Guns accounted for I2.I%"of federal convictions in FY ZAn FightAgoinst Violent 1n Lou"Letel Cun Ðept. 7ìrrgel.r
Two Firearms Offenses Make Sessions "Nervous" That Are Most Common P<¡ssession of fire.rrm by.r convicted felon (rB USC $ 9zz(g)(r)); and Firearm possessed during and in relation to crime of violence or drug trafficking offense (r8 l",SC 6 q¿¿(cxrx.À) ) FIRST TYPE OF GUN CASE: Other "Prohi bited Persons" 18 Usc S e22{exr} l)r'olr ibitecl persons .rls<¡ inclucle: "lllegal".-rliens r8 U.S.C. $ gzz(gxr) makes it a Federal crime or Fugitivcs flom justice offense ft¡r an individ¡¡al wl¡o has been convictccl of .r Unlawful users of controlled substances; acldicts felony oflense to possess å fìrealm in or affècting Adi ud icatecl "melrtal defèctives" i nterstate coûlrrìerce. I ) i s h on o r"rtrly discharged service personnel L.l.S. citiz.ens who have renounced cítjzerrslrip M isde rneanor dornesric violence nåtters 'I h¿ L Lhe [)cfi,nt1¡nt knoH irtgly ¡rossessed .r f ìrearrr ; Li]:r: Elements of Offense .l'h¿ t the [)ele¡lc{¡ rrt knorvingly possessed .r fìre¿ rnr Seco¡rtl: i n 0r ¿lfi-criDg irìl(fstatr or f' rrciÍln c' ìilr¡ìrerre, ¿\ A defenclant ca¡r be found ¡¡uilty of a $ Szz(g) chargetl; and offþnse only if all of the following facts are 'l hird: 'l'hat befo¡e the Defendrnt possessed the fire¿rm the Dcfendant had been convict¿d in a court provcd beyond a reasonable cloubt: of a crime punishable by Ímprisonment fora term in excesg ofone yea6 that ie, a felony offens¿, lJ¡rt se¿ rB IJ.S.C. S q¿l(aXzollB): ifstateclasgifìesoffense.rs.r nl is<lrnr¿arror and dorsnt errcee<l z year sfat rn ¡r, not a lelony. Antique Firearm Bill Fetleml law does not prevent prohibiterl pelsons fronr Unclcr ploposcd bill, "1898," is stricken and posst'ssing, a n "a¡ìtique" f ì re¡r'm. lepl"rced rvitlr "the c.rlenclal year that is roo years Arr .rntique fìrearnr is any fìrearrn nranufàctr¡¡'ecl bcfblc bcfble the calend.rr: year in which the 1898, See r8 U.S.C. S 9¿r(a)(r6)(A). detclminatir-rrl âs to whethe r the lìrearrn n'le€ts the On Jr.rly rz, zor7, Sen. Billl C.rssidy (lì-LA) introduced le<¡uilement of this subparagraph beirrg nradel' bill (S. r54r) to modify tlre definition of antique firear¡n.
II. KNOWLEDGE ËLEMENT (lovelnlnent need not plove that clefþndant knew Defenclant consciously possessed u,hat hc ¡rosscssion of fìr'e.rrr-¡r was unla'¡,f ul. knew to be a firearrn. US. v. (iorne.s.-Perez,667 [r.jd 1136, u4o-41 (ro'l' (ìin ' Government must only prove that :orz); [J..9. y. Thonra.s, 615 F.3d 89S, 8sg (8tlì Cir. defendant wa$ aì/vare that he possessecl a zoro); {./.5. v. McCrcy, ¡+: }'. App'x 498 (ntl' Cir. fìrearm. ¿t¡t'rg); U.S. v. Wilson, $7 Y.}d 616, 6¿o (7'r' Cir: zoo(r); U.S. v. Dodd, zz5F3d 3,.+<r, 344 i3d Cir., :,crr¡o); U.S. v. Frazier-El,zo4F3d 551,56r (4'l'Cir. :uro). Gorsuch and Knowledge? '. Gorsuclr concurrence in Game.s-Pe¡ez, (rfi7 [:'.3d rr36, rr4u-43 (roth Cir. zor:,) (Gorsuch, f., conculring) 5 92,1(a)(:) autlrolizes irnplisonmerrt for "u,hoever hnorvirrgly violates" 5 9¿z(g). Precedent dictates that the r,rnly knou'lcdgc rt <¡uirccl is t he Prececlent "leapfrog[sl" over first element (fblony linowleclgc lhat instrtunent possr:ssed is a fir'ca¡rl. corrviction) to focus on the second (possessed fircalm) "Ilt]recedent son'retilrres ¡'equircs r.ls to lìlakc nìistakcs." Colsuch argues that knowingly should be applied to o/1 three elenrents. Holding that thegovernmerrttloes not necd to provc a defbnd.¡nt,knew be was a felon "sirnply can'l bc squarttl u'ith the text of [$ çr¿¿(C)l lll. Actual vs. Constructive Bifurcation Possession 'l\vo tvoes of uerssession; actual and Bifurcation in a single-count case. -fiemendous risk of unfäirprejudice inherent in corlstructive the fäct of a prior felony conviction. Llnite(l States y ?