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Brent Doberstein Banda Aceh, Indonesia Dec 26 2004 University of Waterloo 1 bdoberst@uwaterloo.ca What is failure knowledge? Disciplines using failure knowledge Use in disaster recovery Theory Practice: 2 Cases 2


  1. Brent Doberstein Banda Aceh, Indonesia Dec 26 2004 University of Waterloo 1 bdoberst@uwaterloo.ca

  2. • What is failure knowledge? • Disciplines using failure knowledge • Use in disaster recovery • Theory • Practice: 2 Cases 2

  3. • “…knowledge or understanding emerging from a systematic analysis of failure” • Ex-ante failure knowledge • Testing an experimental design or system until it fails, then improving design/system to avoid future failure • Ex-post failure knowledge • Investigating accidental failure, then improving design or system 3

  4. • Aviation industry (ex-post) • steady and consistent advances based on the “ meticulous and painstaking analysis that goes into understanding the crash of an airliner” (Cannon and Edmondson 2005, 306). 4

  5. • Aviation industry • steady and consistent advances based on the “ meticulous and painstaking analysis that goes into understanding the crash of an airliner” (Cannon and Edmondson 2005, 306). • Civil, Mechanical & Aeronautical Engineering (ex-ante & ex-post) 5

  6. Tacoma Narrows bridge, USA 6

  7. • Aviation industry • steady and consistent advances based on the “ meticulous and painstaking analysis that goes into understanding the crash of an airliner” (Cannon and Edmondson 2005, 306). • Civil & Mechanical Engineering • Resource & Environmental Management (largely ex-post) 7

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  9. Failure knowledge Failure Knowledge (ex-post) 9

  10. • “…knowledge or understanding emerging from a systematic analysis of failure” • Ex-ante failure knowledge • Testing an experimental design or system until it fails, then improving design/system to avoid future failure • Ex-post failure knowledge • Investigating accidental failure, then improving design or system PROBLEM: Generally unadvisable to stage an intentional social failure… Failure knowledge in social sciences usually learning after unintentional failure ( ex-post ) 10

  11. • Disasters: confluence of hazardous potential (e.g. flooding ) & human vulnerability (e.g. living in a floodplain ) • Failure knowledge: • reduce hazard potential • reduce human vulnerability • increase resilience in the face of disaster 11

  12. Does failure Challenges & knowledge opportunities? inform recovery? Hazard mapping Regional planning Pre- Land use planning & zoning Disaster: Risk assessment Emergency Vulnerability assessment preparedness Mitigation & Insurance plan planning Incentives & penalties Protection structures Public education Rehabilitation Recovery : Relief: Post- • Debris removal • Search/Rescue • Decrease vuln. • Public services Disaster: • Medical • Re-plan Disaster (water, elect) • Psychological • & DRR • Housing • Food aid • Rebuild Recovery • Reconnect families • Shelter • Relocate 12

  13. • Challenges: Chaotic environment • Time pressure • Simultaneous relief/rehabilitation/reconstruction • Multiple institutions & multiple agendas • Disaster profiteering • Resistance: “slow down & plan properly” • Opportunities • Aid $ • Coordinating body(ies) • New disaster recovery paradigm (2005  ) 13

  14. 1. 1999 North Vargas State, Venezuela debris flows (30-50,000 people est. killed); 2. 2004 Banda Aceh, Indonesia tsunami (80,000 est. killed) 14

  15. o 900mm of rain in 24 hrs o Simultaneous debris flows in 26 watersheds o 30-50,000 killed o Largest debris flow disaster in recent global history 15

  16. Case #1: Failure Knowledge, Disaster Causes • Rainfall • Settlement(s) location: • Alluvial fans • No watershed monitoring • Lack of hazard-oriented zoning • No warning/evacuation system • Lack of public awareness of risk • “No history of recent debris flows” • Ineffective physical protection structures 16

  17. Case #1: Disaster Recovery Little to no evidence failure knowledge influenced recovery • Recovery Philosophy: “Rebuild largely as before (1999)” • Physical protection structures • Far too small • Monitoring/warning/evacuation system • Largely absent 9 years after disaster (one siren, one community) • Public awareness • Initially high, but fading…no evidence of community awareness or preparedness exercises • Zoning: unchanged post-disaster 17

  18. Evidence: massive flow volumes High water mark 18

  19. Small-scale Engineered Solutions 19

  20. Old flood deposits 2005 „mini - flood‟ 2008 20

  21. New Destroyed in 1999 21

  22. Clock stopped when tsunami struck: 9:00am • Earthquake >9.0 strongest in >40 years • Banda Aceh “shook for over 8 minutes” • Tsunami: 20 minutes after earthquake stopped • >20% of city’s Pop’n killed 22

  23. • aftershocks Seismic energy radiated over the 1500 kms rupture zone Banda Aceh Epicentre 23

  24. Roof repair showing evidence of tsunami’s height Former hospital 24

  25. Case #2: Failure Knowledge, Disaster Causes • City location (coastal, near known fault line) • Lack of tsunami awareness • Lack of monitoring/warning/evacuation system • Housing design (single story) 25

  26. March 2009

  27. Case #1: Disaster Recovery Significant evidence failure knowledge  recovery • Recovery Philosophy: “Build Back Better” • Tsunami-resistant housing + relocation villages • Comprehensive monitoring, warning & evacuation system • Commitment to learning/failure knowledge • Public awareness & Evacuation preparedness 27

  28. Banda Aceh Relocation Village Different styles: Many tsunami resistant 28

  29. Escape building 29

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  32. Tsunami research & training

  33. Networking: South-south-north cooperation

  34. Tsunami warning drill: November 2008 34

  35. Community-Based Disaster Recovery ( CBDR ) Failure knowledge Social learning Assess & mitigate all disaster Failure knowledge causes “Platforms” (collective learning/decision- making bodies) 35

  36. “The only good thing about the bad things are the lessons learned…” (Disaster survivor, 2005) 36

  37. 37

  38. Brent Doberstein University of Waterloo 38 bdoberst@uwaterloo.ca

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