11 july 2017 ruth taillon director centre for cross
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11 July 2017 Ruth Taillon, Director Centre for Cross Border Studies - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Brexit and its Border Implications Presentation to Fianna Fil 11 July 2017 Ruth Taillon, Director Centre for Cross Border Studies 39 Abbey Street, Armagh BT61 7EB r.taillon@qub.ac.uk 2 The centrality of the border to the conflict --


  1. Brexit and its Border Implications Presentation to Fianna Fáil 11 July 2017 Ruth Taillon, Director Centre for Cross Border Studies 39 Abbey Street, Armagh BT61 7EB r.taillon@qub.ac.uk

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  3.  The centrality of the border to the conflict -- increased dangers arising from uncertainties about the nature of the border  Increased tensions re Migration and citizenship issues  Social and economic cohesion in the border region and other disadvantaged areas at risk  The commitment to cross-border cooperation embedded in the Good Friday Agreement must remain a priority before and after ‘Brexit’ 3

  4.  A consensus on protecting the 1998 Agreement  the specific circumstances pertaining to the island of Ireland  the border between Northern Ireland and Ireland  the peace process  The 1998 Agreement is an ideal vehicle for maintaining the current socio-economic relations between Northern Ireland and Ireland, and between the island of Ireland and Great Britain following the UK’s exit from the European Union. 4

  5. “Our commitment to the 1998 Belfast Agreement and its successors, together with the institutions they establish, is undiminished .” “As we leave the European Union we recognise Northern Ireland’s unique circumstances and will seek to ensure that Northern Ireland’s interests are protected . “We will maintain the Common Travel Area and maintain as frictionless a border as possible for people, goods and services between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland .” 5

  6. The Great Repeal Bill will convert EU law into  UK law, …. Once EU law has been converted into  domestic law, parliament will be able to pass legislation to amend, repeal or “improve” any piece of EU law it chooses, “We will not bring the European Union’s  Charter of Fundamental Rights into UK law .” “We will not repeal or replace the Human  Rights Act while the process of Brexit is underway but we will consider our human rights legal framework when the process of leaving the EU concludes .” “We will remain signatories to the European  Convention on Human Rights for the duration of the next parliament .” 6

  7. European Convention on Human Rights Withdrawal from the ECHR could place Britain in breach of its international obligations in the 1998 Good Friday agreement :  the two communities in Northern Ireland would be protected by safeguards that include “the European Convention on Human Rights and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland supplementing it, which neither the Assembly nor public bodies can infringe”. 7

  8.  Acts of the Northern Ireland Assembly  Must be compatible with Convention rights  Must be compatible with Community law  Shall not modify the European Communities Act 1972 or the Human Rights Act 1998  Article 12: “Reconsideration where reference made to EJC” “(3)In this section “reference for a preliminary ruling” means a reference of a question to the European Court of Justice … ” 8

  9. U.K. Shared Prosperity Fund to replace the EU Structural Funds: “specifically designed to reduce inequalities between communities across our four nations” “Current EU- wide structural funding … is expensive to administer and poorly targeted .” “The money … will help deliver sustainable, inclusive growth based on our modern industrial strategy .” While there “may be specific European programmes in which we might want to participate and if so, it will be reasonable that we make a contribution” but “… the days of Britain making vast annual contributions to the European Union will end .” 9

  10. EU cross-border programmes ( PEACE and INTERREG ) mirror the objectives of the NSMC in the 1998 Agreement:  “to develop consultation, co -operation and action within the island of Ireland – including on an all-island and cross-border basis – on matters of mutual interest”.  funded projects contribute to the further embedding of Strand II 10

  11. EU Community Funding: PEACE and INTERREG Programmes Ireland/Northern Ireland 1994-2020 PEACE PROGRAMME INTERREG A INTERREG IA 76 m ECU Peace I (1994-99) 500m ECU INTERREG IIA 165m ECU Peace II (2000-2006) € 995m INTERREG IIIA € 137m Peace III (2007-2013) € 225m INTERREG IVA € 192m Peace IV (2014-2020) € 229m INTERREG V € 240m 11

