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"CYBER SECURITY AND SPACE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION. - PDF document

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/308780834 "CYBER SECURITY AND SPACE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION. STUDY CASE: SATCOM" - 67 slides Conference Paper


  1. See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/308780834 "CYBER SECURITY AND SPACE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION. STUDY CASE: SATCOM" - 67 slides Conference Paper · September 2016 DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.34111.51361 CITATIONS READS 0 58 1 author: Marius Eugen Opran Romanian Space Agency 64 PUBLICATIONS 7 CITATIONS SEE PROFILE Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects: CYBER TERRORISM, CYBER WAR AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION View project SPREADING DEMOCRACY View project All content following this page was uploaded by Marius Eugen Opran on 01 October 2016. The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

  2. CY CYBE BER R INTEL INTELLIGENCE LIGENCE EU EUROPE ROPE 2016 2016 29 - 30 APRIL 2016 BUCHAREST – ROMANIA 1

  3. CY CYBE BER R INTEL INTELLIGENCE LIGENCE EU EUROPE ROPE 2016 2016 THE IMPACT OF ICT REVOLUTION ON THE SPACE INDUSTRY  DURING THE LAST DECADES THE IMPACT OF ICT, QUANTUM PHYSICS & NEW MATERIALS REVOLUTION ON THE SPACE INDUSTRY HAS CHANGED THE WAY BUSINESS IS TRANSACTED, GOVERNMENT OPERATES, AND NATIONAL DEFENSE, SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE ARE CONDUCTED .  THOSE FUNCTIONS NOW DEPENDS ON THE INTERDEPENDENCY BETWEEN SPACE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE (SCI)) AND CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE (CII) INCLUDING THEIR PERMANENT PROTECTION AGAINST CYBER ATTACKS AND NOT ONLY . 29 - 30 APRIL 2016 BUCHAREST – ROMANIA 2

  4. CY CYBE BER R INTEL INTELLIGENCE LIGENCE EU EUROPE ROPE 2016 2016 SPACE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE (I)  THE SATELLITES = MAJOR SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE  HEAVILY USED IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TO FACILITATE AND SUPPORT:  COMMUNICATION FUNCTIONS; Fig. 1: CANADA – 10 CIP SECTORS  ENTERTAINMENT SYSTEMS;  WEATHER FORECASTING;  SEARCH & RESCUE FUNCTIONS;  GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEMS;  NATIONAL DEFENSE AND INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS. Fig. 2: USA – 16 CIP SECTORS 29 - 30 APRIL 2016 BUCHAREST – ROMANIA 3

  5. CY CYBE BER R INTEL INTELLIGENCE LIGENCE EU EUROPE ROPE 2016 2016 SPACE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE (II)  AT NATIONAL LEVEL CI SYSTEMS ARE INCORPORATED IN SO – CALLED NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PLAN (NIPP).  NO NIPP SECTOR EXCLUSIVELY ADDRESSES THE SPACE- BASED SYSTEMS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR FUNCTIONS THAT HAVE BECOME ESSENTIAL IN OUR SOCIETY.  SPACE COMPONENTS ARE INCORPORATED INTO VARIOUS OTHER RELATED SECTORS, SUCH AS COMMUNICATIONS & NATIONAL DEFENSE.  BETWEEN OTHERS, THE SPACE SYSTEMS APPLICATIONS DUTIES - SUPPORT CRUCIAL ACTIVITIES FOR NAT’L DEFENCE, SECURITY AND PUBLIC ORDER. 29 - 30 APRIL 2016 BUCHAREST – ROMANIA 4

  6. CY CYBE BER R INTEL INTELLIGENCE LIGENCE EU EUROPE ROPE 2016 2016 Fig. 3: Main Analysis Domains 29 - 30 APRIL 2016 BUCHAREST – ROMANIA 5

  7. CY CYBE BER R INTEL INTELLIGENCE LIGENCE EU EUROPE ROPE 2016 2016 DEFINING THE CYBER TERRORISM THE CYBER TERRORISM IS DEFINED IDENTICALLY, IT DOESN'T MATTER THE ENVIRONMENT WHERE IT TAKES PLACE - INCLUDING SPACE.  CONVERGENCE OF CYBERSPACE AND TERRORISM / MERGE OF TERRORISM AND TECHNOLOGY; CYBER TERRORISTS - AT LEAST 3 GOALS IN MIND: (1) INFORMATION THEFT = STEALING DATA (2) INFORMATION DISRUPTION = DEFACEMENT (3) INFORMATION DENIAL = DESTRUCTION 29 - 30 APRIL 2016 BUCHAREST – ROMANIA 6

