Crypto developments A bit about me Daniel J. Bernstein Designer of: • qmail , used by Yahoo Research Professor, to handle Internet mail; University of Illinois at Chicago • tinydns , used by Facebook Hoogleraar, to publish server addresses; Cryptographic Implementations, • dnscache , used by OpenDNS Technische Universiteit Eindhoven to look up server addresses; • Curve25519 public-key system used by Apple to protect files stored on iPhones; • ChaCha20 secret-key cipher used by Chrome to encrypt HTTPS connections to Google.
developments A bit about me Standard J. Bernstein Designer of: Goals: p • qmail , used by Yahoo integrity, rch Professor, to handle Internet mail; University of Illinois at Chicago • tinydns , used by Facebook ogleraar, to publish server addresses; Cryptographic Implementations, • dnscache , used by OpenDNS echnische Universiteit Eindhoven to look up server addresses; • Curve25519 public-key system used by Apple to protect files stored on iPhones; • ChaCha20 secret-key cipher used by Chrome to encrypt HTTPS connections to Google.
developments A bit about me Standard crypto is Bernstein Designer of: Goals: protect confidentialit • qmail , used by Yahoo integrity, and availabilit Professor, to handle Internet mail; Illinois at Chicago • tinydns , used by Facebook to publish server addresses; Implementations, • dnscache , used by OpenDNS Universiteit Eindhoven to look up server addresses; • Curve25519 public-key system used by Apple to protect files stored on iPhones; • ChaCha20 secret-key cipher used by Chrome to encrypt HTTPS connections to Google.
A bit about me Standard crypto is failing Designer of: Goals: protect confidentiality • qmail , used by Yahoo integrity, and availability. to handle Internet mail; Chicago • tinydns , used by Facebook to publish server addresses; Implementations, • dnscache , used by OpenDNS Eindhoven to look up server addresses; • Curve25519 public-key system used by Apple to protect files stored on iPhones; • ChaCha20 secret-key cipher used by Chrome to encrypt HTTPS connections to Google.
A bit about me Standard crypto is failing Designer of: Goals: protect confidentiality, • qmail , used by Yahoo integrity, and availability. to handle Internet mail; • tinydns , used by Facebook to publish server addresses; • dnscache , used by OpenDNS to look up server addresses; • Curve25519 public-key system used by Apple to protect files stored on iPhones; • ChaCha20 secret-key cipher used by Chrome to encrypt HTTPS connections to Google.
A bit about me Standard crypto is failing Designer of: Goals: protect confidentiality, • qmail , used by Yahoo integrity, and availability. to handle Internet mail; Standard crypto does a bad job • tinydns , used by Facebook of meeting these goals today, to publish server addresses; and an even worse job tomorrow. • dnscache , used by OpenDNS to look up server addresses; • Curve25519 public-key system used by Apple to protect files stored on iPhones; • ChaCha20 secret-key cipher used by Chrome to encrypt HTTPS connections to Google.
A bit about me Standard crypto is failing Designer of: Goals: protect confidentiality, • qmail , used by Yahoo integrity, and availability. to handle Internet mail; Standard crypto does a bad job • tinydns , used by Facebook of meeting these goals today, to publish server addresses; and an even worse job tomorrow. • dnscache , used by OpenDNS The standardization process to look up server addresses; does not insist on security; • Curve25519 public-key system ignores important warnings used by Apple to protect from cryptographers; files stored on iPhones; ignores predictable improvements • ChaCha20 secret-key cipher in computer technology; and used by Chrome to encrypt is unable to resist attack. HTTPS connections to Google.
about me Standard crypto is failing MD5 Designer of: Goals: protect confidentiality, 2008 Stevens–Sotirov– qmail , used by Yahoo integrity, and availability. Appelbaum–Lenstra–Molna handle Internet mail; Osvik–de Standard crypto does a bad job tinydns , used by Facebook MD5 ⇒ of meeting these goals today, publish server addresses; and an even worse job tomorrow. dnscache , used by OpenDNS The standardization process ok up server addresses; does not insist on security; Curve25519 public-key system ignores important warnings by Apple to protect from cryptographers; stored on iPhones; ignores predictable improvements ChaCha20 secret-key cipher in computer technology; and by Chrome to encrypt is unable to resist attack. HTTPS connections to Google.