  12.  Co-operation across EU’s external frontiers is facilitated & supported by framework for European Territorial Co-operation (e.g. Norway, Switzerland and third countries or territories neighbouring outermost regions) BUT  Continued participation in EU cross-border cooperation programmes would require adherence to EU cohesion policy, EU regulations and continued financial contributions.  Cooperation can take place outside the EU funding programmes (e.g.: Karlsruhe Agreement (1996) between France, Luxembourg, Germany and Switzerland facilitates and promotes cross-border cooperation between local and regional authorities and local public institutions BUT  Cross-border cooperation requires both political will and financial resources 12

  13. Risks of the UK withdrawal from the EU / loss of EU funds:  cross-border cooperation will be given less priority by the governments in Belfast, Dublin and London  policy divergence may make the conditions for cross-border cooperation more difficult, increasingly reverting to ‘back -to- back’ policy development  reduction of funding for cross-border cooperation increases the likelihood of a return to piecemeal cooperation with little regional impact  CSOs and LAs will struggle to replace EU programme funds – loss of key personnel and ‘soft infrastructure’ 13

  14.  the ‘soft infrastructure’ to support cross-border cooperation – must be protected and nurtured  statutory cross-border bodies  links at Departmental and local government level  civil society networks and projects  existing EU directives and regulations should remain in place until proposed changes have comprehensive territorial, equality and environmental impact assessment 14

  15.  Continued eligibility of Northern Ireland in the European Territorial Cooperation Programmes and transnational programmes e.g. Horizon 2020, Erasmus+, Life and Europe for Citizens  Additional ‘Peace’ funding allocated to address the challenges of inter-community conflict and cross-border relationships (Peace IV and a new Peace V)  Irish and UK Governments ensure new and sufficient resources are available for the social and economic development of the border region , including local authority- and civic society-led projects  On the UK side, additional funding allocations should be derived from the UK’s current contribution to the EU budget that will revert to the Treasury post-withdrawal, not from the ‘block grant’  A Social Cohesion Programme for these islands , funded by the UK and Irish Governments – modelled on Peace I and II – to promote and support social cohesion and good relations between the island of Ireland and GB 15

  16. “Flexible and imaginative solutions”: The 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement as a framework for post-Brexit relations within and between these islands  1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement should not be viewed simply as a problem to be overcome during the negotiations over the UK’s exit from the EU, but also as a potential “flexible and imaginative” solution to the maintenance of post-Brexit relations.  the framework provided for by the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement must be a minimum conclusion to the negotiations. 16

  17.  Protecting the integrity of the Agreement means not only ensuring the continuing free movement of Irish and UK citizens between their jurisdictions, but also the free movement of goods and services  Accommodations will have to taking into account the Irish Government’s continuing responsibilities as a co-guarantor of the 1998 Belfast/GFA and the potential economic consequences faced by the [Republic of] Ireland.  An outcome that ensured cross-border trade on the island of Ireland, but not between the Republic of Ireland and Great Britain, would not significantly reduce the disturbance to the Irish economy and would require Ireland receiving greater support from the EU. 17

  18. Model 1: Model 1 Republic of Ireland is in the EU/EEA area through its membership of the European Union, but is also within another area as a 1998 Belfast/Good EU/EEA Area Republic of Friday Agreement Ireland Area co-guarantor of the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement and its membership of the institutions under Strands II and III of that Agreement. goods, services and people flow freely  Strands II and III institutions would gain  between the Republic of Ireland and the greater prominence as coordinating United Kingdom . bodies and spaces for significant dialogue Goods and services from the United  Ireland, as a Member State and within the Kingdom would not travel further than  jurisdiction of the EU Court of would the Republic of Ireland, and continue to ensure the integrity of the Goods and services from the United  Single Market and to uphold the values of Kingdom have to adhere to all relevant the EU. EU regulations and standards the UK must continue to largely mirror  EU tariffs with third countries 18

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