Giving Voice to Intelligence Professionals of Conscience Jean Maria Arrigo 2013 Lynn Stuart Weiss Lecture Psychology as a Means of Attaining Peace through World Law
Lynne Weiss Stuart Jean Maria Arrigo 2
Intelligence Professionals of Conscience Those who have grappled with moral issues in their national security work, either sooner or later, as the process of discovery unfolded for them, and taken some action commensurate with their resources . 3
Interviewee Premises • Patriotism! Loyalty! • The “hard reality”: inescapable conflicts over resources; no third-party justice; you only have the rights you can defend. • The U.S. Constitution, the Geneva Conventions, and Just War Theory as moral bedrock. • “A soldier may be called to give his life for his country but not his soul.” — H.W. Rood 4
Message from three “senior dissidents” Covert operations damage national security (MacMichael), especially because of uncontrollable contractors and mercenaries (Villanueva), and should be discontinued. The current (2012) program of 66,100 Special Operations forces in 100 countries points to disaster in US foreign policy (Wagner). 5
Key parameters for scope of action • Access to knowledge • Degree of autonomy • Predictability/controllability of environment/circumstance/risk 6
At the extremes: “Senior Dissidents” (high on the parameters) versus “Throwaway Operatives” (low on the parameters) 7
“Senior Dissidents” 1980s U.S. counter- D avid MacMichael insurgency operations in CIA historian Latin America John Villanueva Iraq War Special Forces Intelligence contractor Harry D. Wagner 1966-1968 Vietnam War Head of PsyOps and Phoenix Program 8
David MacMichael (1959) 9
Winter 1989 David MacMicha el, Editor 10 10
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Mayor Harry Wagner 1964 12
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Basic research finding from oral histories of the moral development of intelligence professionals Understanding the epistemology of intelligence is prerequisite to understanding the ethics of intelligence — as in social psychology (with its ubiquitous deception experiments) and medicine (with its gold-standard double-blind studies). 16
Scientific Inquiry v. Intelligence Inquiry I-1 The target of inquiry is S-1 The targets of the Adversary—or what- inquiry are natural ever could empower us or phenomena. the Adversary. S-2. Nature is I-2. The adversary is consistent. deceptive. S-3 Scientific inquiry I-3. Intelligence inquiry must be open. must be secret. 1 7
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Scientific Inquiry v. Intelligence Inquiry S-4. Ignorance, I-4. Ignorance, omission, and error omission, and error have have no epistemic indispensable epistemic roles. roles. I-5. Knowledge is critical S-5. Scientific inquiries preparation for action. (at best) converge to Action at some point the truth over time. requires belief. 20
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Distinguish the intractable moral conflicts arising from intelligence epistemology from the harms due to ideological commitments, corruption, careerism, ill will, etc. 22
Retired Operative on Spiritual Devastation “It’s a black place, you know, of all the things that you saw, all the inequities that you were contributing and a part of, and all the hell that you created, either directly or as a result of what you did. “It’s all the things that you saw, all the things that you learned you knew and didn’t admit to. “Your soul’s no longer clean. It’s now carrying a dark burden. And it’s black, it is ugly, it hurts, it’s unclean. “It’s not something you can just let go of. It’s something that lives within you until you finally die.” 23
There is no comprehensive moral theory that is consistent across levels of analysis. Moral Philosopher Charles Young Dynamical social systems theory — social psychologist Robin Vallacher & multi-disciplinary colleagues, 1980s to present 24
Lessons from oral histories of“throwaway operatives” in black/deniable operations In spite of new technologies, new conflicts, new terrains, etc. teams currently deployed in deniable operations can have disastrous political effects similar to teams deployed decades ago because of the dynamics of the “aggressive, roving behavior settings” of deniable operations. (Derived from the ecological psychology of Roger Barker, 1950s-1970s) 25
