikely that Appellant would be permitted to develop the space at the maximum build-out potential theoretically allowed under the new designation, which would be five units per acre. He emphasized that, no matter what the number of approved units proved to be, complete protection of the wetlands would be required. Finally, Dr. Pitts testified that there were several vested uses in the surrounding area, including a 300- to 400- unit RV park, that did not conform to the land use designations identified for those properties in the Plan. Farnsworth, an environmental planner for the County, testified that the wetlands were located around the perimeter of the property and that they extended into the part of the property beyond the perimeter. She explained, however, that permitting standards for an RV park prohibited the filling of wetlands and that the subject property could be developed as an RV park without the need to fill in the wetlands. After the hearing, the ALJ issued a Recommended Order concluding that the Amendment was inconsistent with FLUE Policy 17.2.7‟s requirement that future development be directed to “the most appropriate areas, as depicted on the 10

GFLUM, specifically those with minimal environmental li mitations.” In support of this conclusion, the ALJ noted the County Staff‟s finding that the land had “severe environmental limitations.” In particular, the ALJ noted that the area in which the subject property was located had extensive wetlands, a karst sensitive landscape, and a CHHA designation. The ALJ acknowledged that the Plan did not expressly prohibit RV parks in CHHA areas and that there were regulations in the Plan and the LDC that would limit the intensity of development on this land even under the RVP designation. The ALJ concluded, however, that “[n]otwithstanding the other provisions within the Plan and LDRs that place limitations on RV park development in an effort to satisfy environmental constraints, . . . the subject property is clearly not „the most appropriate area, as depicted on the GFLUM‟ for new development, nor is it an area with „minimal environmental limitations.‟” The ALJ also concluded that the Amendment was inconsistent with FLUE Policy 17.2.8‟s requirement that development be accomplished in a “functional and compatible land use framework which reduces incompatible land uses.” Because “compatible” is not defined in the Plan, the ALJ relied on the definition of “compatibility” in Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J -5.003(23). That definition is as follows: “Compatibility” means a condition in which land uses or conditions can coexist in relative proximity to each other in a stable fashion over time such that no use or condition is unduly negatively impacted directly or indirectly by another use or condition. 11

In support of the conclusion that the new designation approved a land use incompatible with the surrounding uses, the ALJ noted Appellee‟s testimony concerning the characteristics of the area. He also noted Appellee‟s conce rns about noise, lighting, litter, traffic, and property value. The ALJ further noted that there were only six nonconforming land uses and that each was permitted to exist due to vested rights. The ALJ then stated, “It is fair to infer that the insertion o f an RV park in the middle of a large tract of vacant CL land would logically lead to further requests for reclassifying CL land to expand the new RV park or to allow other non- residential uses.” The ALJ further found the following: The commercial RV park, with a yet-to-be determined number of spaces for temporary RVs, tenants, and associated commercial development, will be in close proximity to a predominately [sic] residential neighborhood. A reasonable inference from the evidence is that these commercial uses will have a direct or indirect negative impact on the nearby residential properties and should not coexist in close proximity to one another. Based on these findings and the determination that the Amendment was inconsistent with FLUE Policy 17.2.7, the ALJ recommended that the Commission conclude that the Amendment was not in compliance with the Act. The Commission adopted the ALJ‟s findings and conclusions, except that it modified the finding that the Amendment would “logically lead to further requests for reclassifying CL land to expand the new RV park or to allow other non- residential uses.” The Commission concluded that this finding was mere 12

