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Secure Systems Lab Technical University Vienna Effective and Efficient Malware Detection at the End Host Clemens KOLBITSCH, Paolo MILANI COMPARETTI, Engin KIRDA, Christopher KRUEGEL, Xiaoyong ZHOU, XiaoFeng WANG ck@iseclab.org Secure Systems

  1. Secure Systems Lab Technical University Vienna Effective and Efficient Malware Detection at the End Host Clemens KOLBITSCH, Paolo MILANI COMPARETTI, Engin KIRDA, Christopher KRUEGEL, Xiaoyong ZHOU, XiaoFeng WANG ck@iseclab.org Secure Systems Lab [TU Vienna, Institute Eurecom Sophia Antipolis, UC Santa Barbara] Indiana University at Bloomington 1

  2. Motivation Secure Systems Lab Technical University Vienna Why do we propose yet another malware detection scheme (yamds)? • Binary signature based detection inherently ineffective – We all know the problems... – Arms-race, pretty much a lost battle • Network based approaches evadable – Systems scan for communication artifacts – Encryption / blending thwart detection 2

  3. Motivation Secure Systems Lab Technical University Vienna Why do we propose yet another malware detection scheme (yamds)? • Don't rely on artifacts of malware instances – Instead focus on generic patterns • Proposed solution: – Detection based on malware's behavior – Behavior is hard to obfuscate – Behavior is hard to randomize – Behavior is often stable across various malware version 3

  4. Motivation Secure Systems Lab Technical University Vienna • Behavior-based detection received some attention over last couple of years • Despite promising detection results, binary signatures remain the method of choice 4

  5. Motivation Secure Systems Lab Technical University Vienna • Behavior-based detection received some attention over last couple of years • Despite promising detection results, binary signatures remain the method of choice + efficiency - emulation binary signatures behavior - evasion + effectiveness 5

  6. Motivation Secure Systems Lab Technical University Vienna • Behavior-based detection received some attention over last couple of years • Despite promising detection results, binary signatures remain the method of choice + efficiency - emulation binary signatures behavior - evasion + effectiveness 6

  7. Outline Secure Systems Lab Technical University Vienna • Motivation • Detecting Behavior – Motivating example (Agent) • Matching Behavior Graphs • Extracting Behavior Graphs • Evaluation 7

  8. Secure Systems Lab Technical University Vienna Detecting Behavior 8

  9. Detecting Behavior Secure Systems Lab Technical University Vienna • Characteristic malware behavior – Manifest on system (i.e., survive reboot) • (Over-) write system executables, dlls, files • Create registry entries (autorun) • Register as Windows (startup) service – Conceal from being detected • Restart under some stealthy name (e.g., svchost.exe) • Inject into legitimate processes – Replicate • Send eMails ( 'check out this picture I found: pic.jpg.exe' ) • Copy to Samba shares, USB drives, etc. • Scan and exploit services on LAN or WAN 9

  10. Detecting Behavior System Overview Secure Systems Lab Technical University Vienna • Detection based on execution characteristics – Execute malware in full system emulator (Anubis) – Monitor interaction with the operating system – Perform detailed (taint-) analysis – Generate detection graphs • Describe sequence of required system calls leading to security relevant system activity • Include dependencies to related, previous calls (using taint dependencies) • Detect described behavior on end host – Log system call activity of unknown executable – Match against behavior graph 10

  11. Detecting Behavior Developer Perspective Secure Systems Lab Technical University Vienna • Example: Agent (trojan horse) • As part of its system manifestation, it – Reads content from binary image – Decrypts binary content • Proprietary decryption routine • Simple, XOR based algorithm – Stores binary in system file ( C:\Wind...\drivers\ip6fw.sys ) – Later, restarts IPv6 firewall • Turns itself into a system service 11

  12. Detecting Behavior Taint-Trace Perspective Secure Systems Lab Technical University Vienna GetModuleFileNameA Name FileHandle Mode: Open NtCreateFile NtCreateSection SectionHandle Mode: Create NtCreateFile NtMapViewOfSection C:\Win... \ip6fw.sys (read & decrypt buffer) FileHandle NtWriteFile 12

  13. Detecting Behavior System Perspective Secure Systems Lab Technical University Vienna GetModuleFileNameA Name FileHandle Mode: Open NtCreateFile NtCreateSection SectionHandle Mode: Create NtCreateFile NtMapViewOfSection C:\Win... \ip6fw.sys (read & decrypt buffer) FileHandle NtWriteFile 13

  14. Detecting Behavior System Perspective Secure Systems Lab Technical University Vienna GetModuleFileNameA Name FileHandle Mode: Open NtCreateFile NtCreateSection SectionHandle Mode: Create NtCreateFile NtMapViewOfSection C:\Win... \ip6fw.sys (read & decrypt buffer) FileHandle NtWriteFile 14