  8. CY CYBE BER R INTEL INTELLIGENCE LIGENCE EU EUROPE ROPE 2016 2016 DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCY ON ON NET NETWORK WORK-BA BASED SED SYS SYSTE TEMS MS  THE DEGREE THAT ANY CRITICAL COMPONENT OF NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE, INCLUDING SPACE - IS VULNERABLE, IS DEPENDENT UPON A NUMBER OF CHARACTERISTICS:  TYPE OF ATTACK;  SCOPE OF IMPACT;  TIME OF ATTACK;  DURATION OF OUTAGE. 29 - 30 APRIL 2016 BUCHAREST – ROMANIA 7

  9. CY CYBE BER R INTEL INTELLIGENCE LIGENCE EU EUROPE ROPE 2016 2016 CYBER THREATS SOURCES AND THEIR POTENTIAL RISK LEVEL FOR SPACE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE (SCI) THE FOUR MOST COMMON SOURCES OF THREATS : 1. NATION NATION ST STATE TES - LAUNCH OF MAJOR CYBER ATTACKS IN SPACE AGAINST ONE ANOTHER – THE THE REAL DANGER DANGER 2. TERRORISTS – READY TO EXPAND THEIR CAPABILITY INTO THE SPACE UNDER POLITICAL AND/OR FINANCIAL MOTIVATION – POTE POTENTI NTIAL AL TH THREAT REATS 3. TERRORIST SYMPATHIZERS: NOT NOT IMPORTANT IMPORTANT 4. SENSATION HUNTERS: – THE GRAY HACKERS NOT NOT TAKE TAKEN INT INTO ACCO ACCOUNT UNT 29 - 30 APRIL 2016 BUCHAREST – ROMANIA 8

  10. CY CYBE BER R INTEL INTELLIGENCE LIGENCE EU EUROPE ROPE 2016 2016 STUDY CASE: THE SATELLITES I. WHAT MEANS “VULNERABILITIES” IN CASE OF SATELLITES? • THE VULNERABILITIES OF SATELLITE SYSTEMS ARE INTRODUCED BY THEIR INTRINSIC ATTRIBUTES: 1. RENDERING COLLISIONS WITH EVEN SMALL SPACE DEBRIS ARE DISASTROUS; 2. TRAVEL ON ORBIT (EVEN GEO) AT EXTRAORDINARY SPEEDS; 3. NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE TO HIDE - JUST AS SATELLITES CAN VIEW LARGE SWATHS OF THE EARTH, THEY ARE ALSO VISIBLE TO OBSERVERS OVER LARGE AREAS. FIG. 4 29 - 30 APRIL 2016 BUCHAREST – ROMANIA 9

  11. CY CYBE BER R INTEL INTELLIGENCE LIGENCE EU EUROPE ROPE 2016 2016 1. SINCE 1957, 4.900 LAUNCHES PLACING INTO ORBIT MORE THAN 6.600 SATELLITES  3.600 STILL IN SPACE Fig. 5: Space Debris  ONLY 1.000 STILL ACTIVE Distribution  ACTIVE: 502 - US, 188 – COURTESY around Earth OF NASA RUSSIA, 116 - CHINA 2. US SPACE SURVEILLANCE NETWORK TRACKING REGULARLY:  > 23,000 DEBRIS Fig. 6: LEO  TOTAL WEIGHT 6,500 To.: Space Debris Density (not size)  5-10 CM IN LEO: 500,000; mapping for  > 10 CM IN GEO : 21,000. 2009. COURTESY OF NASA 29 - 30 APRIL 2016 BUCHAREST – ROMANIA 10

  12. CY CYBE BER R INTEL INTELLIGENCE LIGENCE EU EUROPE ROPE 2016 2016 FIG. 7 FIG. 3 29 - 30 APRIL 2016 BUCHAREST – ROMANIA 11