conjecture, unsupported by competent, substantial evidence. It modified the finding to read, “Unlike t he presence of . . . pre-existing, non-conforming uses, permitting the addition of an RV park in the middle of a large tract of vacant CL land now would set a precedent that an RV park, a Commercial Land Use, is compatible with the Low Intensity Coastal and Lakes Land Use designation in this vicinity.” Based on the adoption of the ALJ‟s findings and conclusions, as modified, the Commission held that the Amendment had no legal effect. II. Analysis A. Standard of Review The amendment at issue in this case was adopted under the authority of section 163.3187(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2008). Section 163.3187(3)(a) provides for review of amendments adopted under section 163.3187(1)(c) under the following terms: The state land planning agency shall not review or issue a notice of intent for small scale development amendments which satisfy the requirements of paragraph (1)(c). Any affected person may file a petition with the Division of Administrative Hearings pursuant to ss. 120.569 and 120.57 to request a hearing to challenge the compliance of a small scale development amendment with this act within 30 days following the local government's adoption of the amendment, shall serve a copy of the petition on the local government, and shall furnish a copy to the state land planning agency. An administrative law judge shall hold a hearing in the affected jurisdiction not less than 30 days nor more than 60 days following the filing of a petition and the assignment of an administrative law judge. The parties to a hearing held pursuant to this subsection shall be the petitioner, the local government, and any intervenor. In the proceeding, the local 13

government's determination that the small scale development amendment is in compliance is presumed to be correct. The local government's determination shall be sustained unless it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the amendment is not in compliance with the requirements of this act. In any proceeding initiated pursuant to this subsection, the state land planning agency may intervene. § 163.3187(3)(a). Because Appellant is challenging the Administrati on Commission‟s final agency action in this appeal, see id. , this Court‟s standard of review is governed by section 120.68(7), Florida Statutes (2010). That section provides in pertinent part as follows: The court shall remand a case to the agency for further proceedings consistent with the court's decision or set aside agency action, as appropriate, when it finds that: . . . . (b) The agency's action depends on any finding of fact that is not supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record of a hearing conducted pursuant to ss. 120.569 and 120.57; however, the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on any disputed finding of fact; [or] . . . . (d) The agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law and a correct interpretation compels a particular action . . . . § 120.68(7). In this Court, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the findings of inconsistency with both policies. 3 In addition, Appellant 3 In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, Appellant argues that the ALJ did not view the evidence with an eye toward the proper standard. He contends the 14

challenges the ALJ‟s interpretation of the policy requiring that future development be directed toward areas of the County with minimal environmental limitations. The separate arguments concerning each policy will be addressed in turn. B. FLUE Policy 17.2.7 With regard to FLUE Policy 17.2.7, Appellant raises two arguments: first, that the ALJ e rred in relying on the County Staff‟s finding of “severe environmental limitations” because the County Staff recommended approval of the application; and second, that the ALJ erred in failing to apply the FLUE policies that are more specific to RV parks in the Coastal Area in lieu of FLUE Policy 17.2.7, which is a general planning policy applicable to all land use decisions countywide. We agree with the second point. i. The County Staff’s Report Appellant insists that the ALJ was required to give the County Staff ‟s recommendation great weight. Even assuming that the County Staff‟s report wa s entitled to great weight in this case, there is no basis in the record for believing that ALJ should have considered whether the County‟s determination that the Amendment was proper was “fairly debatable,” based on the standard recognized in Coastal Development of North Florida, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 788 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 2001). The argument that the ALJ applied the wrong standard is not properly before us because Appellant stood silent when Appellee argued to the ALJ that the “fairly debatable” standard did not apply and when the ALJ invited Appellant to provide contrary authority. See Dep‟t of Bus. & Prof‟l. Regulation, Constr. Indus. Licensing Bd. v. Harden, 10 So. 3d 647, 649 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (recognizing the preservation rule in administrative proceedings). 15