  15. Detecting Behavior System Perspective Secure Systems Lab Technical University Vienna GetModuleFileNameA Name FileHandle Mode: Open NtCreateFile NtCreateSection SectionHandle Mode: Create NtCreateFile NtMapViewOfSection C:\Win... \ip6fw.sys (read & decrypt buffer) FileHandle NtWriteFile 15

  16. Detecting Behavior System Perspective Secure Systems Lab Technical University Vienna Mode: Open NtCreateFile NtCreateFile Mode: Create FileHandle C:\Win... \ip6fw.sys NtCreateSection FileHandle SectionHandle NtMapViewOfSection NtWriteFile 16

  17. Detecting Behavior System Perspective Secure Systems Lab Technical University Vienna Mode: Open NtCreateFile NtCreateFile Mode: Create FileHandle C:\Win... \ip6fw.sys NtCreateSection FileHandle SectionHandle NtMapViewOfSection NtWriteFile 17

  18. Detecting Behavior Secure Systems Lab Technical University Vienna • Detection based on execution characteristics – Works well as long as we can see all types of dependencies between system calls – Handle dependencies • Insufficient for detection • Behavior graphs break into trivial subgraphs – Data dependencies • Convenient for behavior graph generation • Necessary for behavior detection 18

  19. Secure Systems Lab Technical University Vienna Matching Behavior Graphs 19

  20. Matching Behavior Graphs Secure Systems Lab Technical University Vienna • Maintaining dependencies using taint propagation – Performance overhead: Extended emulation engine – Memory overhead: Shadow memory – Not applicable to production systems / end hosts • Maintaining dependencies without taint propagation – Handle dependencies • Direct value propagation • System provided identifiers – File, section, process, thread handles – Registry keys – Socket identifiers – Must be constant between call invocations 20

  21. Matching Behavior Graphs Secure Systems Lab Technical University Vienna • Maintaining dependencies without taint propagation – Data dependencies • Arbitrary data (& control) dependency between system calls • Might modify values between system calls – Our proposal: Anticipate precise call arguments • Use recorded execution semantics • Extract data propagation/manipulation formulas • Emulate taint dependency between system call A and B – Log outgoing parameters of call A – Use as input to propagation formula – Predicted incoming parameters for system call B – Compare predicted and monitored input parameters – Assume dependency between A and B if prediction holds 21

  22. Matching Behavior Graphs System Perspective Secure Systems Lab Technical University Vienna GetModuleFileNameA Name FileHandle Mode: Open NtCreateFile NtCreateSection SectionHandle Mode: Create NtCreateFile NtMapViewOfSection C:\Win... \ip6fw.sys (read & decrypt buffer) FileHandle NtWriteFile 22

  23. Matching Behavior Graphs System Perspective Secure Systems Lab Technical University Vienna GetModuleFileNameA f 1, data Name FileHandle Mode: Open NtCreateFile f 2, handle NtCreateSection SectionHandle f 3, handle Mode: Create NtCreateFile NtMapViewOfSection C:\Win... f 5, handle \ip6fw.sys (read & decrypt buffer) f 4, data FileHandle NtWriteFile 23

  24. Matching Behavior Graphs System Perspective Secure Systems Lab Technical University Vienna GetModuleFileNameA f 1, data Name FileHandle Mode: Open NtCreateFile f 2, handle NtCreateSection SectionHandle f 3, handle Mode: Create NtCreateFile NtMapViewOfSection NtMapViewOfSection C:\Win... f 5, handle \ip6fw.sys (read & decrypt buffer) (read & decrypt buffer) f 4, data FileHandle f 4, data NtWriteFile NtWriteFile 24

  25. Matching Behavior Graphs System Perspective Secure Systems Lab Technical University Vienna NtMapViewOfSection NtMapViewOfSection( out m_buffer [0...size] , out m_size) NtCreateFile( out c_handle) f 5, handle NtWriteFile 25

  26. Matching Behavior Graphs System Perspective Secure Systems Lab Technical University Vienna NtMapViewOfSection NtMapViewOfSection( out m_buffer [0...size] , out m_size) NtCreateFile( out c_handle) (p_buffer, p_size) = f 4 (m_buffer, m_size) f 5, handle NtWriteFile NtWriteFile( in w_handle, in w_buffer [0...size] , in w_size) 26

  27. Matching Behavior Graphs System Perspective Secure Systems Lab Technical University Vienna NtMapViewOfSection NtMapViewOfSection( out m_buffer [0...size] , out m_size) NtCreateFile( out c_handle ) ( p_buffer , p_size ) = f 4 (m_buffer, m_size) f 5, handle NtWriteFile NtWriteFile( in w_handle , in w_buffer [0...size] , in w_size ) 27

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