2
play

2 Transportation Card Access Card - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Mar 13, 2023 •114 likes •442 views

2 Transportation Card Access Card Credit Card Any potential security risk with these cards? Any potential security risk with these cards? 3 Thievery Loss Why cant these

  2. 2

  3. Transportation Card Access Card Credit Card Any potential security risk with these cards? Any potential security risk with these cards? 3

  4. Thievery Loss Why can’t these cards resist loss and thievery? Why can’t these cards resist loss and thievery? 4

  5. Sth you have? Who are you? 5

  6. Device Authentication User(Biometric) Authentication 6

  7. Issues with these approaches:  Not convenient  Not easy to customize  Not light-weight  Not fast to implement  Not low cost  … 7

  8. User-dependent & Unique User-dependent & Unique

  9. Our goal Device Authentication Device Authentication User Authentication User Authentication Light-weight Counterfeiting Low-cost Impersonation Universal Replay 9

  10. Radiative & Inductive coupling 10

  11. Observation 1 --- Impact of tag coupling  Tags in a vicinity  Their circuit characteristics change. 11

  12. Observation 1 --- Impact of tag coupling  What will happen if we collect their phases together? 12

  13. Why does the phase change due to coupling? 13

  14. Observation 2 Impact of human impedance 14

  15. Why does phase change with fingertip touch? 15

  16. User-dependent & Unique Phase Fingerprint Phase Difference of Tags (PDoT) 16

  17. Challenge 1 The impact of touching is unstable. 17

  18. Tackle with challenge 1 Introduce a conductor Complexity of coupling & Size of array Complexity of coupling & Size of array 18

  19. Challenge 2 Phases change with distance. 19

  20. Tackle with challenge 2 Phase shifting algorithm 20

  21. Tackle with challenge 2 Phase shifting algorithm Max PDoT Get phase fingerprint at this status Max PDoT Max PDoT 21

  22. Tackle with challenge 2 Phase shifting algorithm 22

  23. Challenge 3 Impact of accessories r=ring w=watch n=necklace 23

  24. 1. Impinj R420 reader 2. Larid antenna A9028 3. Alien-9629 tag 24

  25. Overall accuracy vs. Human diversity • 7 females + 8 males • 15 representative tag array layouts Accuracy > 99% 25

  26. Resisting impersonation attack • 10 attackers try to use an authorized user’s credential to access the system. Maximum FRR < 0.1 FAR < 0.05 26

  27. Resisting counterfeiting attack • Attacker produces a counterfeited array with the same tag model and layout. - 90 Alien-9629 tags - 10 arrays Average FAR < 0.01 FRR < 0.005 Tags’ hardware differences will reflect in phases. 27

  28. Resisting replay attack • Effective read range < 30cm Tolerable space angle of tag rotation < 10 ° • (w.r.t. x-y-z axis) 28

  29. Accuracy vs. distance ± 4cm region > 90% accuracy Effective authentication range 15cm 29

  30. Accuracy vs. rotation and accessories Tolerable space angle < 10 ° 30

  31. • Converting an array of tags attached on a card into an effective authentication credential. • Light-weight, low-cost, universal solution for a fingertip profiled RF identifier, authenticating both the card and its holder’s identity simultaneously. • Demonstrated a working system implemented purely based on COTS RFID devices. 31

Recommend

More recommend