the ALJ did not give it due consideration. To the contrary, the ALJ recited it heavily and relied on the concrete findings within it that showed the environmental limitations of the subject property, even though the ALJ disagreed with the ultimate conclusion. If an ALJ were not entitled to disagree, then the ALJ‟s review would serve no purpose. To the extent Appellant argues that the recommendation of the County Staff was not given sufficient weight, this assertion is unreviewable because “[i]t is not the role of the appellate court to reweigh evidence anew.” Young v. Dep‟t of Educ ., Div. of Vocational Rehab., 943 So. 2d 901, 902 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). The ALJ‟s finding that the subject property had severe environmental limitations was thoroughly supported by the County Staff‟s report. Whether those limitations required a finding that the Amendment was inconsistent with FLUE Policy 17.2.7 is, however, a separate matter. ii. Interpretation of the Plan Appellant‟s argument that the ALJ erred in relying on a general policy in the Plan where more specific policies existed is an issue of law to be reviewed de novo. See Nassau County v. Willis, 41 So. 3d 270, 278 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). In reviewing this issue de novo, however, we bear in mind that the ALJ was required under section 163.3187(3)(a) to presume that the County‟s determination that t he Amendment complied with the Act (and, thus, was consistent with the Plan) was correct. 16

Rules of statutory construction are applicable to the interpretation of comprehensive plans. See Great Outdoors Trading, Inc. v. City of High Springs, 550 So. 2d 483, 485 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (noting that the rules of statutory construction apply to municipal ordinances and city charters); Willis, 41 So. 3d at 279 (noting that a comprehensive plan is like a “constitution for all future development within the governmen tal boundary”) (citation omitted). Appellant argues that this case implicates the rules of construction that specific provisions control over general ones and that one provision should not be read in such a way that it renders another provision meaningless. Both rules are well-established. See Murray v. Mariner Health, 994 So. 2d 1051, 1061 (Fla. 2008). Another rule of construction relevant to this issue is that all provisions on related subjects be read in pari materia and harmonized so that each is given effect. Cone v. State, Dep‟t of Health, 886 So. 2d 1007, 1010 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Here, the ALJ concluded that the Amendment conflicted with FLUE Policy 17.2.7, which provides, “The County shall guide future development to the most appropriate areas, as depicted on the GFLUM, specifically those with minimal environmental limitations and the availability of necessary services.” (CP 10 -155). Appellant contends that FLUE Policies 17.6.5 and 17.6.12, which are more specific to RV parks in the Coastal Area, indicate that the Amendment was consistent with the Plan. Those policies provide as follows: 17

Policy 17.6.5 Specialized commercial needs, such as water-dependent and water-related uses, temporary accommodations for tourists and campers, as well as neighborhood commercial uses and services serving residential communities within the general Coastal, Lakes, and Rivers Areas shall be provided for within the Future Land Use Plan and standards for development provided within the County LDC. Policy 17.6.12 Recreational vehicle (RV) parks and campgrounds shall be designed according to a detailed master plan, shall preserve a minimum of 30 percent of the property in open space, shall provide a minimum of an additional 10 percent of the property as recreation areas, and generally shall conform to the commercial development standards in the Land Development Code. . . . In order to minimize the adverse impact of development on the resources and natural features of the Coastal, Lakes, and Rivers Region, the LDC shall be amended to include additional review criteria for all new RVP projects located in this region. Such criteria may include:  Restrictions on density  Enhanced open space requirements  Wetland protection  Upland preservation  Clustering  Connection to regional central water and sewer service Appellant is correct in noting that the development of new RV parks in Coastal Areas was specifically anticipated by FLUE Policy 17.6.12. This 18

Growth Management Growth Management Issues Issues STBR. v. - PDF document

!! Growth Management Growth Management Issues

Celebrating 20 years of JMG Symposium Emerging issues in management and governance in the

West Suffolk Growth Steering Group Future issues and challenges 1 Good Growth Different

June 30, 2016 Tonights Agenda Background Project Watershed Issues Management

Development Charges Update Growth Management Committee April 30, 2015

Growth in Student Achievement: Issues of Measurement, Longitudinal Analyses & Accountability

Evidence For LSE Growth Commission Human Capital Stephen Machin 1 Relevant Issues It is

things to come Growth Management Update May 2019 MICHELLE BANFIELD, RPP MANAGER, GROWTH &

Business Process Management Journal S trategic issues in customer relationship management (CRM)

1 In Practice Change Management Issues Can managers expect people to j ust accept a new

A10/M11 Growth Area Overview of economic characteristics and issues Tony Jackson, Executive