Standard crypto is failing MD5 Goals: protect confidentiality, 2008 Stevens–Sotirov– y Yahoo integrity, and availability. Appelbaum–Lenstra–Molna ernet mail; Osvik–de Weger exploited Standard crypto does a bad job by Facebook MD5 ⇒ rogue CA of meeting these goals today, server addresses; and an even worse job tomorrow. used by OpenDNS The standardization process server addresses; does not insist on security; public-key system ignores important warnings to protect from cryptographers; iPhones; ignores predictable improvements secret-key cipher in computer technology; and Chrome to encrypt is unable to resist attack. connections to Google.
Standard crypto is failing MD5 Goals: protect confidentiality, 2008 Stevens–Sotirov– integrity, and availability. Appelbaum–Lenstra–Molnar– Osvik–de Weger exploited Standard crypto does a bad job ook MD5 ⇒ rogue CA for TLS. of meeting these goals today, addresses; and an even worse job tomorrow. enDNS The standardization process addresses; does not insist on security; system ignores important warnings rotect from cryptographers; ignores predictable improvements cipher in computer technology; and rypt is unable to resist attack. Google.
Standard crypto is failing MD5 Goals: protect confidentiality, 2008 Stevens–Sotirov– integrity, and availability. Appelbaum–Lenstra–Molnar– Osvik–de Weger exploited Standard crypto does a bad job MD5 ⇒ rogue CA for TLS. of meeting these goals today, and an even worse job tomorrow. The standardization process does not insist on security; ignores important warnings from cryptographers; ignores predictable improvements in computer technology; and is unable to resist attack.
Standard crypto is failing MD5 Goals: protect confidentiality, 2008 Stevens–Sotirov– integrity, and availability. Appelbaum–Lenstra–Molnar– Osvik–de Weger exploited Standard crypto does a bad job MD5 ⇒ rogue CA for TLS. of meeting these goals today, and an even worse job tomorrow. 2012 Flame: new MD5 attack. The standardization process does not insist on security; ignores important warnings from cryptographers; ignores predictable improvements in computer technology; and is unable to resist attack.
Standard crypto is failing MD5 Goals: protect confidentiality, 2008 Stevens–Sotirov– integrity, and availability. Appelbaum–Lenstra–Molnar– Osvik–de Weger exploited Standard crypto does a bad job MD5 ⇒ rogue CA for TLS. of meeting these goals today, and an even worse job tomorrow. 2012 Flame: new MD5 attack. The standardization process Fact: By 1996, a few years does not insist on security; after the introduction of MD5, ignores important warnings Preneel and Dobbertin were from cryptographers; calling for MD5 to be scrapped. ignores predictable improvements in computer technology; and is unable to resist attack.
Standard crypto is failing MD5 Goals: protect confidentiality, 2008 Stevens–Sotirov– integrity, and availability. Appelbaum–Lenstra–Molnar– Osvik–de Weger exploited Standard crypto does a bad job MD5 ⇒ rogue CA for TLS. of meeting these goals today, and an even worse job tomorrow. 2012 Flame: new MD5 attack. The standardization process Fact: By 1996, a few years does not insist on security; after the introduction of MD5, ignores important warnings Preneel and Dobbertin were from cryptographers; calling for MD5 to be scrapped. ignores predictable improvements Internet crypto standardization in computer technology; and continued using MD5. is unable to resist attack.
Standard crypto is failing MD5 Taiwan Citizen protect confidentiality, 2008 Stevens–Sotirov– Renesas integrity, and availability. Appelbaum–Lenstra–Molnar– Security Osvik–de Weger exploited by T-Systems, Standard crypto does a bad job MD5 ⇒ rogue CA for TLS. CC assurance meeting these goals today, even worse job tomorrow. 2012 Flame: new MD5 attack. standardization process Fact: By 1996, a few years not insist on security; after the introduction of MD5, res important warnings Preneel and Dobbertin were cryptographers; calling for MD5 to be scrapped. res predictable improvements Internet crypto standardization computer technology; and continued using MD5. unable to resist attack.
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