Discussion of Evaluating Monetary Policy Operational Frameworks by - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Discussion of “Evaluating Monetary Policy Operational Frameworks” by Ulrich Bindseil Jackson Hole Symposium Simon M. Potter August 26, 2016 The views presented here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System

Figure 1 – Federal Reserve Balance Sheet August 1, 2007 ($ Billions) Assets Liabilities Securities held outright 791 Federal Reserve notes 777 Reverse repurchase agreements 32 U.S. Treasury securities 791 Reserve balances (incl. clearing balances) 17 Federal agency debt 0 Deposits, other than reserves 5 Agency MBS 0 Repurchase agreements 25 Other liabilities 6 Foreign currency denominated assets 21 Total liabilities 837 Other assets 34 Capital 34 Total assets 871 Total liabilities and capital 871 August 3, 2016 ($ Billions) Assets Liabilities Securities held outright 4,226 Federal Reserve notes 1,419 Reverse repurchase agreements 311 U.S. Treasury securities 2,463 Reserve balances 2,403 Federal agency debt 22 Deposits, other than reserves 286 Agency MBS 1,741 Repurchase agreements 0 Other liabilities 8 Foreign currency denominated assets 21 4,427 Total liabilities Other assets 220 Capital 40 Total assets 4,467 Total liabilities and capital 4,467 Source: Federal Reserve Statistical Release (H.4.1) 1 Notes: Balance sheet figures indicate Wednesday level.

Figure 2 – Federal Funds Target Range Federal Funds Target Range EFFR IOER Rate RRP Rate BPS 75 50 25 0 08/15 09/15 10/15 11/15 12/15 01/16 02/16 03/16 04/16 05/16 06/16 07/16 08/16 Source: Bloomberg, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Notes: Light dashed vertical lines indicate month-ends, dark dashed lines indicate quarter-ends. Data source switches from brokered 2 federal funds data to FR 2420 data in March 2016.

Figure 3 – Lower Volatility in Federal Funds Trades BPS Spread Between the 75th and 25th Percentile Rate 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Magnified view (0-15 bps) 15 10 5 0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York Notes: Figures represent federal funds rate spread between the volume-weighted 75 th and 25 th percentile. Data source switches 3 from brokered federal funds data to FR 2420 data in March 2016.

Figure 4 – Banking Sector Balance Sheet Scenario 1 - Bank A lends to Bank B Bank A Bank B Total Assets Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities Before Reserves 200 Deposits 200 Reserves 80 Deposits 80 280 Bank B borrows $20m from Bank A to satisfy reserve requirement of $100m. Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities (+20) After Reserves 180 Deposits 200 Reserves 100 Deposits 80 300 Loan Receivable 20 Loan Payable 20 Total Reserves remained unchanged while Total Assets increased by $20m. Scenario 2 - A nonbank transfers deposits from Bank A to Bank B Bank A Bank B Total Assets Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities Before Reserves 200 Deposits 200 Reserves 80 Deposits 80 280 A nonbank pulls $20m in deposits from Bank A and places them in account at Bank B. Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities (+0) After Reserves 180 Deposits 180 Reserves 100 Deposits 100 280 4 Total Reserves and Total Assets remained unchanged.

Figure 5 – Discount Window Stigma Percent of Federal Funds Daily Volume Traded Above Discount Rate Percent 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York 5 Notes: Data source switches from brokered federal funds data to FR 2420 data in March 2016.

Figure 6 – Liquidity Provision and Regulation “…managing liquidity risk is a core activity of banking, and it seems unlikely that centralizing this subtle activity through liquidity regulation can be done without efficiency costs. Therefore liquidity regulation must not be overburdened, and central banks providing some well-designed and rule based economic counterincentives to an excessive reliance on the [lender of last resort] is an important contribution to reduce the burden put on regulation.” - Ulrich Bindseil (2016) 6

Figure 7 – Projected SOMA Domestic Securities Holdings December 2014 December 2015 August 2016 (Reinvestment Policy Median) $ Billion August 2016 (Reinvestment Policy Mean) 4,500 4,000 3,500 3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 Historical Values Projections (rounded) 0 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York staff projections Notes: As presented in the FRBNY’s Report on Domestic Open Market Operations for 2014 and 2015. August 2016 projections are based on interest rate path assumptions drawn from market forward rates and expectations for changes in reinvestment policy drawn from the FRBNY’s July 2016 Survey of Primary Dealers. For the mean reinvestment expectation, survey responses suggesting no end to reinvestments were assigned the date at which staff project the size of the portfolio to normalize assuming normal currency growth and no end in reinvestments. 7