and password. The app will send the phones ID (IMEI) to the Netpay - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Jan 22, 2023 •301 likes •436 views

On the sign in page, the merchant will sign in with his merchant ID and password. The app will send the phones ID (IMEI) to the Netpay system which in response, will create an activation code. The unique activation code will be

On the sign in page, the merchant will sign in with his merchant ID and password. The app will send the phones ’ ID (IMEI) to the Netpay system which in response, will create an activation code.
The unique activation code will be sent via SMS to the merchant ’ s phone. The merchant will then enter the activation code and the system will check the correlation between the code and the IMEI. This will enable Netpay to control the merchant ’ s terminals.
On the menu screen the merchant can choose between starting a new payment process and reviewing his payment history. The history function enables the merchant to go over the last transactions made throw the mobile terminal, this will help the merchant to follow up and send out receipts.
On the payment screen the merchant will determine the payment details such as: Payment amount – Payment details what was the purpose of the purchase. Presets – the merchant could predetermine 3 payment presets that, with the touch of a button, will allow him to move to the next step.
After the merchant defines the payment details, he will be asked to swipe the card using the Netpay card swiper. The combination of the Netpay mobile app and card swiper allows the merchant to send threw all the details required ‘ card present ’ for a transaction.
In cases where the merchant is not able to swipe the card, the merchant will be able to manual input the card ’ s details. The merchant will then be asked to take a photo of the card to prove that the card was present at the moment of the payment.
The next step is filling in the card holder ’ s details , the required fields could be predetermined by Netpay or the merchant. The client information fields will be used at the end of the process, in order to send a payment confirmation either via email or SMS.
The payment review page After making sure all the includes all details that are payment details are relevant to the transaction. correct, the last step is for the card holder to sign for After reviewing the the transaction and to payment and send the payment. acknowledging the information, the merchant After the payment is sent is just one step away from for processing, the finishing the transaction. merchant will receive one of two messages: The information on this page will be used in the history page for the merchants ’ convenience.
After making sure all the payment details are correct, the last step is for the card holder to sign for the transaction and to send the payment. After the payment is sent for processing, the merchant will receive one of two messages:
THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION www.netpay-intl.com

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