ñompson, 675 Fed. App'x :,2r, Constructive posses$ion: power and intent zz4 (3d Cir. zotT ) (concltrd,ing bifurcation for to exerclse dominioaand control over single-count c;rses nôl required but object. Mere proximity ß)t enough. perrnissible). DEFENSES TO POSSESSION " Insufficient eviclence to establish that clefend.rnt constructively possessed firear'¡n: LJ.S. v. Hooks, 55r F.jd rzo5, rzr3-r4 (roth U5. rr Cunninrrh<rnr, 5r7 F.3cl r75 (ld Cir. zooS) (holding Cir'. zoog) (no constructive possession th¡t <tefend¡¡t - u'ho sintply walked tk¡rv¡r stleet u'ith co-de{endant who rvas canying gun in a [.lackp.rck clitl u'hel'e clefendant was one of several rìot coûstructi!'ely possess gun in backpack) passengers, no fingerprints, no showing of kno.,r4 edge or control) See olso U.S. v. Anderssn, 6zz F 3ð 1264, 1268-69 ( D.C. Cir. zol) {rlefendar* "trying to kick the gun up undcr the se.rt" {toes ¡rot arïosrlt to¡dmission of constnrctive possession)
Duress ltclcl: (r) 'I'he jury instructions in this casc l.)ixon v. U¡titecl States, ¡+tl U,S. r (zoo6) I)ixon w.rs charged rvith rS U.S.C. fi .{j 9zr(n) clicl not run afoul of the DP clausc u'hcn (receivirrg a fì¡'e¿rnr while under indictrnent) .rnrt they placecl the burclen on Dixon to g¿t(a)(6) (making false statements in connectior.r cst.rblish the existence of duress by a with the acqlisition of a firearnr). preponderance of the evidence', (z) Modelrr Dixon claimed duress and requested a .iury corrmon law requires Dixon to bear burden iustructíon placing the burclen on the golernment of ploving defense <¡f clur:ess by a to rlisprove her dures clefbnse beyoncl .r reason¿blc prepond,erance of the evidence. doubt. lnnocent Possession ' 'l'he'l'hird Cilcuit lras yet to recognize the 'lir successfuìly invoke innocelrt possession affirrnative defènse of "innoccnt" or "transitoly" dclbnse, the l¿cts must be that: possession. (r) tl're fìr'earrn was attained innocently and held witlr no illicit purpose and (z) possession of the lìreamr was transitory * i.e., , Only one published appellate opinion fì nding crime r¡l innocent possession and affìlmative in liglrt of the circurn$tä,ûces presented there is a clefènse to !i gz¿(gXr). U,S. v. Mason, 233 F.jcl 6r<.¡ goocl basis to fìnd that th.e defendant took (D.C. Cir. zooo) .ìdequate rìleasur€s to lid l¡i¡nself of posscssion of thc fìrearnr as pronqrtly as reasonably possible. 'I'he'l'hild Circuit has assumecl for the salce of' U.S. v. Jockson, z8:u Fed. App'x 999 (3d Cir: zootÌ) argument that if tlre afiìrmative defl'nse applied, it (no evidence suggesting that clefèndant obtained rvould use the standard articulated in U.S. v. \\¡capons in an "i¡rnocent" fäshion as required to support atïìrmative defense fol tlansitory Mason. possession). See U.S, v, Longfo,rddavis, 454 Fed. App'x 34 (3d Cir: zorr) (hold,irtg ir¡st¡uclio* <¡n i¡urocent U.S. v. Duniels, 248 Fet1. App'x 387 (3tl Cir. "reru7) (holding innocent possession not a{Hrmative possession not wa¡¡ânted)l sec r¡lso U,S. v. Hollowoy,4oe Fed. App'x 692 (¡oroXholding detènse to possessio¡l of fì¡earm try convicted defþndalrt not enti.tled to instruction on f leeting felon) innocent contaet). Rule 4A4(b) ls A Rule Of Exclusion, Not lnclusion , Rule 4o4(b) c¿rries rtr> ¡:r'esunr¡:tion of U.S. v. ( uldu,ell, 7(ro [r.jd 267 (i<l Cir. zor4) (holding evidence of defelrdant's plior convictions adnrissibility. for unlawhrl fircar'¡n possession u,as not adrnissiblc t o slrorv knou,leclge). Plior act evidence is inadn'rissible unless the evidence is (l) oflerecl fbr.r proper non*plopensity Calclrvcll was charged u'ith violating 9zz(g)(r). 'l'lrc purpose; (z) relevantto rhat identified pulposc; (3) sufficiently probati.ve r¡nder Rule 4o3; (4) gove¡-nnìent's theory rvas "purely one of actual accornpanied by a li,rnìting instrt¡ction. ¡.rossession [. l"
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