Assessing Partisan Bias in Federal Public corruption Prosecutions Sanford C. Gordon New York University 2009 報告人：謝長江 20101020 1 / 25
Goal and Finding of the Paper To assess political bias in prosecution of officials under federal corruption laws. Develop a game-theoretic model of sequential moves between officials and a prosecutor. Strong evidences of partisan bias are found by employing newly collected data. 2 / 25
Background I Significant political consequences arise from detection and prosecutions of corruption. Prosecutors: the U.S Attorneys, who are political appointees. A 2007 scandalous dismissal by Bush administration: attorneys who either did not pursue investigations against prominent Democrats, or did so against prominent Republicans. 3 / 25
Background II Some explanatory factors about corruption: Higher conviction rates in states with larger government expenditures (Goel and Nelson 1998) or urban states with less educated citizenries, more citizens with Irish or Italian ancestries, lower voter turnout, higher total government employment (Meier and Holbrook 1992). Higher perceived levels in states with closed primaries, restrictive ballot access for voter initiatives, and loose restrictions on campaign finance (alt and Lassen 2002). 4 / 25
Prosecution of Public Corruption in U.S. FIGURE 1. Disposition of State and Local Corruption Referrals from Investigative Agencies by U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, 1986–2008 Note : Outcomes not depicted include referrals in which charges were eventually folded into other cases, or in which charges were dropped and then refiled. 5 / 25
Politicization in the Literature Efforts to politicize Presidential appointments and removals (Lewis 2008; 1 Moe 1985; Nathan 1975) Phone calls inquiring about investigations 2 Institutional resilience against politicization Cultivating some degree of autonomy (Carpenter 2001) 1 Advancing ”strategically neutral” procedures (Huber 2 2007) 6 / 25
Partisan Bias in the Literature Some evidence about disportionate targeting (Meier and Holbrook 1992) Aggregate caseloads respond to national political trends (Whiteford 2002). 7 times or more probability for Democrats to be investigated by Bush Justice Department (Shields and Cragan 2007) Use of media releases Absence of partisan breakdown of those not investigated 7 / 25
The Proposed Approach The bias makes prosecution of weaker cases, which induce lower sentences for political opponents of prosecutors. Underlying interparty differences in the severity of the typical corruption case have confounding influences on sentencing. To circumvent this problem: Compare sentences handed down during adjacent administrations of different parties. Difference-in-difference (DiD) estimation is used. 8 / 25
Introduction of the Model An approach advanced by Becker (1957). An additional benefit from prosecuting opponents (or cost for prosecuting co-partisans). Concerning the outcomes, thus bypassing the problem of uncertainty regarding the full set of referrals to the U.S. Attorneys. Similar studies included: Ayres and Waldfgel (1994): Bail setting Knowles et al. (2001): Traffic stops and searches 9 / 25
Primitives and Equilibrium I One attorney ( a ) and N public officials indexed by i = 1 , . . . , N . An official is described by his partisan affiliation p i ∈ { D , R } and type m i ∈ R . Types are drawn from party-specific distributions with pdf g D ( · ) and g R ( · ), whose shapes are common knowledge to the players. 10 / 25
Primitives and Equilibrium II How the game unfolds: ✟ brings a case ✟ = 0 ✟✟✟✟✟✟✟✟ ✟✟✟✟✟✟✟✟ a i c i • • g ❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍ ❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍ ✟ ✟✟✟✟✟✟✟✟ ❍ otherwise ❍ > 0 • ❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍ 1 − unreferred g ❍ c i = levels of corruption ( c i ≥ 0). g ∈ (0 , 1). 11 / 25
Primitives and Equilibrium III Utility functions are given by N � Q i c i + b P a � � U a = A i − k and P i i =1 U i = (1 − Q i A i ) m i c i − Q i A i × S ( c i ) for all i . where: A i = 1 if a prosecutes against i , = 0 otherwise. Q i = 1 if the case of i is referred, = 0 otherwise. b , k , ∈ R with b p p ′ > b p p for p � = p ′ , b < k . S ′ ( c i ) > 0 for c i > 0 with S (0) = S ′ (0) = 0. 12 / 25
Primitives and Equilibrium IV In equilibrium, officials fall into one of three relevant categories: 1 2 3 ✲ k − b p i c ∗ 0 i 13 / 25