“Throwaway” Operatives Ernest Garcia (1928- •Late WW II 2008) •Early Cold War OSS Paul Mercier •Vietnam War, (pseudonym) Cambodia Special Operations Bill Dixon •First Gulf War (pseudonym) •1990s counter - Logistical support for narcotics Special Operations
The epistemic framework of Mercier’sillegal collection operation in Cambodia in 1968. 27
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History teacher and army buddy explains the throwaway status of medic Paul Mercier [He’s] “more afraid of his own government than anything else. A lot of them take an oath. If they blab, they can end up dead or in Ft. Leavenworth…. Doc’s too old now, all gone by, …, discreditable …, a bum… But if it was something sensitive … they might shut him up .” 29
The incommunicability of deniable operations and the consequences to “throwaway operatives” of the lack of narrative identity — Organizational theorist Karl Weik, Sensemaking in Organizations, 30
Method and validation of a sample oral history of a covert operator ` Ernest Garcia (1928 - 2008) Chair of the National Association of Contaminated Veterans Ethics of Intelligence and Weapons Development Oral History Collection, Bancroft Library, University of Califronia Berkeley 31
Ernest Garcia in 2005 with Nellie Amondson (my mother) 32
Post-War Black Operations in South America October 21 & 22, 1995. Albuquerque, NM On Torture Interrogation of Nazis and Terrorists March 1, 1997, by telephone Post-War Black Operations Revisited June 1, 2001. Albuquerque, NM Military Chaplains and Spiritual Problems of Covert Operators December 1, 2003, by telephone 33
Interview Commentaries on the Oral History of Ernest Garcia Harold William Rood, PhD, Keck Professor of International Strategic Studies, Claremont McKenna College, November 8, 1995. Claremont, CA USAF Maj. Robert Stapleton (ret), Senior Vice- President of the National Association of Radiation Survivors, December 16, 1995. Ventura, CA 34
Additional Consultations for Ernest Garcia Toni Garcia, wife of Ernest Garcia Norman Weissman, training filmmaker for the U.S. Navy and U.S. Army War College, March 7, 1999. E-mail correspondence. Robert Schulmann, Director of the Einstein Papers Project at Boston University. Email correspondence, March 19, 1999. Constance Pechura, PhD, co-editor (1993, with D.P. Rall), Vet eterans ns a at t risk sk: The The he health e eff ffects o s of f must stard g d gas as an and d lewi wisi site. Washington, DC: Institute of Medicine. June 1999. Student Pugwash USA, UCSD, La Jolla, CA. Bill Dixon (pseudonym), U.S. Navy logistical support for SEAL counternarcotics teams. Telephone communications, September 3 & 4, 1999 Edwin Moise, Ph.D, military historian, September 9, 1999. 35
Confetences with Ernest Garcis Mon Monit itor orin ing g the he Et Ethic hics of of W Weapon ons De Develop opers: : A. Lichterman [anti-nuclear activist attorney] & E. Garcia [ex-covert operator]. Division 48 Conversation hour. American Psychological Association Annual Convention. August, 1997. Chicago, IL. Meeting of the Southwest Oral History Ass’n, April 2005, Albuequerque, NM. Guest. 3
Oral history examples of damages from covert operations due to blowback and requirement of deniability • Contractors • Mercenaries • Innocents in the way of operations • Disposal of dead and problematic operatives • Destruction of inanimate and animate evidence • Corruption of factions of foreign governments • Hit or miss experiments • Unspeakable, instrumental atrocities •
(Repeat) message from three “senior dissidents” Covert operations damage national security (MacMichael), especially because of uncontrollable contractors and mercenaries (Villanueva) and should be rejected. The current (2012) program of 61,600 Special Operations forces in 100 countries points to disaster in US foreign policy (Wagner). 38
Mayor Harry Wagner 1964 39
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David MacMichael (2011) & Wife Barbara Jentzsch 41
Lynne Weiss Stuart 42
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