  13. CY CYBE BER R INTEL INTELLIGENCE LIGENCE EU EUROPE ROPE 2016 2016 29 - 30 APRIL 2016 BUCHAREST – ROMANIA 12

  14. CY CYBE BER R INTEL INTELLIGENCE LIGENCE EU EUROPE ROPE 2016 2016 SPACE DEBRIS REMOVAL: TECHNOLOGIES UNDER DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION FIG. 8 - Image Source: NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC SPACE LASERS THREE IDEAS FOR CLEANING SPACE OF JUNK – COULD NUDGE JUNK PIECES INCLUDING THE DEBRIS OF TWO SATELLITES THAT INTO DECAYING ORBITS COLIDED IN 2009 – WOULD SPEED THE RATE AT WHICH THE DEBRIS FAILS INTO THE ATMOSPHERE AND BURNS SPACE BORNE LASER ELECTRIC TETHERS: ATTACHED BY MICRO-ROVERS COULD DRAG SPACE JUNK DRAG JUNK DOWN AS THE CURRENT IN THE TETHER INTERACTS WITH EARTH’S MAGNETIC FIELD COLLECTOR SATELLITES COULD CAPTURE LARGE JUNK IN NETS AND RELEASEIT INTO LOWER ORBIT FROM WHICH IT WOULD REENTER THE ATMOSPHERE http://www.wedemain.fr/Trois-projets-des-terriens-pour-nettoyer-l-espace_a402.html (37) Michael J. Muolo et al.: Space Handbook, Volume 1: A War Fighter’s Guide to Space, (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Univ ersity Press, December 1993), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/au- 18/au180001.htm (38) Sunil D. S.: “Gps Based Space Debris Removal System”, Vemana Institute Of Technology - Department of Electronics & Communications Engineering. In: Engineering, April 24, 2015. USN No: 1vi11ec078 29 - 30 APRIL 2016 BUCHAREST – ROMANIA 13

  15. COURTESY OF : FIG. 9 : MAJOR SPACE ENVIRONMENT EFFECTS ON CSI (14) E. MAZUR, P. O’BRIEN, J. F. FENNELL: “Space Environment Effects on Space Systems”. Presentation at the Workshop on Scien ce Associated with the Lunar Exploration Architecture, February 26-March 2, 2007. MAMAIA – RO / 9=10.08.2016 MAJOR – GENERAL (RET.) PROF. MARIUS – EUGEN OPRAN 14

  16. CY CYBE BER R INTEL INTELLIGENCE LIGENCE EU EUROPE ROPE 2016 2016 SATCOM Fig. 10 29 - 30 APRIL 2016 BUCHAREST – ROMANIA 15

  17. CY CYBE BER R INTEL INTELLIGENCE LIGENCE EU EUROPE ROPE 2016 2016 I. SATE I. SATELL LLIT ITE E SYS SYSTE TEMS MS COMPONENTS (Fig.6) COMPONENTS (Fig.6) SOME OF WHICH MAKE BETTER TARGETS THAN OTHERS 1. THE SATELLITE ITSELF; 2. THE GROUND STATIONS USED TO OPERATE AND CONTROL THEM; 3. THE LINKS BETWEEN THEM. II II. SA SATELLITES ELLITES BA BASI SIC ELEMENTS ELEMENTS 1. A STRUCTURAL SUBSYSTEM OR BUS. 2. A THERMAL REGULATION SUBSYSTEM, 3. A POWER SOURCE, OFTEN THE SOLAR PANELS Fig. 11 29 - 30 APRIL 2016 BUCHAREST – ROMANIA 16

  18. CY CYBE BER R INTEL INTELLIGENCE LIGENCE EU EUROPE ROPE 2016 2016 TYPES OF ORBITS • GEOSYNCHRONOUS 1. SAME ROTATIONAL VELOCITY AS EARTH 2. MAINTAINS POSITION RELATIVE TO EARTH 3. ALTITUDE - 35 786 KM 4. VELOCITY - 11 300 KM/HR • ASYNCHRONOUS 1. MUCH LOWER ALTITUDE 2. MUCH HIGHER VELOCITY 3. POSITION OVER EARTH CONSTANTLY CHANGING Fig. 12 29 - 30 APRIL 2016 BUCHAREST – ROMANIA 17

  19. CY CYBE BER R INTEL INTELLIGENCE LIGENCE EU EUROPE ROPE 2016 2016 VULNERABILITIES VULNERABILIT IES  INTRODUCED BY THEIR INTRINSIC ATTRIBUTES 1. SATELLITE’S MOTION IS PREDICTABLE; 2. CHANGING THE ORBIT = SIGNIFICANT EFFORT; 3. DIFFICULT TO PROTECT: LAUNCH MASS IS AT A PREMIUM, SO ARMOR AND DEFENSIVE MEASURES COME AT SOME PRICE; 4. THE SENSITIVITY OF SATCOM: EASILY ACCESSED BY USERS, CAN BE EXPLOITED TO HARM OR INTERFERE WITH THEM; 5. SATELLITES CAN’T BE REPAIRED IN SPACE. 29 - 30 APRIL 2016 BUCHAREST – ROMANIA 18

  20. CY CYBE BER R INTEL INTELLIGENCE LIGENCE EU EUROPE ROPE 2016 2016 THE SOLUTION??? LASERS!!! Fig. 13 Fig. 14 29 - 30 APRIL 2016 BUCHAREST – ROMANIA 19

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