Empirical Implication and Identification The author further assumes that: g D ( · ) and g R ( · ) are ordered by monotone likelihood ratio (MLR) dominance. g D ( · ) and g R ( · ) do not change drastically over adjacent administrations. 14 / 25
Identification Strategy I FIGURE 2. Potential Threats to Inferring Bias Stemming from Underlying Interparty Differences in Returns to Corrupt Activity: (A) Confounding Yields Overestimate of Partisan Bias, (B) Confounding Yields Underestimate of Partisan Bias Note : In the situation depicted in (A), the equilibrium distribution of (prosecuted) corruption for party R dominates that of party D , leading to a lower average sentence for party D even in the absence of prosecutorial partisan bias against party D . In the situation depicted in (B), the equilibrium distribution of corruption for party D dominates that of party R , pushing the average sentence for party D up relative to that of party R ; if the average sentence for party D is still lower than that of party R , the source of the disparity must be prosecutorial bias. 15 / 25
Identification Strategy II Let E [ S | p i , p a ] be expected sentence of i under administration of party p a . the sample analog of the quantity (DiD) ( E [ S | p i = R , p a = R ] − E [ S | p i = D , p a = R ]) − ( E [ S | p i = R , p a = D ] − E [ s | p i = D , p a = D ]) provides a measure of the total extent of partisan bias among two adjacent administrations of different parties. The estimator does not allow apportion between two administrations. 16 / 25
Discussion of the Model Not distinguishing between trial and plea bargaining S ( c i ) represents expected sentences for the offense Assuming apolitical referral and sentencing process The evidence of partisan bias may be attributed to the Justice Department as a whole. Assuming that referral accurately reflects the level of corruption. Incorporation of uncertainty will allow the inference of equilibrium indictment threshold. Uncovering the marginal sentence is empirically difficult. 17 / 25
Description of Data Two samples of state and local corruption prosecutions First: during Bush, 2004 ∼ 2006. Second: during Clinton, 1998 ∼ 2000. Collection is involved (83% of defendants are identified) Match the filing date and details to identify names of defendants. Match the judge’s name, sentencing time and defendant’s position with news articles. Through phone calls and Internet 18 / 25
Partisan Composition of Defendants TABLE 1. Partisan Affiliation of Public Corruption Prosecution Defendants, Bush and Clinton Samples Bush Sample Clinton Sample 2004–2006 1998–2000 Public Private All Public Private All Dem affiliated 49 35 84 36 13 49 Rep affiliated 8 15 23 14 14 28 Other 78 36 114 107 39 146 Ratio (Dem/Rep) 6.13 2.33 3.65 2.57 0.93 1.75 Ratio (Dem/non-Dem) 0.57 0.69 0.61 0.3 0.25 0.28 Ratio (Rep/non-Rep) 0.06 0.21 0.12 0.1 0.27 0.14 19 / 25
Descriptive Results TABLE 2. Descriptive Indicators of Partisan Bias in Sentencing: Administration-specific Differences Between Republican and Democratic Defendants and Differences-in-Differences Prison Only Incorporating Probation Defendant Party/ Mean Dif. in Means Dif. in Difs. Mean Dif. in Means Dif. in Difs. Prosecuting Administration (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) All Partisan-Affiliated Defendants Republicans under Bush 28.39 38.06 Democrats under Bush 20.07 8.32 (.17) 29.59 8.48 (.17) Republicans under Clinton 12.39 14.85 (.06) 22.42 15.14 (.06) Democrats under Clinton 18.92 − 6.53 (.04) 29.08 − 6.66 (.06) Public Employee Defendants Republicans under Bush 39.25 51.25 Democrats under Bush 19.9 19.35 (.07) 29.55 21.7 (.05) Republicans under Clinton 10.79 30.32 (.01) 21.41 32.34 (.01) Democrats under Clinton 21.75 − 10.96 (.003) 32.05 − 10.64 (.01) Private Citizen Defendants Republicans under Bush 22.6 31.03 Democrats under Bush 20.31 2.29 (.42) 29.64 1.39 (.45) Republicans under Clinton 14 − .64 (.52) 23.43 − 1.18 (.53) Democrats under Clinton 11.08 2.92 (.68) 20.86 2.57 (.64) Notes : Sentences and differences in columns (1) through (3) denote months of incarceration placing zero value on probation; sentences in columns (4) through (6) are calculated as 0.2 times the number of months of probation in the sentence if the sentence is solely probationary, and 12 plus the number of months of incarceration plus 0.2 times the number of months of probation if the sentence includes imprisonment (see text for additional explanation). One-tailed p values in parentheses. 20 / 25
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