Communications Network Economics Jianwei Huang Network Communications and Economics Lab Department of Information Engineering The Chinese University of Hong Kong March 2017 Jianwei Huang (CUHK) Communications Network Economics March 2017 1 / 40
The Role of Economics in Networking Explain operator behaviors 1 Predict network equilibrium 2 Envision network services 3 Provide policy recommendations 4 Jianwei Huang (CUHK) Communications Network Economics March 2017 2 / 40
Explain Operator Behaviors Calls 4G 4G 3G 3G ρ . Operators of similar sizes upgrade technologies at different times A tradeoff between market share and upgrading cost Network effect provides additional benefit to late upgrade a [Duan- H -Walrand] “Economic Analysis of 4G Network Upgrade,” IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing , May 2015 Jianwei Huang (CUHK) Communications Network Economics March 2017 3 / 40
Predict Network Equilibrium BS 2 MU 13 BS 1 AP 1 MU 11 MU 21 AP 2 MU 24 AP 4 MU 14 MU 32 AP 3 BS 3 MU 33 MU 31 On-demand data offloading from cellular networks to Wi-Fi networks When, where, and how much to offload? Market clearing through an iterative double auction mechanism [Iosifidis-Gao- H -Tassiulas] “An Iterative Double Auction for Mobile Data Offloading” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking , October 2015 ( IEEE WiOpt 2013 Best Paper Award) Jianwei Huang (CUHK) Communications Network Economics March 2017 4 / 40
Envision Network Services one advertising platform ad sponsored Wi-Fi access % × $ premium Wi-Fi access one venue $ $ ad multiple users multiple advertisers Monetization of the public Wi-Fi networks Free ad-sponsored Wi-Fi access vs. premium paid Wi-Fi access Optimal pricing mechanisms based on user valuation, visiting frequency, and advertisement concentration [Yu-Cheung-Gao- H ] “Public Wi-Fi Monetization via Advertising,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking , forthcoming ( IEEE INFOCOM 2016 Best Paper Award Finalist) Jianwei Huang (CUHK) Communications Network Economics March 2017 5 / 40
Provide Policy Recommendations White Space Databases Step 1: WSD Report Location Microsoft Step 2: Google Database Return White Spaces Update Licensee Information Repository of Regulators Portable WSD (FCC, Ofcom, etc.) Fixed WSD Spectrum Regulators White Space Devices TV white space as golden unlicensed spectrum resources White space database operator manages the interferences Information market provides differentiated service to users [Luo-Gao- H ] “MINE GOLD to Deliver Green Communication in Cognitive Communications,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications , December 2015 ( IEEE WiOpt 2014 Best Paper Award) Jianwei Huang (CUHK) Communications Network Economics March 2017 6 / 40
Media Coverage Coverage by CUHK and in 20+ Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese news agencies (e.g., Mingpo, Sina, Sohu, and ChinaDaily) Jianwei Huang (CUHK) Communications Network Economics March 2017 7 / 40
Economics of User-Provided Networks Joint work with Ming Tang & Lin Gao (CUHK) Haitian Pang & Shou Wang & Lifeng Sun (Tsinghua University) Jianwei Huang (CUHK) Communications Network Economics March 2017 8 / 40
Infrastructure-Based Network 3G/4G Wi-Fi Femtocell A user obtains network connectivity from a network provider No network connectivity outside the network coverage Clear distinction between “providers” and “users” Jianwei Huang (CUHK) Communications Network Economics March 2017 9 / 40
User-Provided Network 3G/4G Wi-Fi Femtocell Users serve as micro-providers, offering connectivity to other users Exploit the diversity of user devices Extend coverage and service of network operators Better match demand and supply in heterogeneous networks Jianwei Huang (CUHK) Communications Network Economics March 2017 10 / 40
Commercial UPNs Fixed Hosts Mobile Hosts Network-Assisted Fon Karma Autonomous BeWiFi Open Garden Jianwei Huang (CUHK) Communications Network Economics March 2017 11 / 40
Costs and Incentives Resource sharing induces costs: ◮ Reduced internet access bandwidth ◮ Increased data usage cost ◮ Reduced battery energy (for mobile users) Proper incentive mechanisms are critical for the success of UPNs Jianwei Huang (CUHK) Communications Network Economics March 2017 12 / 40
