Applying F(I)MEA Technique for SDN/OpenFlow Security Analysis Green - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Applying F(I)MEA Technique for SDN/OpenFlow Security Analysis Green Kim greenkim@konkuk.ac.kr

Contents 1. Introduction 1.1 Motivation 1.2 Related Works Analysis 1.2.1 OpenFlow: A Security Analysis 1.2.2 OpenFlow Vulnerability Assessment 1.2.3 Towards Secure and Dependable Software-Defined Networks 1.2.4 Evaluation of Security Vulnerabilities by Using ProtoGENI as a Launchpad 2. Security Issues associated with the SDN 3. Failure (Intrusion) Modes and Effects Analysis 3.1 Taxonomy of issues 3.2 Analysis Technique 4. Case study of F(I)MEA Technique 5. Conclusion 6. Future Works 2

1. Introduction 1.1 Motivation 1.2 Related Works Analysis 1.2.1OpenFlow:ASecurityAnalysis 1.2.2OpenFlowVulnerabilityAssessment 1.2.3TowardsSecureandDependableSoftware-DefinedNetworks 1.2.4EvaluationofSecurityVulnerabilitiesbyUsingProtoGENIasaLaunchpad 3

1. Introduction (1/2) • SDN is rapidly moving from vision to reality – Host of SDN-enabled devices in development and production – The combination of separated control and data plane functionality and programmability in the network have found their commercial application in cloud computing and virtualization technology • The SDN architecture can be exploited to enhance network security – Provision of highly reactive security monitoring, analysis and response time – The central controller is key to this system • Deploy traffic analysis or anomaly-detection 4 %SDN : Software Defined Networks

1. Introduction (2/2) • However, the same attributes of centralized control and programmability associated with the SDN platform introduce network security challenges – An increased potential for Denial-of-Service attacks • Centralized controller and flow-table limitation in network device – Another issue of concern based on open programmability of the network is trust • Between applications and controllers • Between controllers and network devices • An Analysis technique for SDN security is required 5

1.1 Motivation (1/3) • OpenFlow is a standardized protocol which implements the notion ofSDN – Theseparationofthenetworkcontrolplanefromthedataplane – ALogicallycentralizedcontroller • OpenFlow is used for the interaction between a network switch, constituting the data plane, and a controller, constituting the controlplane – Theswitchperformspacketforwardingusingoneormoreflowtables • Theflowrulesareinstalledontheswitchbythecontroller – The controller can choose to install flow rules proactively on its own accord, or reactively in response to a notification by the switch regarding a packet failing to matchexistingrules 6

1.1 Motivation (2/3) • OpenFlow has seen widespread deployment on production networksanditsadoptionisconstantlyincreasing • Although openness and programmability are primary features of OpenFlow,Securityisofcoreimportanceforreal-worlddeployment • AnumberofSecurityAnalysishaverecentlybeenperformed – Security Analysis have performed that the altered elements relationship betweenelementsintheSDNframeworkintroducenewvulnerabilities • VulnerabilitieswerenotpresentbeforeSDN 7

1.1 Motivation (3/3) • Whenfocusingonsecurity,analysisiscalledsecurityevaluation • FaultForecasting • qualitative, or ordinal, evaluation that aims to identify, classify, and rank the failure modes, or the event combinations (component failures or environmental conditions)thatwouldleadtosystemfailures • qualitativeevaluation:e.g.,failuremodeandeffectanalysis • quantitative, or probabilistic, evaluation that aims to evaluate in terms of probabilities the extent to which some of the attributes are satisfied; those attributesarethenviewedasmeasures Basic Concepts and Taxonomy of Dependable and Secure Computing. 2004 8

1.2 Related Works Analysis 1.2.1OpenFlow:ASecurityAnalysis(2013) 1.2.2OpenFlowVulnerabilityAssessment (2013) 1.2.3TowardsSecureandDependableSoftware-DefinedNetworks(2013) 1.2.4EvaluationofSecurityVulnerabilitiesbyUsingProtoGENIasaLaunchpad(2011) 9

1.2 Related Works Analysis 1.2.1OpenFlow:ASecurityAnalysis(2013) → EvaluationofPossibility 1.2.2OpenFlowVulnerabilityAssessment (2013) → EvaluationofPossibility 1.2.3TowardsSecureandDependableSoftware-DefinedNetworks(2013) → High-levelanalysisoftheoverallsecurityofSDN 1.2.4EvaluationofSecurityVulnerabilitiesbyUsingProtoGENIasaLaunchpad(2011) → EvaluationofPossibility % possibility of any event is always 1 or 0 i.e. 'yes' or 'no'. If an event is possible, how likely will its occurrence be, under a given situation is probability 10

