approximate reconstruction of encrypted databases
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Approximate reconstruction of encrypted databases Paul Grubbs, Marie-Sarah Lacharit, Brice Minaud, Kenny Paterson Information Security Group ESSA2, Bertinoro, 9th July 2018 Situation overview General message from previous talk: Dont use

  1. Approximate reconstruction of encrypted databases Paul Grubbs, Marie-Sarah Lacharité, Brice Minaud, Kenny Paterson Information Security Group ESSA2, Bertinoro, 9th July 2018

  2. Situation overview General message from previous talk: Don’t use range queries with access pattern leakage! Closer look: ‣ KKNO16 : full reconstruction… - Assuming i.i.d. uniform queries. - O( N 4 log N ) queries. ‣ Kenny’s talk : full reconstruction… - Assuming density. - O( N log N ) queries. 2

  3. Approximate reconstruction New goal: δ -approximate reconstruction . Recover the values of records within δ N . LMP18 approximate attack but: only improvement in log factor, complicated analysis, requires density… ➞ We would like to get best possible reconstruction with given queries. And handle large N ’s. And get rid of the density assumption, and i.i.d. queries. Two new tools : ‣ VC theory (machine learning). ‣ PQ-trees . 3

  4. Plan 1. VC theory. 2. PQ trees. 4

  5. VC theory

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  7. <latexit sha1_base64="UfpOiKm2RL8/P6WTnBh3SDiIqYU=">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</latexit> <latexit sha1_base64="UfpOiKm2RL8/P6WTnBh3SDiIqYU=">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</latexit> <latexit sha1_base64="UfpOiKm2RL8/P6WTnBh3SDiIqYU=">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</latexit> <latexit sha1_base64="UfpOiKm2RL8/P6WTnBh3SDiIqYU=">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</latexit> VC theory Vapnik and Chervonenkis, 1971. Now you have a set 𝓓 of concepts. The set of samples drawn from X is an ε -sample i ff for all C in 𝓓 : � � � Pr( C ) − #points in C � � � ≤ ✏ � � #points total V & C 1971: If 𝓓 has VC dimension d , then the number of points X to get an ε -sample whp is O( d / ε 2 log d / ε ). 7

  8. VC dimension 1 N X 𝓓 = ranges A set S of points in X is shattered by 𝓓 i ff every subset of S can be written in the form C ∩ S for some C in 𝓓 . shattered X not shattered X The VC dimension of 𝓓 is the largest cardinality d such that every subset of X of size d is shattered. e.g. for ranges the VC dimension is 2. 8

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