Costs and Incentives Resource sharing induces costs: ◮ Reduced internet access bandwidth ◮ Increased data usage cost ◮ Reduced battery energy (for mobile users) Proper incentive mechanisms are critical for the success of UPNs We will focus on the incentive mechanism design for UPN-based mobile video streaming. Jianwei Huang (CUHK) Communications Network Economics March 2017 12 / 40
Single-User Video Streaming My downloading My downloading speed is 0.5Mbps, speed is 1Mbps, do not watch video. want to watch video. A B I can watch 240p in YouTube Live, My resource is idle. with the downloading speed of 0.5Mbps. Jianwei Huang (CUHK) Communications Network Economics March 2017 13 / 40
Multi-User Cooperative Video Streaming My downloading My downloading speed is 0.5Mbps, speed is 1Mbps, want to watch video. do not watch video. Cooperate A B I can watch 720p in YouTube Live, Resource is utilized, with the downloading any reward for me? speed of 1.5Mbps. Jianwei Huang (CUHK) Communications Network Economics March 2017 14 / 40
Crowdsourced Mobile Video Streaming Crowdsource network resources from multiple near-by mobile users from potentially different service providers. Each mobile user watches a different video. Jianwei Huang (CUHK) Communications Network Economics March 2017 15 / 40
Adaptive BitRate Streaming 1 2 3 .... 9 10 A video file 1 2 1 2 1 2 ... ... ... 0.2Mbps 0.4Mbps 1.3Mbps ... 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Play video t To achieve flexible Quality of Experience in wireless video streaming Single user case: choose the bitrate of each video segment based on real-time network conditions and user QoE preferences. Jianwei Huang (CUHK) Communications Network Economics March 2017 16 / 40
Multi-User Collaborative Video Streaming Three decisions when downloading a video segment Jianwei Huang (CUHK) Communications Network Economics March 2017 17 / 40
Multi-User Collaborative Video Streaming Three decisions when downloading a video segment Need decentralized and asynchronous algorithm without complete network information Jianwei Huang (CUHK) Communications Network Economics March 2017 17 / 40
Social Welfare, Utility, and Cost User n downloads a segment of bitrate r for user m at time t 0 Jianwei Huang (CUHK) Communications Network Economics March 2017 18 / 40
Social Welfare, Utility, and Cost User n downloads a segment of bitrate r for user m at time t 0 Social welfare W nm ( r ) � U m ( r ) − C n ( r ) Jianwei Huang (CUHK) Communications Network Economics March 2017 18 / 40
Social Welfare, Utility, and Cost User n downloads a segment of bitrate r for user m at time t 0 Social welfare W nm ( r ) � U m ( r ) − C n ( r ) Utility of receiver user m φ qd [ R pre − φ reb [ T n ( r , t 0 ) − B cur − r ] + ] + U m ( r ) � log(1 + θ m r ) − m m � �� � � �� � � �� � video quality quality degradation loss rebuffering loss ◮ (Private) valuation information θ m ◮ (Private) state information µ = ( R pre m , B cur ) m Jianwei Huang (CUHK) Communications Network Economics March 2017 18 / 40
Social Welfare, Utility, and Cost User n downloads a segment of bitrate r for user m at time t 0 Social welfare W nm ( r ) � U m ( r ) − C n ( r ) Utility of receiver user m φ qd [ R pre − φ reb [ T n ( r , t 0 ) − B cur − r ] + ] + U m ( r ) � log(1 + θ m r ) − m m � �� � � �� � � �� � video quality quality degradation loss rebuffering loss ◮ (Private) valuation information θ m ◮ (Private) state information µ = ( R pre m , B cur ) m Cost of downloader user n C n ( r ) � G cell ( r ) + E cell ( r ) + E wifi nm ( r ) n n � �� � � �� � � �� � cellular data payment cellular energy WiFi energy Jianwei Huang (CUHK) Communications Network Economics March 2017 18 / 40
Design Objectives Truthfulness: users truthfully reveal their utility functions despite of private information Efficiency: design a resource allocation mechanism to maximize the social welfare Optimality: design a resource allocation mechanism to maximize the downloader’s benefit Jianwei Huang (CUHK) Communications Network Economics March 2017 19 / 40
Design Objectives Truthfulness: users truthfully reveal their utility functions despite of private information Efficiency: design a resource allocation mechanism to maximize the social welfare Optimality: design a resource allocation mechanism to maximize the downloader’s benefit Efficiency and optimality are conflicting objectives. Jianwei Huang (CUHK) Communications Network Economics March 2017 19 / 40
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