1.2.1 OpenFlow : A Security Analysis (1/2) • This research Combines two modeling techniques – Microsoft’s STRIDE methodology • STRIDE methodology is used to construct a model of and OpenFlow system and enumerate its potential vulnerabilities • S poofing, T ampering, R epudiation, I nformation Disclosure, D enial of Service, and E levation of Privilege • The result of this analysis is a set of system component and vulnerability pairs – Attack trees • Attack trees is used to explore how an identified vulnerability could be exploited • The root of an attack tree is an attacker’s ultimate objective 11

1.2.1 OpenFlow : A Security Analysis (2/2) OpenFlow : A Security Analysis. 2013. • Although a number of mitigation techniques are proposed in this paper, these techniques are not proven in the work 12

1.2.2 OpenFlow Vulnerability Assessment • This research suggests the possibility of attacks OpenFlow Vulnerability Assessment. 2013. 13

1.2.3 Towards Secure and Dependable Software-Defined Networks • This research presents a high-level analysis of the overall security of SDN • They conclude that due to the nature of the centralized controller and the programmability of the network, net threats are introduced requiring new responses 14 T owards Secure and Dependable Software-Defined Networks. 2013.

1.2.4 Evaluation of Security Vulnerabilities by Using ProtoGENI as a Launchpad • The authors discovered that numerous attacks between users of the testbed along with malicious propagation and flooding attacks to the wider internet were possible when using the ProtoGENI network Evaluation of Security Vulnerabilities by Using ProtoGENI as a Launchpad 15 %ProtoGENI : Prototype control framework implementation of GENI (Global Environment for Network Innovations)

2. Security Issues associated with the SDN (1/4) • The basic properties of a security communications network • Confidentiality • Integrity • Availability of information • Authentication • Non-repudiation → Secure data, network assets and communications transactions 16

2. Security Issues associated with the SDN (2/4) • SDN Characteristics (4) Network Services 3 rd Party Applications Load balancers Routing (6) Configuration Controller Cluster Monitoring Units (1) Point Cluster Analysis Master Slave 1 Slave 2 Data Collector Engine Master Network Hypervisors Enforcement Layer Slave 1 (2) (3) (1) Logically Centralized Control Slave 2 (2) Open Programmable Interfaces Packet Forwarding (3) Switch Management Protocol (4) 3 rd -party Network Services (5) Packet Forwarding Packet Forwarding (5) Virtualized Logical Networks (6) Centralized Monitoring Units Packet Forwarding ‘A Survey of Security in Software Defined Networks’, IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, 2015. 17

2. Security Issues associated with the SDN (3/4) • SDN Potential Attacks and Vulnerabilities (d) Network Services Control Interfaces 3 rd Party Applications Load balancers Routing Data path traffic Configuration Controller Cluster Analytics Units (a) Point Cluster Analysis Master Slave 1 Slave 2 Data Collector Engine Master Network Hypervisors Enforcement Layer Slave 1 (c) (e) (f) a. UnauthorizedAccess(AllLayers/Interfaces) Slave 2 Packet Forwarding b. DataLeakage(DataLayer) c. DataModification(Ctl-DataLayer) d. Malicious/CompromisedApplication(App-CtlLayer) (b) Packet Forwarding Packet Forwarding e. DenialofService(Ctl-DataLayer) f. ConfigurationIssues(AllLayers/Interfaces) Packet Forwarding ‘A Survey of Security in Software Defined Networks’, IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, 2015. 18

2. Security Issues associated with the SDN (4/4) • Categorization of Security Issues SDN Layer Affected or Targeted Security Issue/Attack Application Layer App-CtlInterface Control Layer Ctl-Data Interface Data Layer Unauthorized Access e.g. • Unauthorized Controller Access/Controller Hijacking X X X • Unauthorized/Unauthenticated Application X X X Data Leakage e.g. • Flow Rule Discovery (Side Channel Attack on Input Buffer) X • Credential Management (Keys, Certificates for each Logical Network) X • Forwarding Policy Discovery (Packet Processing Timing Analysis) X X X Data Modification e.g. • Flow Rule Modification to Modify Packets (Man-in-the-middle attack) X X X Malicious/compromised Applications e.g. • Fraudulent Rule Insertion X X X Denial of Services e.g. • Controller-Switch Communication Flood X X X • Switch Flow Table Flooding X Configuration Issues e.g. • Lack of TLS(or other Authentication Technique) Adoption X X X X X • Policy Enforcement X X X • Lack of Secure Provisioning X X X X X System Level SDN Security e.g. • Lack of Visibility of Network State X X X ‘SDN Security: A Survey’, IEEE SDN for Future Networks and Services, 2013. 19

3. Failure (Intrusion) Modes and Effect Analysis 3.1 Taxonomy of issues 3.2AnalysisTechnique 20