CLE & e-ID Management: Issues, Prospects and Opportunities Chris E Onyemenam Director

Memory Management 1 Overview Basic memory management Address Spaces Virtual

Diligence Issues / Growth By Acquisition Strategy OVERVIEW PRESENTATION Boston New York

Workshop HH New & Emerging Water Management Issues An Exciting, Interactive Panel on

1 Significant organic growth - strong growth markets + strong growth strategies = strong results

Endogenous growth through R&D Empirical issues and extensions Carl-Johan Dalgaard

Iden%ty Management Issues - status and plans OSG

The Paradox of Knowledge Management: The Paradox of Knowledge Management: Progress, Issues

Growth issues and optical properties of nonpolar (Al,In,Ga)N films and quantum wells Shigefusa F.

An Approach to Addressing Spectrum Management Issues for Radar Systems TC-6 Spectrum Management

Gro rowth M Management R Review September 18, 2014 Growth Management Review 1 Agenda 1.

Risk management Issues in Fisheries Management Selles Jules PhD candidate University of Nantes

Macroeconomics Kwabena Otoo TUC, Ghana Key Macroeconomic Issues 1. GDP Growth 2. Inflation 3.

Quality Risk Management Issues Neale Baldwin Senior GMP Inspector Manufacturing Quality Branch

Growth Management Growth Management Issues Issues STBR. v. - PDF document

!! Growth Management Growth Management Issues

Celebrating 20 years of JMG Symposium Emerging issues in management and governance in the

West Suffolk Growth Steering Group Future issues and challenges 1 Good Growth Different

June 30, 2016 Tonights Agenda Background Project Watershed Issues Management

Development Charges Update Growth Management Committee April 30, 2015

Growth in Student Achievement: Issues of Measurement, Longitudinal Analyses &amp; Accountability

Evidence For LSE Growth Commission Human Capital Stephen Machin 1 Relevant Issues It is

things to come Growth Management Update May 2019 MICHELLE BANFIELD, RPP MANAGER, GROWTH &amp;

Business Process Management Journal S trategic issues in customer relationship management (CRM)

1 In Practice Change Management Issues Can managers expect people to j ust accept a new

A10/M11 Growth Area Overview of economic characteristics and issues Tony Jackson, Executive

CLE &amp; e-ID Management: Issues, Prospects and Opportunities Chris E Onyemenam Director

Memory Management 1 Overview Basic memory management Address Spaces Virtual

Diligence Issues / Growth By Acquisition Strategy OVERVIEW PRESENTATION Boston New York

Workshop HH New &amp; Emerging Water Management Issues An Exciting, Interactive Panel on

1 Significant organic growth - strong growth markets + strong growth strategies = strong results

Endogenous growth through R&amp;D Empirical issues and extensions Carl-Johan Dalgaard

Iden%ty Management Issues - status and plans OSG

The Paradox of Knowledge Management: The Paradox of Knowledge Management: Progress, Issues

Growth issues and optical properties of nonpolar (Al,In,Ga)N films and quantum wells Shigefusa F.

An Approach to Addressing Spectrum Management Issues for Radar Systems TC-6 Spectrum Management

Gro rowth M Management R Review September 18, 2014 Growth Management Review 1 Agenda 1.

Risk management Issues in Fisheries Management Selles Jules PhD candidate University of Nantes

Macroeconomics Kwabena Otoo TUC, Ghana Key Macroeconomic Issues 1. GDP Growth 2. Inflation 3.

Quality Risk Management Issues Neale Baldwin Senior GMP Inspector Manufacturing Quality Branch

Growth in Student Achievement: Issues of Measurement, Longitudinal Analyses & Accountability

things to come Growth Management Update May 2019 MICHELLE BANFIELD, RPP MANAGER, GROWTH &

CLE & e-ID Management: Issues, Prospects and Opportunities Chris E Onyemenam Director

Workshop HH New & Emerging Water Management Issues An Exciting, Interactive Panel on

Endogenous growth through R&D Empirical issues and extensions Carl-Johan Dalgaard